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By

JUSTICE SIR MANMATHA NATH MUKHERJEE,

M.A., B.L. KT.

Acting Chief Justice of Bengal.

I deem it a high honor to be called upon to open the eleventh session of the Indian Philosophical Congress. It was not without hesitation that I responded to your call and it is not without a degree of diffidence that I have risen to address you ; for I am keenly alive to the responsibilities of this office, which, much as I would desire, I cannot discharge to my entire satisfaction on account of two prominent causes, if not more : firstly the time at my disposal has been too short to enable me to get myself ready ; and secondly, what is more, I have never been a student of philosophy. But when I secretly disclosed this latter inherent deficiency in myself to my esteemed friend Dr. Urquhart, the Chairman of your Reception Committee, he gave me an assurance which I shall take the liberty of divulging before you and which dispelled all any nervousness. He said to me that the very fact that I have never studied philosophy was likely to make me a better philosopher. I have, therefore, consented to stand before you and say a few words. Ladies and Gentlemen ! I have no doubt, however, that you will abide by these enforced limitations of mine.

What I feel in being thus called upon to address a distinguished gathering of professional Philosophers is, I confess, that it provides no occasion for apologetic observations or conventional platitudes. For I am persuaded to believe that

philosophical thinking is not one profession alongside of others, necessitating, as it does, some peculiar equipments and entailing some peculiar disciplines, out of the reach of all and sundry. On the contrary it has a universality of appeal which makes it out to be the most humanistic of all intellectual pursuits. A philosopher is he who is accustomed, by training and temperament, to "see life steadily and see it whole". But fallen, as we are, on the evil days of specialisation, we have come to lose this art,—the art of taking a whole view of things and men. As it has been wisely observed, the specialist knows more and more of the less and less. Accordingly, it is not so much the subject-matter with which one deals but the *way* in which one deals with it that serves to differentiate the unphilosophical from the philosophical mind. That is just the reason why the frontier quarrels between Science and Philosophy are steadily becoming things of the past, and bonafide scientists like Bertrand Russell, Whitehead, J. S. Haldane, Sir Arthur Eddington, Sir James Jeans, Einstein and the entire galaxy of such first-rate scientists of to-day, are turning philosophers and tackling those problems of the 'whence' and 'whither' of men and things which are still an anathema in orthodox quarters.

It is exactly after ten years that Calcutta welcomes you once again, the philosophers of our country. To Calcutta belongs the credit of having inaugurated the Indian Philosophical Congress, and it was in the fitness of things that you on that occasion invited the poet-philosopher of international repute, Dr. Rabindra Nath Tagore, to deliver the inaugural address. Those of you who had the privilege of listening to his inimitable address on "The Philosophy of our People" will certainly recall with pleasure those typically Oriental flashes of insight with which that edifying discourse abounds. Although we miss his inspiring presence to-day in this Hall, we brace our hearts with the assurance that his

blessings are with us. We have to-day in our midst one who brings to bear on our deliberations the mellowed fruits of scholarship as well as piety. Endowed with a truly Christian 'charity' in St Paul's sense of the term, Principal Dr. A. G. Hogg, has, in the South, endeared himself in a manner which has hardly a parallel anywhere. Perhaps it would not be impertinent to suggest that it is the holy alliance between his faith and practice, so ably effected in his own life that has earned for him the unstinted esteem and reverential veneration of at least two generations of students. This, above all, has a perennial appeal for the Oriental mind, and we greet him as one of our own, recruited to the long apostolic succession of *Āchāryyas* in this ancient land of ours.

It is a matter of genuine satisfaction that under the auspices of the Indian Philosophical Congress, the Calcutta Philosophical Society celebrates this year the completion of the twenty-fifth year of its existence, and offers its felicitations to Dr. Sir Brajendra Nath Seal who was one of its most distinguished Vice-Presidents. We cannot afford in this connection to forget its founder the late Dr. P. K. Ray, who had, by ceaseless care and devotion, kept it alive during the early days of its existence,—a no mean achievement in this unhappy land where infantile mortality in individuals as well as in institutions, is abnormally high. To him we offer our tribute of respect and reverence. We remember again with veneration that saintly character, Dr. Henry Stephen, who nursed this infant institution into youthful vigour through his ungrudging service and support. Of him it is well-nigh impossible to speak with restraint for his sphere of influence did not restrict itself to the Philosophical Society alone but was co-extensive with the entire Student Community of Bengal. In literalness of fact he lived and worked for Indian students and at death he dedicated his all to these very students who were so dear to his

heart. Whether in the scholarly seclusion of his studious cloister at the Bristol Hotel or in select association of young minds, Dr. Stephen worked unsparingly for the much-maligned 'youngsters' of our country. Bound by indissoluble ties of love and affections, the memories of Dr. Ray and Dr. Stephen are still with us, animating us with the hope, 'that creates itself out of its own wreck.' Happily, there is still spared to us one out of this galaxy of patron saints, Dr. Seal, whom we are expecting to honour this afternoon. It is pathetic to note how this encyclopædic mind has been fighting against tremendous odds to bequeath its rich legacy to the future generations. The exact extent of his scholarship and intellectual powers is known only to those who have had the privilege of coming in intimate touch with him. Suffice it to note that one of this group, Dr. Sir Michael Sadler (who has just sent his tribute of respect on this happy occasion) acclaims him as one of his *Gurus*,—testifies to what Dr. Seal has "taught" him "during many long and intimate discussions about Education and about the needs or genius of India." It is some consolation to learn that Dr. Seal in his hitherto unpublished poem "The Quest Eternal" (to be shortly published by the Oxford University Press) has acquainted us with the growth of his intellectual life. May he be spared to us for years to come !

Today we are painfully conscious of the fact that we are the unworthy legatees of the cultural inheritance of Bengal which once boasted of the Karikās of Gaudāpada and Madhusudan Saraswatī of Brahmānanda Saraswati, Ramananda Vachaspati and Krishnakanta Vidyavagisa, of Vasudeva Sarvabhauma and Gadadhara, of Viswanath Nyayapanchanan and Rādhāmohan Vidyāvāchaspati, of Raghunātha and Raghunandana, of Krishnānanda Agambāgisha and Chaitanya—the great master and founder of Neo-Vaishnava School—, of Siva Goswami and Valadeva Vidyabhusana, of Sanatana and Rupa Goswami, of

Silābhadrā and Sāntideva, of Santaraksita and Dipankara, of Luipada and Ramachandra Kavibhārati* in the different schools of philosophical thought. We offer in deep humility their legacy to you along with the no less noteworthy contributions of contemporary Bengal.

For the distracted world of today, the philosophers, particularly the Orientals, have got an important contribution to make. The East may be a negligible partner in the geographical dispensation of the League of Nations ; but not so, as we believe, on the spiritual side of it. The star has always risen in the East, and 'eastern lights', to use the happy phrase of one of our leading thinkers, are being hailed from unexpected quarters. As representing the Western point of view, Dr. Jung has truly remarked,—“It is the East that has taught another wide, more profound and *a higher understanding through life.*” Truly, in the East, Philosophy has never served as an intellectual pastime merely, but always in its classical sense of a Way of Life,—life being in ultimate analysis the only effective commentary upon theory. Such an outlook upon life may not commend itself to all. But it is there, as a silent preacher in the background, and greets us across the perspective of centuries. Therein consists the individuality of Indian thought and culture ; and at this thought-exchange of this world it would be courting sheer bankruptcy if we were to undervalue our own thought-currency in order to secure an international credit.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I do not desire to stand any longer

**Vide* Prof. C. Chakravarti's excellent article on “*Bengal's Contribution to Philosophical Literature in Sanskrit*” Indian 'Antiquary Vol. LVIII & I. LIX.

between you and our President, whom you are all eager to hear.

I now open formally the Proceedings of the Eleventh Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress and invite Dr. A. G. Hogg to deliver his Presidential Address.

The Claim of Society on the Metaphysically-Minded

**PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS**

1935

By

THE REV. A. G. HOGG, M.A., D. LITT., D.D.

It would be unbecoming to enter upon this Presidential Address without first expressing my sense of the honour of being selected for so distinguished an office. It is an honour which I had great diffidence in accepting. I should have had the same feeling even if the invitation had come to me in the years when I could still count myself an active explorer in those regions of thought which absorb the chief interest of the philosophical mind. All the greater is my diffidence now, conscious as I am that for the last seven or eight years an imperious combination of circumstances has constrained me to let administrative responsibility rule out all chance of systematic study. If I have consented nevertheless to accept the invitation with which you have honoured me, it is only because usage enjoins that a Presidential Address shall not be a learned

treatment of the latest technical issue that has come under discussion by the specialists, but shall be of the broader character that may interest the philosophically minded layman. For the preparation of an address of that nature there is a qualification of greater importance than familiarity with all the latest monographs, and that qualification is a life-long sensitiveness to the vital human significance of the major issues of speculative thought.

In that qualification I hope that I have some share. I do not mean to claim, indeed, to be quite unsmirched by what some practical people regard as the vice of an interest in logical abstractions and a purely intellectual curiosity. In fact, one of the most vivid of my youthful memories is of the thrill that went through me when, as a boy at school, I read for the first time the first proposition of Euclid. Never before had I dreamed that proof could be so absolute. It gave me an entirely new ideal of what logical demonstration could be. Also it was, to begin with, a purely intellectual fascination that gripped me when, as an Edinburgh undergraduate, I received my first introduction to Psychology and Metaphysics. My teacher was the already distinguished Professor Andrew Seth, afterwards still better known as A. S. Pringle Pattison. Even now, more than forty years later, I remember the topics of the class-essays prescribed in that introductory year—topics of a kind on which the very rawest philosophical recruit might do some crude thinking of his own. There was the well-worn, but to the beginner quite intriguingly novel, question whether proper names are connotative. There was the problem—with René Descartes ranged on the one side and John Locke on the other—‘Does the Mind think always?’ And when the class lectures had just begun to introduce us to Bishop Berkeley, we were set to arrive for ourselves at our own pronouncement on the question: ‘Does Matter exist?’ Happily it was on a really independent quest that we were made to enter; for the Professor

was always careful, until after the essays had been written, to leave us in some doubt as to what were his own opinions on the points at issue. It is easy now in recollection to smile at the absorbed preoccupation and tense excitement with which one wrestled with problems which now seem so trite but which then for the tyro held the fascination of newness. But if one smiles at the recollection, there is in the smile no self-mockery. For it was a young man's first introduction to what is one fundamental feature of all serious philosophising—that feature which led the late William James somewhere to define philosophy as simply an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly. It was my youthful mind's first glimpse of an exacting ideal which every philosopher must recognise—the ideal of dragging into the light of full consciousness every inherited and unconscious presupposition, and letting none pass muster till it had been examined and found legitimate.

For the mere beginner this can constitute an intriguing amusement, but there is something wrong with the man who can prosecute it for long in that light-hearted spirit. You cannot proceed far with the enterprise of unearthing the preconceptions on which ordinary thought unconsciously depends, and putting them to the test, and condemning as untrustworthy those which fail to justify themselves at the bar of abstract reason, without experiencing the shock of discovering that some of the dearest of human beliefs have a stake in the issue of your adventure. In my own case that discovery was curiously delayed, and when at length it arrived, it came with a suddenness and a breadth of application that was all the more devastating. From that date philosophical enquiry ceased for me to be an entertaining intellectual game. It became, instead, an imperious spiritual necessity, engendering in me at first, I fear, an unpleasantly intolerant impatience with those who, feeling no equally imperious urge to test all preconceptions, held their beliefs with what seemed a too cheaply earned

conviction. That youthful impatience soon passed, being rooted chiefly in envy of those who still enjoyed the certainties which I had lost. But the spiritual necessity remained. And ever since that date, to track out all unconscious preconceptions, and to examine with ruthless honesty their title to acceptance, has appeared to me to be one part of the serious business of life. It is not, indeed, by any means the duty of every one; but for him who has the metaphysical bent of mind and leisure to exercise that bent, it is a sacred obligation which he owes to humanity and to his own soul.

Have I committed a solecism in venturing to be so autobiographical? It certainly would have been unpardonable, had it not been a natural way of leading up to the subject to which I have decided to devote this Presidential Address. For I wish to speak of the rightful claim which society has upon the metaphysically-minded. In many of our Indian Universities and certainly in the University which it is my privilege to serve—the University of Madras, Philosophy has fallen upon evil days. Her class-rooms are all but deserted; her professional exponents are few; and the public lip-homage still paid to her does not prove its sincerity, in any notable degree, by sacrifices made for her sake. Now if society is treating philosophy so scurvily, is it possible that the fault may lie partly with her own devotees? Have we perhaps been failing to honour the claim which society rightly has upon us? Have the severely technical issues which are an inevitable by-product of the main philosophical undertaking drawn us away too much from that deeply human enterprise itself? If for such self-questioning there is even a vestige of justification, it may be well to spend an hour in considering what social function the public may rightly expect to be fulfilled by those who have the gift and the leisure for metaphysical thought.

I think it was in his *'Secret of Hegel'* that James Hutchison Stirling, some seventy years ago, made amused allusion to days

then not so long gone by, when every professor of Philosophy was popularly supposed to carry about with him, in his coat-pocket, a complete theory of the universe. I doubt whether, to-day, even the scoffers at Philosophy would consider such a gibe worth making. But there would be less absurdity in a surmise that not the professor of Philosophy alone but every devotee of the subject would *like* to have his coat-pocket thus handsomely furnished. Indeed, the reason why no modest man cares to claim for himself the name of 'philosopher' is just the presumptuous-seeming objective to which, by accepting such a designation, he must confess himself devoted. Nevertheless I believe that, no matter how ambitious the ultimate aim may be which philosophic thought must set itself, its typical contribution to the common good is to render a service that is modest and even prosaic. Its permanently valuable achievements are apt to be critical rather than constructive. Like the homely household commodity, salt, it is an ingredient of the community's intellectual dish which is quite indispensable, but which is not too palatable by itself, and of which it is easy to have too much. Woe be to any community that consisted exclusively of philosophers! And yet woe would be equally certain to betide society if it included none of the metaphysically minded. Especially would this be the case if it were a modern society of the progressive type. For mankind has made, once for all, the discovery that rapid advance in the conquest of nature is possible only by an extensive development of what in the industrial field is called division of labour and in the intellectual field specialisation. Now specialisation breeds evil as well as good. And the primary social function of the philosopher is, I believe, to serve as the necessary intellectual counterpoise to the specialist and to provide a prophylactic against the harm that can be done to the general mind by over specialisation on the part of the leaders of thought.

Am I taking altogether too low a view of the main benefit which society derives from the presence in it of men with the metaphysical bent of mind? I do not deny for a moment that the philosopher *aims* at much more than this. My case is that his value to society lies far less in the degree of his achievement of what he aims at—which is always lamentably meagre—than in the fact that such *are* his aims, and in the subsidiary results of his pursuit of them.

Philosophy is sometimes described as a speculative science. It is *speculative* inasmuch as it deliberately admits within its range of study topics regarding which demonstrable positive conclusions are unattainable, but which are of such vital moment that no thoughtful mind can refrain from forming or accepting conjectures about them. It is speculative also in this respect that, with regard to these topics, it allows itself to engage, when necessary, in what is at its best a divining rather than a knowing, and at its worst may be a mere guessing. On the other hand it is *scientific* in the sense that to this business of combined reasoning and divining, from which no man can wholly refrain, it addresses itself in a careful methodical and critical manner. It endeavours to become consciously aware of those assumptions and preconceptions which the ordinary man regards as so obvious that he does not notice them to be, for him, mere assumptions. It looks to see whether these preconceptions are demonstrably true. If they seem undemonstrable, it sets itself to determine whether they are nevertheless scientifically legitimate because indispensable to all coherent thought. And it tries never to be betrayed into confusing together the demonstrable, the probable and the merely possible.

From the point of view of society it is all to the good that to a vital human endeavour from which no man can entirely hold aloof—the endeavour to divine the truth in regions where proof is impossible—there are some who

address themselves in a methodical and severely critical manner. In the way of permanent conclusions, however, the results of all this careful labour are but slender. They must be so when finite mind tries to see and express the infinite. It is well-known how difficult even a learned man may find it to answer a child's questions. Much of this difficulty is due to the fact that the child does not know enough to frame its questions rightly. They are so crudely worded that the answer 'Yes', and the answer 'No' may be equally far from conveying the truth. Now in regard to the ultimate metaphysical issues we are all like children, and the questions which even the wisest of us ask ourselves are probably as inaptly framed as are a child's questions about mere every-day matters. So the real progress which metaphysics has made in the course of the centuries—that is, the advance which is so definite or final that it should never need to be gone through again,—lies less in getting better answers than in learning to put better questions. By critical study of past Philosophy we are saved from the mistake, into which the untrained thinker on philosophical subjects frequently falls of expressing the philosophical problem in terms which have already been discovered to render it insoluble—the mistake of asking ourselves old questions so badly worded that both the answer 'Yes' and answer 'No' are necessarily false. About the ultimate issues which are so vital to humanity philosophers may seem to be as far as ever from definite conclusions of a stable and positive character, but at least we have narrowed a little the general direction which pursuit of ultimate truth must follow.

I trust that I may have said enough to dispel any suspicion that if the social function which I claim for the metaphysically minded is of a prosaic and lowly character, this is because I fail to appreciate the loftiness of the metaphysical objective. I am far from forgetting that there have been

philosophical geniuses whose positive teachings have been a fountain of inspiration for many. Such geniuses, however, are rare, and the height of their achievement has been due to the fact that with the metaphysical bent they have combined something of the mind of the poet and the seer. To determine the typical social function of any human class we must consider not the rare exceptions but the average case.

I have suggested that the social function which the community may expect to see discharged by the rank and file of the metaphysically-minded consists in their serving as a counterpoise to the specialist. But how can that possibly be true, some one is sure to exclaim, since Metaphysics itself is the product of particularly concentrated specialisation? To meet this objection and develop my thesis, I must direct attention to the distinctive nature of philosophical enquiry.

Philosophy is concerned with the appreciation or appraisal of facts as a whole rather than with the quest for facts in detail. This is why, although in itself a highly specialised kind of endeavour, it can fulfil the social function of neutralising the evil effects of specialisation. Of the essential or distinctive nature of philosophical thought I know of no better simple definition than this: that it consists in the attempt to answer the kind of questions which arise in a man's mind when, in a reflective mood, he interrupts the business of *doing* things, and of extending the *range* of his knowledge—interrupts it in order to ask himself, with regard to the world as he knows it, and the activities which make up life as he lives it, and it all means, what is its total significance and worth.

Typically, then, Philosophy is preoccupation with wholeness. It seeks to transcend the fragmentariness of our ordinary judgments, and to achieve an integralness of personality, by detecting and responding to the One that exists through the Many, the Harmony that resolves the Discords, the Infinite

that makes the finite possible and bestows on it its degree of worthiness. The faith that such an Infinite, such a harmonious unity, is there to be discovered may be, from the logical point of view, only a postulate, but it is no unsupported imagining. For the *discovering* of it would be, in a true sense, a *recovering*. It is the loss of an immediately known and lived unity that starts the mind on the philosophical quest for a constructed synthesis. That loss is, for man as a reflective being, quite inevitable. The very effort to reflect involves withdrawing the self from its unself-conscious immersion in the flow of experience, and setting the content of experience over against it as an object of study. And ordinarily it involves also a concentration on some part of the continuum of the experienced, with the result that this part acquires a sharpness of outline which destroys our immediate apprehension of its continuity with the remainder. Yet, however inevitable this loss of the immediately known and lived unity may be, it is never complete and final. No man can practise reflection only and all the time. Of necessity he must step back again into the active life. And as soon as he does so, the continuity of experience begins to reassert itself. His self ceases to be, in its own self-apprehension, a mere dispassionate centre of observation over against an independent real, and becomes again an immediate unity in which apprehension, feeling and activity are inextricably interfused. Continuity returns also to the world that he unreflectively apprehends. In the immediacy of sense-perception one moment in the passage of time melts into the next without any need for the artificial unity of arithmetical summation. Each portion of the perceived external world regains that continuity with the rest which constrains us to apprehend all spatial determinations as limitations of that which transcends every limit. The spatial and temporal forms of apprehension themselves get merged in the unity of space-time. And in

the realm of ends, the pursuit of the momentary objective is felt as springing out of a continuum of appetite, our consciousness of which is what renders the concept of the desirable psychologically prior to the concept of the desired.

From all this it follows that if Philosophy is preoccupation with wholeness, it is not the pursuit of any merely arbitrary ideal. On the one hand, it springs out of a hunger for something that has been lost—for the harmonious wholeness which scientific and practical thinking have replaced by a multiplicity that is imperfectly jointed and eternally incomplete. On the other hand, it is the effort to justify the work of thought by evolving a type of synthesis that will verify itself by its congruity with the immediate unity of experience. Moreover the search for such a synthesis is nothing less than a spiritual necessity. It is only through recognition of a continuous unity in the object that there can be personal identity in the subject; and development of integralness of personality is fundamentally conditioned by the degree in which the felt unity of the objective has been transformed into a coherent and inclusive understanding of the world and of life.

The effort to do justice in reflection to the wholeness that characterizes immediate experience quite naturally gives rise to speculative cosmologies. The precariousness of all attempts at a metaphysical theory of reality absolute is attested by the spectacle of the many derelict philosophical systems that strew the centuries like stranded wrecks upon the shores of time. If these abandoned hulks were Philosophy's only gift to mankind, it would be difficult indeed to claim that the metaphysically minded have a social function to fulfil that is of any great human importance. This is why, in estimating their contribution to the common good, I have laid stress on the subsidiary conclusions which are the by-products of philosophical reflection rather than on the constructive

theories which are its direct objective. For there are such incidental gains and they can be of real moment.

The primary philosophical quest, which searches for a final synthesis that will give reflective expression to the infinitude or wholeness of reality as apprehended in immediate experience, may well be an enterprise of baffling difficulty. On the other hand, there is a subsidiary task which is much less difficult, and that is to detect and exhibit the inadequacy of conceptions of the real which pass muster in scientific and general thinking, but which, by their relativity or narrow one-sidedness render the philosophical enterprise intrinsically impossible of accomplishment. And that preoccupation with wholeness which is the native bent of the philosophic mind makes it particularly sensitive to the one-sidedness of outlook which is apt to result from all specialisation, whether it be in the theoretical or the practical realm. It is, I think, by an alert and untiring opposition to the tendency of current types of relative knowledge to pass themselves off as absolute truth that the metaphysically-minded can render society their greatest service.

For an illustration of this contention let us glance back at the course of nineteenth century thought. Nothing could better exemplify the loftiness of the heights which it is the nature of Philosophy to long to scale than the daring Idealisms, the first sketches of which heralded the advent of that century and which held the field during its first intellectual period. Yet, as constructive theories of the universe, their domination was short-lived. They intoxicated rather than convinced. No one to day will style himself without reservation a disciple of Fichte, or Schelling, or Hegel or Schopenhauer. There have been Neo-Kantians and Neo-Hegelians of various brands. To Hegel in particular we owe many deep insights into the history of thought and of institutions, and there are those who acclaim his Dialectical Principle as the permanent

discovery of the logical instrument needed for an understanding of organic development. But all this pertains to the province of the special student ; it but little affects humanity at large. If we ask what has been the main social contribution of Idealism, I think we must seek it not in its adventurous climbing on inaccessible heights, nor in its regeneration of the science of Logic, but in its subsidiary work in the criticism of categories, by means of which it provided much valuable protection against the danger lest scientific knowledge should impose itself on the general mind as absolute truth.

No greater disaster can befall a community than an undermining of its spiritual convictions and its faith in ultimate values. Yet those whose memory reaches back into even the latter part of last century will vividly recall the general oppression under which faith laboured in consequence of the prestige lent to mechanical views of the universe by the achievements of physical and biological thought. I do not say that this oppression has been dispelled with any completeness ; indeed it is part of my case that it has not. Secularism, with its imperilment of spiritual values, is alarmingly widespread—possibly even on the increase. But the very fact that now a days we speak of Secularism as the enemy where formerly we spoke of Materialism shows that the centre of the battle has shifted a little. One form of the attack has been routed, and it was the solid work done by Idealism in the criticism of categories that provided the defence with its strongest weapons. Idealist Metaphysics may have been regarded with contempt in the latter half of the century by the leaders of scientific thought ; but in the same period men came gradually to recognise more and more that in the nature of the case scientific constructions of the real cannot claim ultimate truth ; and it was in the Idealistic criticism of categories that the growing recognition of this truth had its source. One may find an interesting illustration of this in Karl Pearson's

Grammar of Science, published in 1392. From cover to cover the book reeks with contempt of the mere metaphysician, and yet it is in itself nothing else than a gruelling criticism of scientific categories. There was unfortunately one science namely, Introspective Psychology, the concep's of which the author subjected to no critical examination, with consequence that the positive outcome of his argument was nothing better than a very subjective Idealism. But the excellence of his critical work must have made every Objective Idealist welcome Karl Pearson as an unconscious ally; and in this combination in one personality of the unconscious ally and the contemptuous detractor I find a striking corroboration of the view that the effective contribution of Idealism to the common good is to be found not so much in its well-known final achievement, viz., that conception of the ultimate nature of reality for which it is either admired or despised by the general reader, as in the humbler preliminary spade work it undertook in its searching criticism of categories.

It is I think, the same service that to-day the community still has most need of from the metaphysically-minded. The physical theory of the universe which dominated the imagination of last century may have become a back-number, and its collapse may have rendered moribund the crasser Materialism which finds the secret of our whole rich universe in the blind dance of pictorially imaginable atoms. The new Physics may even look sometimes not unlike a Metaphysics of an Idealist cast. But all this is not equivalent to a real disappearance of Materialism. For matter does not need to be pictorially imaginable in order to be essentially matter. Matter means the real in so far as it is capable of serving as the passive material or instrument which we turn to use as we will. And however immaterial, in the pictorial sense, may be the physicist's conception of the real, in so far as it is passive to our interference, his physical theory becomes a

Materialism, as soon as it ceases to be content to offer itself as a valid formulation of one universal aspect of the real, and succumbs to the temptation of professing to be the truth about its whole rich nature. So upon the metaphysically-minded of to-day there still lies the sacred obligation of seeking to protect society from the dangers of a new and subtler Materialism by insistently exhibiting the inherent relativity of all mathematical thinking, and therefore of the typical scientific way of attacking the secrets of being. Science can yield valid and amazingly useful formulations of aspects of reality, but it can never even begin to tell us the whole truth about the real.

How comes it that the desire to apprehend reality in its wholeness makes the philosophical mind alert to detect the unconscious assumptions and uncritical conceptions on which ordinary thinking is so prone to rely? The reason is not far to seek. The very effort to apprehend reality as a whole requires the thinking subject to set over against himself as object not merely all outer existence but the whole of himself as he knows himself, all his habits of feeling, thought and action. What ordinarily is most immediately his very self becomes, in that moment, something other than the thinking subject, something, therefore, which it falls to him to criticise and appraise. No longer may any habit of judgment be accepted by him simply because it is familiar, for he looks on it now as something merely *given*, something other than himself which is merely there, and is to be acquiesced in only with deliberate responsibility and at his own peril. No longer may any belief be relied on solely because it is socially universal, for at that moment he is alone with the absolute, solitarily face to face with an 'other' which is absolute because at that moment all being has been funded into it without any remainder except the empty thinking subject. To have had that experience even once,

with any vividness, leaves a permanent mark on a man's mentality for it evokes in him an unforgettable realisation of the precariousness of all untested preconceptions.

Let us, then, discharge with faithfulness this function that is laid upon us by our share, however small or great it be, in the true philosopher's hunger for an apprehension of the real in its wholeness. Society needs that we keep watch and ward against the dangers which lurk in that division of labour and specialisation of study which she finds so indispensable—the danger of mistaking legitimate abstractions for concrete truth, the danger of too confidently depending on the complete trustworthiness of conceptions which have proved their utility in their own proper sphere. I do not urge for a moment that we should confine ourselves to this criticism of categories as our sole vocation. The impulse to it has to spring out of our devotion to the pursuit of positive philosophical knowledge. And in our pursuit of this we shall necessarily be led into technical issues in which the general public can take no interest, and into patient study, both sympathetic and critical, of bygone systems of thought. But let us never allow these special studies to render us forgetful of our social function of exposing and opposing the false abstractions, preconceptions and one-sidedness to which the philosophically untrained mind of the general community is inevitably so prone.

It is not in any single realm of thought alone that we need to exercise this social function. I have referred to the call for alert watchfulness against any tendency on the part of the new Physics to assume the garb of a Philosophy. But even more urgent is it to-day, I cannot help thinking, that the metaphysically-minded should apply their critical gifts in the realm of Social Philosophy and Ethics. There may be exaggeration, but there is certainly no absurdity, in the idea that modern Western civilisation is now in the melting-

pot, and that the emergence of Bolshevism, German National Socialism, and Italian Fascism means that mankind is standing at a great parting of the ways. There is a call here for radical thinking of the most strenuous kind. Our first duty is to make a far more deep probing effort than has yet been undertaken to understand these new social phenomena. We must reach a comprehension of the economic and social conditions from which they take their rise. We must not let ourselves be blind to the fact that surrender of individual freedom to meet a great social need is itself a form of the exercise of freedom. Also we must not fear to recognise how much of hollowness there is in the kind of freedom that democracy secures in practice for the average man. We need to probe and probe and probe, relentlessly exposing what is unsound both in the new and the old forms of social organization, but generously acclaiming all that is true and healthy. To do this thoroughly and well is a toilsome and supremely difficult task, but its faithful performance is, I believe, a service which society has to-day an absolute right to expect from the metaphysically-minded.

Some Aspects of Modernism in Philosophy.

By

Prof. N. G. DAMLE, M.A.,

(*President, Logic & Metaphysics Section*)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am very grateful to the authorities of the Indian Philosophical Congress for the honour they have conferred on me by inviting me to preside over the Logic and Metaphysics Section. Last year a similar invitation was given to me, but at the last moment circumstances beyond control came in the way and I had to deny myself the pleasure of attending the Session at Waltair. This year also on account of very indifferent health and pressure of work I was not at first prepared to accept the invitation at a short notice and to undertake such a long journey to Calcutta. But I could not say 'no' to the very pressing request of our Secretary. I wish the choice of the president had fallen on a worthier person who could have found ample time to work out an elaborate thesis for the occasion. In the present circumstances I have to request you to overlook shortcomings in my effort and to cooperate with me in successfully carrying out the work entrusted to me. I need hardly say that I have come here to learn and not to teach, to discuss and not to dictate.

Philosophy like art and literature is the product of the age. They all express and reflect, each in its own way, the spirit of the times. They embody the modes in which we respond to the persistent problems of life, and serve as an index to the intellectual and emotional life

of the society at any particular stage of its evolution. Every age has its own novel ideas to offer which appear more or less strange and disturbing to the conservative elements in the society. 'The new-fangled ways' is quite a common expression of the old in almost every age. But there seems to be something very special about the innovations that are introduced in our own times.

Some of our recent scientific and philosophical speculations mark a greater break with the past than probably any similar previous attempts. The peculiarity of our modern 'adventures' is that they are all conscious attempts in the direction of radical change. The new philosophers try to do away with the past traditions almost with a revolutionary zeal. The new mentality is so widely different in its outlook on life, in its methodology, and in its philosophical 'idiom' that often it ceases to be intelligible to minds that are brought up in the older tradition. This tendency towards novelty and revolt is not limited to any particular sphere of thought or action but marks the very quality and texture of our present-day cultural life. It is symptomatic of the general condition of our spiritual tissue. Youthful restlessness is in evidence everywhere. The foundations of established tradition are rudely shaken.

Significantly enough, this 'youth movement' in Philosophy, as it is sometimes called, started its conscious career in America, the youngest of the nations, under the energetic leadership of William James. It soon caught the imagination of many American and European thinkers and exercised considerable influence over their minds. This influence was due as much to the freshness of the new doctrine as to the attractive and eloquent manner in which it was propounded by its advocates.

The change did not come all at once, and in a perfectly definite way. The new philosophy was not so much

a definite school or system of thought; it was only a general tendency against all schools and systems as such. Of these late years, a general distrust of philosophy, both in its methods and conclusions, is becoming more and more manifest. The achievement of philosophy in proportion to its promise has been, it was contended, very poor and insignificant. In the conflicting and inconsistent conclusions of different philosophies nothing seemed quite certain. The barren speculations tended to engender skepticism of a thoroughgoing and fundamental character. With all its pretensions to consistency of thought each system appeared to be full of internal contradictions. Each system appeared to defend certain 'prejudices' on the basis of certain questionable premises with an elaborate Logic whose strength lay in its weakest link. Philosophy seemed to have lost its head in the clouds of abstractions of all sorts. It ignored the particular, existent facts in pursuing its ideal of 'system-making and logic-chopping'. It had lost its hold on the rich, concrete reality and become only a medley of empty generalizations and inadequate formulæ.

The leaders of the modernist movement like William James in America and M. Bergson in France, to mention only two names, got almost exasperated with 'the intolerant use of abstractions which was the major vice of the old intellectualist philosophies.' On account of their partial thinking and over-emphasis on certain aspects of our experience theories like Materialism and Mentalism were found to offer, even at their best nothing more than a very inadequate explanation of the whole of reality. The scope of principles of limited applicability like 'mechanism', for instance, was extended to cover the whole realm of our experience. In the materialistic philosophies of the 19th century it was assumed that to know the reality of a thing

is to analyse it into its infinitesimal parts and to accept them as the full explanation of that particular thing. The concrete reality was reduced to a 'huge system of differential equations in a featureless medium'.

To be real, in this system, meant to be like a machine, subject to the laws of the physical world, the laws of mechanical determination. Whatever refused to accommodate itself in this rigid framework of mechanism was either an illusion or at the most an epiphenomenon. If our highest experiences, aesthetic, moral and spiritual, could not be adjusted to the closed circle of physical sciences, the boundaries of which are set by the quantitative and measurable aspects of things, they were dismissed as being not real. To be real is to be amenable to mechanistic causation. We only deceive ourselves when we say that we are free. All freedom, all initiative is unreal, only illusory. Man's actions are no more free than the movements of the figures that unroll themselves on the screen. Life itself is only incidental to the arbitrary grouping of matter and it has no determining influence on matter. 'This fitful jet of life flickers in some insignificant corner of the universe and will pass away in the dark abysmal silence'. This is the one-sided, abstract description that is offered as the explanation of our manifold, concrete universe.

Other philosophical systems also fare no better. In attempting to give an all-sufficing and all-comprehensive conception of the universe they only set up some thin abstractions like the Being, Idea, Infinite, Eternal, which almost vanish into nothingness. Systems of thought that are based on, to use the graphic expression of Bradley, 'the earthly ballet of bloodless categories' fail to do justice to our living world with its bewildering variety and incessant change and growth. The static unity to which such philosophies lead is simply the negation of the real dynamic variety. Their universality

is exclusive of all particularity. Their infinity is exclusive of all finiteness. All diversity, all finiteness is superficial; it is only an appearance. Such a view also, based on the static categories that Kant deduced from the Formal Logic of Aristotle, gives us an equally closed universe. In such a universe there can be only an appearance of novelty and change. In such a scheme of reality conceived after the ideals of logical and mathematical necessity there can be really no room for the play of any creative power.

Modernism marks a vigorous reaction against 'a deep-seated mental habit' of excessive system-making. It is 'a new way of philosophising, 'a new logic and a new methodology.' In a negative way it may be broadly described (allowing for exceptions) in terms of Irrationalism and Anti-intellectualism. The leaders of this movement are exploring unknown regions. They have begun speaking a language which it is extremely difficult for men of older generations to follow. They propose to bring about a trans-valuation, or shall we say 'topsyturvydom' of our hitherto recognised intellectual values. In its most destructive aspect the new logic means an unsparing criticism and a thoroughgoing depreciation of the entire fabric of the traditional logic and metaphysics. To a daring modernist the natural, ratiocinating activity of human reason has become the procedure of a distorting and falsifying intellect. It is because of such a mental habit and mode of thinking that modernism in philosophy has become almost a cult of unintelligibility. Not only does it question the fundamental categories of human intellect but the very belief in the intelligibility of the universe which is a necessary pre-supposition in any attempt at the explanation of the world. Recent psychological studies have thrown some light on this attitude towards reason. The investigations of the Russian psychologists, the psycho-analysts, the Behaviourists, etc., and the general evolutionary philosophers have taught us

the tininess of the human element in the race and the enormity of man's animal past.' Reason holds no privileged position in the scheme of nature; in fact, it is there only as an 'after-thought.'

What can be the significance of this movement of A-Logism, this distrust of logic and reason? This change is declared as a triumph of 'open-mindedness', as the giving up of all 'prejudices' and the unstiffening of all theories. The change is no doubt a relief from the pressure of hard mechanism, but it is very doubtful whether it is supported by the stable foundation of truth, whether it provides a real unmixed good. In our impatient enthusiasm for the victory of life over mechanism we have washed off the very foundations of rational thought. When we are asked to give up the very structure of our thought as a prejudice we naturally question the claims of the proposed theory. When modernism stands for such a drastic change in our outlook and insists on our accepting a conception of reality which renders it unintelligible and which brings us on the brink of the unmeaning, we legitimately suspect that there is something radically wrong in its method and mode of thinking. *He who attempts to overthrow reason ends by overthrowing himself.* We can understand the criticism of reason upon itself. It is self-criticism. But that will always be of the nature of the delimitation of reason by itself and can never be the abandonment of reason which would be meaningless.

The positive aspect of the modernist philosophy, especially in its idealistic and attractive forms, its doctrine of freedom and spontaneity as being the chief characteristics of life, and the place it gives to the creativeness of mind and spirit, explains the grip it has over the imagination of young minds. This movement is a revolt against the rigid framework of Materialistic or Absolutistic mechanisms in the name of freedom, teleology and creative enterprise. It recognises

that faith in initiative, original determination by a genuinely creative power, is a necessity of our moral nature. It is an 'open philosophy' as opposed to the closed traditional systems of the 'block universe'. All the static expressions are given up as arbitrary things and as distortions by our spatialising intellect of reality which is essentially flowing. To use Prof. Whitehead's phrase, not static 'positions' but '*events*' compose the world of which our lives are parts. Reality is not a spatial scheme but a continuous process in time, every item running into every other in complete inter-penetration. There is an essential mobility at the heart of things.

Pragmatism of William James and Humanism of Schiller, Emmergent Evolution of Alexander and Lloyd Morgan and Creative evolution of Bergson, and Neo idealism of Croce and Gentile—all these diverse formulations strike one note in common. They all ask us '*to take time seriously*'. Their's is a serious attempt at the rehabilitation of time. Time is an inherent characteristic of reality as such. Time is reality in fact. Change is not a mere unfolding of a reality which is beyond time but it is a real process that introduces something essentially new. Fluency is not an appearance of reality abiding and permanent but it is itself real. It is reality in the making. Time gives us the novelty of creation and not the monotonous repetition of meaning less change. These Change and Time-minded philosophers ask us to direct our gaze on the unrealised possibilities of the future whose gates are always open. Dropping the veil on the achievements of the past with its closed doors we are advised to cultivate a forward-looking attitude. The future does not give us only what is contained implicitly in the past but it brings into life newer and newer values. In the course of evolution there is real novelty and spontaneity at critical stages and no mere tyranny of a logical system. This possibility of a really new creation

introduces a certain element of contingency in this universe. The creative process is unpredictable. There is no pre-conceived plan which the historical process merely rewrites or copies down. For that would mean bondage to cosmological determinism which is no better than bondage to mechanistic causation. The struggle and endeavour on the moral plane are genuine, a real fight against a real enemy. History is not a mockery nor is progress an illusion, but a living drama in which the spirit of man really decides the issues. The battles are fought *by* him and not for him. Man is no more a helpless creature in the hands of the blind forces of nature than he is a tool in the realisation of a pre-destined end. There is freedom and spontaneity even in the sense of indetermination.

We may ignore the differences in the various forms which the modernist movement in philosophy has assumed and consider one or two important points on which they agree. As we have seen they all harp on the same note 'take time seriously'; they all insist on our recognising change, initiative, novelty and creativeness as real elements in the universe.

We are, as a matter of fact, taking time more than seriously all the while. All our ideas and fancies, all our cares and worries are tied down to the plane of time and very rarely do we rise above them. The really wholesome advice would be to ask us to rise above time, to keep steadily in mind the meaning and claims of the eternal, to cultivate the spirit of other-worldliness, which in its true sense, is conspicuously absent in most of us. The complaint of Dean Inge is only too true when he says, "*It is a common failing both of realists and idealists that they do not take timelessness seriously enough*". Unless we are prepared to take timelessness seriously we shall not be able to understand time itself, much less shall we be able to take it

seriously. Unless we have faith in the values that we are realising in time as being really grounded in the Eternal and Uncreated we shall be depriving them of their fullest, perhaps of all their real meaning. Values which are merely functions of time to be realised at some future date and which are not sustained and vitalised by some eternal reservoir upon which they draw, are lifeless things, such stuff as dreams are made of. Ideals which are consciously projected into the future as the creatures of our imagination have not even the inspiring virtue in them. They are air-bubbles gay in the sunshine and broken by the passing wind. Even in the most creative activities, in the creation of beauty for instance, we hold that prior to the creation of beauty there must be '*reception*' from region beyond. As Browning says, they are not a creation so much as an 'effluence'. The difference between the seer and the artist on one hand and ordinary men on the other is this that while the latter are engrossed in the ephemeral objects that meet their eyes, the former gaze on the eternal ocean of values and thus get a fore-taste of immortality. Faith in the eternal is essential to the proper understanding of temporal phenomena. History and moral progress which are the main concern of modernism would be the first to lose their meaning by the denial of the eternal. Moral obligation would lose its basis and moral progress which simply goes on into infinity would turn out to be a progress into nothingness !

Modernism, as illustrated by Pragmatism or even by Bergson's Intuitionism, cannot be a proper substitute for the Great Tradition—*Perennis Philosophia*. Pragmatism, for instance, is not a theory but only a way of looking at things. It is an attitude in Philosophy which must be brought to bear on different problems awaiting solution. The Logic of Pragmatism may be taken to be typical of the modernist movement in general. Truth is reduced to convenience

and 'Logic becomes simply a foot-note to Ethics.' We may characterise this Logic as the voluntaristic or the psychological Logic as opposed to the Formal Logic of Aristotle, the Metaphysical Logic of Hegel and the new *Logistic* of certain mathematicians. Whatever the defects of the Logic of the Modernist movement it has done much in liberating philosophy from the one-sided, vicious abstractions. Let us not hastily dub this movement as the mere glorification of the Irrational and the Practical. It indicates a healthy and vigorous spirit, though it does not offer a sound and convincing philosophy. It has given a much-needed shock to Philosophy lest it might lose touch with the world of phenomena, with the hard facts of life, with the real living universe. In its insistence upon the legitimate claims of feeling and will along with those of the intellect, and the many-sidedness of our experience it has rendered a valuable service to Philosophy. No Philosophy can be sound which ignores these integral parts of our experience. Modernism has eloquently pleaded on behalf of particularity and multiplicity, of change and movement, of novelty and creativity. It has stressed the reality and importance of the non-rational in thought and life. A philosophy which simply postulates an abstract unity and utterly ignores all fluent plurality can never be an adequate account of our concrete universe. The real unity to be an adequate explanation of our universe cannot be a numerical unity, a bare homogeneous identity but it must be a concrete or a comprehensive unity, an identity in difference. This leads us to a very fruitful idea in philosophy—the idea of the Concrete Universal.

In the conception of the Concrete Universal we have a proper synthesis of the different valuable elements contained in the Great Tradition and emphasised by the Modernist Movement. The abstract universal is bare identity apart from difference. It proceeds by the omission of differences

and ceases to be intelligible. An abstract particular which is only a discrete, isolated phenomenon standing in no relation whatsoever with anything else in the world is equally unintelligible and meaningless. For to be intelligible means to stand in some relation and to give up to that extent at least its exclusive particularity. A distinction which is a distinction from nothing is inconceivable. A particular in itself and by itself is unmeaning. It finds its meaning in the other. The real universal is the sameness in the other. In the Concrete Universal the particulars are not lost and destroyed. Every detail gains incalculably in vividness and meaning when seen in its proper perspective and communication with the Whole. Every particular item is charged with the significance of the Whole. In the Concrete Universal there is a progressive differentiation and integration. Both multiplicity and unity, particularity and universality, are real through each other in the harmonious comprehensiveness of the Concrete Universal.

The doctrine of the Concrete Universal leads us to the Absolute that is neither individual nor universal, neither concrete nor abstract, because it transcends all such distinctions. The significance of the Concrete Universal may be best understood in the light of the doctrine of Cosmism as distinguished from A-cosmism. The Concrete Universal though it expresses itself in the various particulars, is not simply their sum total. A mere endless series of particulars where they monotonously follow each other would lack the principle of unity which is found in the self-contained life of harmonious comprehensiveness of the Concrete Universal. The doctrine of the Concrete Universal leads us to a *higher type of Pantheism* in which the Absolute no doubt is immanent in the particulars but which at the same time is not exhausted in them. Its possibilities of self-expression are unlimited. The Absolute includes the particulars only

because it also transcends them. The whole no doubt is present in the parts, it is their informing principle. But for that very reason it is over and above them though in them as well. This is the *Immanence of the Transcendent*.

We thus see that unity does not mean a uniformity but a community a harmonious interpenetration; multiplicity does not mean an isolation or exclusiveness. Unity and plurality are the aspects distinguishable in thought but not in reality. They do not exclude or negate each other.

A completely harmonious and comprehensive unity which implies such a thoroughgoing interpenetration and which offers an adequate explanation of all its contents, is a spiritual unity. It is the highest kind of experience, Spiritual Experience, in which we have the sense of harmony and fullness, of eternity and completeness, a peace that passes understanding. We can only vaguely understand, can only faintly imagine what that all-inclusive Experience may be like. If our account of the Concrete Universal is correct we may affirm that it is not an all-dissolving experience but an all-illuminating and all-sustaining one. It is a sense of fulfilment, a sense of rest that is attained in harmony and not in vacancy. It is a significant silence, a silence that is full of the rhythm of the infinite. There are many imperfect approximations in our finite experience to the highest spiritual experience. Here Intuition is our last resort and abiding satisfaction.

But the doctrine of Intuition is not easy to propound. It is not to be confused with the Anti-intellectualism and Irrationalism of recent speculation. It is not the doctrine of A-Logism but supra-logism. It does not condemn reason, it does not belittle its importance; on the contrary, it strongly insists upon hard intellectual discipline. Reflective knowledge is a preparation for the Integral Experience which is 'purified vision of truth.' We cannot resort to Intuition simply to avoid

the exertions of hard thinking. If Intuition is a substitute for rigorous thinking, if it means superstitious beliefs and vague and thoughtless sentimentality it is certainly open to the charge that it 'covers a multitude of intellectual sins.' *In Intuition the synoptic view of the rational philosopher blends with the beatific vision of the religious mystic.* There is nothing mystifying about it. *Mysticism is not mystery but mystery unravelled.* It is a sympathetic and the most thorough understanding of the inner nature of Ultimate Reality. This is what Spinoza means by the 'Intellectual love of God.'

We distinguish between intuition and intellect; but we must not construe that distinction into an entire disparateness or an irreconcilable opposition. The Great Indian Tradition has not committed that mistake. It has tried to complete the account of reason by the revelation of intuition, which is the wisdom gained by the *whole* spirit. Intellect is not despised as giving a totally distorted or a false picture of reality. Its account is true so far as it goes, only it does not go far and deep enough. It tries to give us a cogent and coherent account of reality but it is more or less external and it does not penetrate into the heart of reality. Its thought-constructions are more or less abstract and lacking in directness and emotional warmth and intimacy which characterise intuition. The predominantly analytical, discursive and vacillating character of intellect requires to be corrected and supplemented by the wholeness, directness and utter certainty of intuitive vision. Intuition transcends reason, but does not contradict it. In the words of Spinoza, *Intuition is thoughtfulness matured to inspiration.* It is indeed the flower and perfection of intellect. But how from the imperfect thought-constructions the mystic goes to the fullness of his vision it is not possible to determine precisely or to express adequa-

tely in logical propositions. Some thinkers may posit a mystical jump analogous to the 'jump' of the electron !

The spiritual unity of the Absolute is not a dead, monotonous, static unity, for then it would cease to be spiritual. The spirit is essentially active. Modernism in philosophy is as much justified in its attack on the changeless and motionless character of the Absolute as it is justified in revolting against the featureless abstract unity of the Absolute. The modern emphasis on dynamism must be recognised by every philosophy which lends itself to an idealistic or spiritualistic interpretation. The world is a dynamic expression of the Absolute. It is not so much the creation of God as the spontaneous and eternal 'effluence' of the Absolute. The Absolute reveals the inner wealth of its fullness in newer and yet newer manifestations. This spontaneous and eternal revelation of the Absolute is the change or the creation as understood in the time sense. The Eternal is ever manifesting itself in the temporal and historical process. Time is one of the manifestations of the Timeless. Change is real in the sense that we assimilate new aspects which were only dimly felt as flickering on the horizon. Our genuine '*sense of horizon*' throws new light on the problem of change and novelty. Rare beauties and truths swim into our ken from afar and we decipher them as we decipher a star in the sky. Our work of assimilation and formulation of new aspects goes on for ever. Change and moral progress get an added significance from the fact that they are the expressions of the Absolute itself. Otherwise a continuous change and an unending moral progress become like "...a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."

In all the varied expressions and manifestations the Absolute is not transforming itself into something else but is freely giving out what it contains in itself in fullness. Its activity is essentially an activity of manifestation and revela-

tion and not of transformation. The change and progress is not towards attainment but the expression of the Absolute in fruition. The process of the Absolute is a process from attainment to attainment, 'a progress in fruition.' The process is a free and spontaneous movement. There is nothing outside the Absolute which can compel or obstruct the free revelation in the varied forms it takes. The Absolute is pure freedom or spontaneity, which is not the same thing as 'indeterminacy.' Whatever flows, flows from its own inner nature. The very nature of the Absolute is to overflow and to realise possibilities of fuller revelations. The creation of the world is the spontaneous and eternal effluence of the inner wealth of the Absolute. The act of creation may be described as an act of spontaneous 'playfulness' of the Absolute, as the most beautiful expression of its fullness.

The Nature of Value

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

By

J. C. P. D'ANDRADE

(Ethics & Religion & Social Philosophy Section)

The problem of value is an old one, but it has acquired a new significance in recent times and an interesting philosophy has grown around it, mostly of the realistic type. Attempts have been made to explain value as a purely objective quality residing in things independently of their relation to mind, and some of them are highly ingenious and very stimulating, but none of them appears to me to be completely satisfactory. I still think that the good old idealistic attempt to solve the problem is the least unsatisfactory of all, and it will be my object here, by a careful examination of the nature of value, to bring out the failure of the explanation which the "objectivists" give of it.

For the purpose of this inquiry value and good may be regarded as identical in meaning, and in what follows I shall use the two terms indiscriminately. Whatever has value is good, and whatever is good has value. Obviously, good here does not mean moral good alone. Moral good is only one species of good and not the whole of good. Much confusion will be avoided, I think, if this distinction is borne in mind. Very often, when we say that anything is good without qualification, we mean that it is morally good; and so if we give a general definition of good, it may be found that some things to which our definition applies are yet not good in the moral sense and our definition may consequently

appear faulty. But if we remember that what is good in one sense may not be good in another, or that what is good relatively may not be good absolutely, such a misunderstanding will not be possible. We shall see later that to be morally good is to be absolutely good, and that an adequate theory of value must admit degrees of good.

G. E. Moore in his *Principia Ethica* gives an elaborate argument to prove that value cannot be defined. It may be possible to give the verbal meaning of value in other words, but definition such as Moore thinks to be important cannot be a mere matter of words. It must take the idea for which the term to be defined stands and analyse it into its elements. Now the idea for which the term 'good' stands is a simple idea and so cannot be analysed. Therefore 'good' cannot be defined. We may point out the conditions of goodness, we may determine what makes value, we may give the criterion of good, but all that will not be the same thing as explaining what good *means*. 'Good' is like 'yellow,' for instance. They are both names of unanalysable notions, and therefore neither can be defined. I shall not stay to discuss whether value can be defined or not. I think Moore finds it undefinable because he does not or cannot see its real complexity. If the relation to mind is not admitted, the true nature of value is not understood and the only course then left is to confess that it is inexplicable. Moore's contention that value is undefinable, to my mind, only bears witness to the fact that his theory fails to explain it.

Value is ordinarily distinguished from fact. When I say "this rose is red" I am supposed to make a statement of fact; while, when I say 'this rose is beautiful' I am supposed to make a statement of value. And there is at least a *prima facie* difference between the two kinds of judgments. It may be that ultimately all judgments are judgments of value, or it may be that there is an ultimate difference between the

two kinds. I shall not try to decide between these two possibilities, though personally I incline to the view that all judgments as such express value. But it will be my business to show that judgments of value cannot be resolved into judgments of fact. Incidentally, I may remark here that to hold that there are no judgments of fact that cannot be resolved into judgments of value is not the same thing as to hold that there is no ultimate fact as distinguished from value.

"This rose is beautiful" as distinguished from "this rose is red," at first sight at least, implies a reference to a standard. A thing is beautiful or not beautiful according as it does or does not conform to a rule, and not merely according as it does or does not possess an attribute; whereas a thing is red or not red according as it does or does not possess an attribute—the attribute of redness. When we say "this rose is red," we are stating a fact that *is*, and nothing more; but when we say "this rose is beautiful" we are not only stating a fact that *is*, but are also expressing approbation and stating that the fact that *is* is as it *should be*. In the latter case there is *trial* by reference to a preconceived standard and *decision* that the standard is satisfied. In the former case there is no preconceived standard applied and there is no trial and no decision, but the mind simply acknowledges a fact as it is found. In other words, judgments of value are essentially teleological in character, expressing the realization (or want of realization) of an end, while judgments of fact are not teleological.

The kind of value that I mean to consider here is intrinsic value, which alone is value in the strict sense of the term. Intrinsic value is distinguished from instrumental value. A thing is said to possess intrinsic value when it is valuable for its own sake, and to possess instrumental value when it is merely useful or valuable for the sake of something

else. What possesses intrinsic value would still possess it if there were nothing else besides itself in the world, while what possesses instrumental value would not be valuable if there were not something else to which it is a means. What possesses intrinsic value, however, need not possess intrinsic value in every element of it; it is enough that the whole is valuable as a whole for its own sake. When every element in an intrinsically valuable whole is also intrinsically valuable, the whole is said by Moore to possess ultimate value. But I would rather say that such a whole possesses pure or unmixed value and reserve the term 'ultimate value' for value which represents a kind that cannot be reduced to any other. Thus truth, beauty and goodness are ultimate values, because they are irreducible kinds.

There is a kind of value which is neither strictly intrinsic nor strictly instrumental, but which constitutes an essential element in intrinsic value. In a teleological whole which possesses intrinsic value as a whole, every part is necessary for the whole and so far may be regarded as intrinsically valuable. But if the parts are taken separately and not in their place as organic elements in the whole, they may not be valuable at all, and so far they are like things possessing instrumental value. The difference, however, between such value, which I would call contributory value, and instrumental value, is that, while what possesses instrumental value is external to the thing possessing intrinsic value to which it is instrumental, what possesses contributory value is an essential element in, a constitutive part of, what possesses intrinsic value. What possesses contributory value may even be evil by itself. Hunger by itself, for instance, is evil, but hunger satisfied is good. Those who deny that evil is ultimate hold that evil has contributory value and therefore is not evil in the end, though it may be evil when taken by itself.

Intrinsic value may be relative or absolute. This distinction is important because it explains how something that is judged good may yet be found to be not good, and conversely how something that is judged evil may yet not be wholly evil. There are degrees of goodness and everything has some value from some point of view. What is absolutely valuable is valuable under all circumstances and against all competitors and never turns out to be not valuable, but what is relatively valuable is valuable only within certain limits. It may be that there is nothing absolutely valuable in the sense here defined, and I think that nothing finite is absolutely valuable. But Ethics is based on the ideal of absolute value and anything is considered ethically good in proportion as it approximates to this ideal. Moral values, then, are absolute values so far as absolute values are possible. This may sound paradoxical, but what it means in practice is that moral values are the highest values possible for man. Absolute value must not be confounded with intrinsic value as explained above. Moore's definition of intrinsic value makes it necessarily absolute also. What possesses intrinsic value once, according to him, possesses it always, because intrinsic value does not depend upon anything but the nature of the valuable thing itself, and therefore nothing outside the thing can affect it. Moore's view is atomistic, and means that there are many independent intrinsic values each of which is a value in its own right and therefore absolute, and that either the different intrinsic values cannot conflict with one another or are all of them equally absolute even when they conflict with one another. But there is no reason why intrinsic value should be regarded as necessarily absolute. Intrinsic value is intrinsic in so far as it is distinguished from instrumental value ; it is value which a thing possesses independently of anything else. And this may be true of relative value also. What possesses relative value which is intrinsic possesses it

independently of anything else ; but the value it possesses is relative because it may cease to be value if it conflicts with the value of another thing which is preferable. What possesses intrinsic relative value not only does not need the existence of anything else to make it valuable, but on the contrary would have its relative value converted into absolute value if there were nothing else in the world besides it.

We may now turn to consider more precisely the general nature of value as such. Is there any one quality which constitutes the nature of value and is the same in every instance of value ? W. D. ROSS, in his book on *The Right and the Good*, thinks that there is no presumption that there is any such quality. For instance, conscientiousness may be good because it is conscientiousness, and benevolence may be good because it is benevolence, and there may be no one quality which is the same in both. And the conclusion at which Ross himself arrives is that the different instances of good are not good in the same *sense*. I must confess that I fail to understand this. Conscientiousness may not be benevolence and benevolence may not be conscientiousness because they are two different species of good. Similarly blue is not yellow and yellow is not blue, and, further, there is no quality common to the two ; but yet the two are species of the same genus, and we do not say that they are not both colours in the same sense. Therefore, unless the term 'good' is used equivocally, conscientiousness and benevolence, though they are different species of good, must have something in common, must have a common genus. That there is no *specific* quality common to the two does not prove that they do not come under the same definition, or that they do not possess a common *generic* quality. It is not my purpose here to inquire what precisely is a quality and whether the generic qualities of anything are qualities other than and distinct from its specific qualities. The problem about the

true nature of universals is a difficult problem requiring a separate detailed treatment which I cannot give it here. Ross himself is inclined to admit that there is a common fact present whenever the term 'good' is used. This common fact is, according to him, 'that in each case the *judger* has some feeling of approval or interest towards what he calls good.' Then why should we not say that this common fact constitutes the generic meaning of good, instead of holding, as Ross does, that it only connects our *application* of the word in various senses? The only reason seems to be that nothing can be held to constitute the meaning of good unless it is an objective quality residing in the thing called good, independently of any attitude of the *judger* to it. That the *judger* feels approval in relation to a thing cannot constitute the meaning of the goodness of the thing. To admit that would be to play into the hands of the idealist.

I think that, though there is reason for holding that goodness is not a quality like colour, yet goodness, whatever it is, is something common to all instances of goodness. Goodness is not like colour because it is a *relational* quality, not merely a quality which is the result of a relation but a quality which expresses a relation. The judgment "this rose is red" attributes to the rose a quality which in its *meaning* does not involve a reference to mind, even though it may not be capable of *existing* independently of relation to mind. But the judgment "this rose is beautiful" definitely states in its content that a demand of the judging mind has been satisfied. This is why I cannot agree with Moore that good is just like yellow in being unanalysable. Yellow, as a perceived quality, does not *mean* what we obtain by analysing the physical conditions of its production; but good, I think, does *mean* that a demand of the mind is satisfied. Therefore, though 'yellow' is undefinable, 'good' is not. Good is what fulfils a tendency of the mind. Thus good may be said

to be an object of desire. This does not mean that there must be an actual desire for a thing in order that it may be judged good, but it means that the thing must be such that if we had thought of it we should have desired it. Nor does desire for a thing mean desire for its possession, but desire that it should be what it is. Whether a thing is good because we desire it or we desire it because it is good, is, as Bradley has pointed out, an illegitimate question, because it separates elements which cannot be separated. This point raises a metaphysical question of great importance ; but this is not the place to discuss it. To state briefly, and without attempting to prove, what I consider to be the truth, the unity of the desiring mind and the desired thing is logically prior to the separation, which is not quite a separation, that desire represents. From the point of view of desire, therefore, good is good because it is its fulfilment ; but at the same time desire itself is there because of the prior unity. Desire is the implicit unity at a lower level of elements which constitute an explicit unity at a higher level. This may appear too dogmatic, but I cannot help it in an inquiry which must necessarily be brief and does not allow long digressions.

The definition of good as an object of desire leads us to a consideration of the claim of pleasure to be good. Is pleasure good, and can we go still further and say that pleasure is the only good ? Ross, who does not endorse the view I have here taken of value, nevertheless thinks that mental states alone have intrinsic value and that pleasure is one of the ultimate intrinsic values, the others being knowledge and virtue. I think, however, that from the nature of value it does not follow that mental states alone have intrinsic value, and, further, that either pleasure is the only value or that it is not a value at all. I shall not discuss the view that only mental states have intrinsic value. But the view which makes pleasure a value appears to me to be somewhat

confused. Pleasure must be distinguished from what is pleasant, and then it is a question whether pleasure in the abstract can be an object of desire. We may aim at pleasant objects, but I do not know what aiming at pleasure by itself is. But if, when it is said that pleasure is a value, it is meant that pleasant objects are valuable, and if by pleasant objects are meant objects that cause satisfaction of any kind and not only sentient pleasure, then, I think, only pleasant objects are values ; for then pleasant objects are all objects that are desired, whether explicitly or implicitly. Even when we forgo a pleasure to perform a duty, the performance of duty is a desired object and gives us pleasure when it is attained. Thus pleasure is always good and only pleasure is good. But this, I think, is a loose way of speaking and perhaps also of thinking. When, for instance, we feel thirsty and drink water and feel pleasure, what is it that is good here ? Is it the drinking of water when we feel thirsty, or is it the feeling of pleasure that follows or accompanies the satisfaction of thirst ? If it is the feeling of pleasure, then we may ask, why is it good ? If it is answered that we find it good and cannot say why because there is no why, goodness being unanalysable, then I say that I do not find anything simply good, that whenever I find anything good I like it, *i. e.*, it gives me pleasure. Thus, then, if the feeling of pleasure consequent on the satisfaction of thirst is good and not the satisfaction of thirst itself, then the feeling of pleasure is liked and beyond it there is another feeling of pleasure which should be considered good too, and beyond that second feeling of pleasure which is good there is a third feeling of pleasure, and so on endlessly, so that we never come to the feeling of pleasure which is good without being a means to a further feeling of pleasure. Therefore, it is not the consequent state of pleasure that is intrinsically good, but that which produces this state of pleasure ; in other words,

it is what I like that I find good and not my liking it. In fact the feeling of pleasure cannot be separated from the object which gives pleasure, but is rather a sign that the object is good. From all this I should conclude that, not pleasure by itself, but what is pleasant, is good, and that all that is good, in so far as it is an object of desire, is pleasant.

It may be questioned whether everything that is pleasant is good. May we not sometimes doubt whether what is pleasant is really good? And will not this mean that to be pleasant is not necessarily to be good, though what is pleasant may sometimes be good? My answer is that what is pleasant is always, so far, good, but that it is not always absolutely good. Pleasures are not to be taken in isolation, and we find that one pleasure may conflict with another which is preferable, and so, though relatively good, may not be good under all circumstances. The science which considers values in relation to one another so as to determine which are to be preferred and which not, is Ethics, which may thus be said to be the science of absolute values in the sense in which absolute values are possible. When we doubt whether what is pleasant is really good, what we doubt is whether it is *morally* good. We may put it in another way and say that what we doubt is whether what we desire in a certain state of knowledge we would desire if our knowledge were complete, or whether what we find pleasant under certain circumstances would continue to be pleasant under all circumstances.

Ross, who will not accept the essential reference to the judging mind involved in a judgment of value, makes value a quality of the object by itself, independently of any relation of the object to mind. But he makes it a quality of a peculiar character—a consequential quality like a logical 'property', but, unlike a logical property, always strictly consequential and never constitutive. What is ordinarily called a property in Logic is arbitrarily or conventionally so

called. We might just as well have selected it to be an essential attribute and what are considered essential attributes might have been regarded as properties. Ross does not say that value is the only property that is strictly consequential, and as a matter of fact there are properties other than value which are not properties only by arbitrary convention. Man's capacity for speech, for instance, follows from his rationality and cannot by any means be regarded as a fundamental attribute, with rationality following from it. But man's capacity for speech, though strictly consequential, is a constitutive quality of man. A quality that is strictly consequential may, then, be a constitutive quality; and so, if value is not a constitutive quality, it cannot be only because it is consequential. The difference between a consequential quality like value and a consequential quality that is also constitutive, is that, while the latter cannot *exist* independently of the fundamental quality from which it follows but can be *known* independently of it, the former can neither exist nor be known independently of the fundamental quality from which it is said to follow. This is so because a consequential quality like value does not follow from the so-called fundamental quality by itself but follows from it *as known*. And this is the whole contention of the idealistic theory of value.

There is thus necessarily a subjective element in value. I do not like the distinction usually made between subjective and objective. It is very vague, and I doubt whether there is anything that can be called purely subjective. Many of those who maintain the objectivity of value in the sense of complete independence of mind seem to think that if value is not objective in this sense it must be purely subjective. But this is a mistake. Unless there are minds there can be no value, as I have tried to show above; but this does not mean that value has no objectivity at all. It does not mean that if I think something good and another person thinks the

same thing bad, both of us may be right. When, for instance, I say "I like sugar" and another person says "I do not like sugar", the two statements do not contradict each other, because I make a statement about *my* taste in relation to sugar and the other person makes a statement about *his* taste in relation to sugar. But when I say "pleasure is good" and another person says "pleasure is not good," we do contradict each other, because the two statements are about the same thing. The reference to mind which there necessarily is in such judgments is not to an individual mind as in "I like sugar," but to mind in general. Judgments of value are objective in so far as they are not subjective like such judgments as "I like sugar"; but they are also subjective in so far as they are not objective like such judgments as "this rose is red." They are subjective-objective. I think there is some confusion when it is held that a beautiful object would still be beautiful even if there were no mind to appreciate it. The confusion is between what is valuable and its value, between what is good and its goodness. Benevolence, for instance, is good; but the "objectivists" themselves admit that its goodness is different from itself, being a consequential quality, while benevolence is a constitutive quality. What the "objectivists" have in their mind is that the judging subject does not *add* a valuable quality to an object, that, for example, the judging subject does not *make* a man benevolent; and so far they are right. But what the idealists maintain is, not that the judging subject adds a valuable quality to an object by judging it, but that the quality judged valuable would not be *valuable* if there were no subject to judge it. And this much, I believe, may be admitted without difficulty. For why should anything be good or bad except so far as it satisfies or does not satisfy? Why should dishonesty, for instance, be bad in itself? If it exists, it exists, and there is nothing more to be said about it. When we call

it bad, we mean that it conflicts with a standard, falls short of an ideal, frustrates a purpose ; and in order that this may happen it is not enough that dishonesty alone should exist, but there must also be the standard, the ideal, the purpose, by reference to which it is judged. Will the "objectivists" say that standards, ideals and purposes can exist independently of minds ?

It may be asked what mind or minds must be satisfied in order that a true judgment of value may be possible. Must a thing to be good satisfy a particular mind, or any mind, or the minds of the majority of mankind, or the minds of all mankind ? Whichever of these alternatives is chosen, it can be shown that the judgment need not be true, and therefore it may be concluded that whether a thing is good or bad does not depend upon any one's mental attitude. But I think the question is not to be settled by votes ; it is not a question of number at all. Whether one man finds a thing good, or many find it good, or all find it good, is quite immaterial. Value is what satisfies a mind whose ideas are clear and comprehensive and coherent. That finally is the only reliable test in every case, whether of truth, beauty or goodness. The criterion has to be internal and is necessarily fallible in application, though theoretically infallible in character. We can never be absolutely sure in any case that a judgment about truth or goodness or beauty is true. All judgments have to be only relative and are liable to correction as our experience grows more comprehensive and coherent.

Those who fail to see this appear to me to overlook the nature of mind. Mind is a mirror of reality. And it is not a mere figure of speech to call mind a mirror. There is no other form of expression that can bring out equally truly the

very peculiar character of mind. When the whole of reality is reflected in a part of it in the form of ideas explicit or implicit, that part is a mind. It is an essential characteristic of a mind that what in one sense is outside it is in another sense inside it. What is outside it in existence is inside it in idea. Mind is necessarily self-transcendent, or rather, the self-transcendence of any part of reality is its mind. All this will sound grossly metaphorical or mythical to thinkers who consider themselves hard-headed because they do not want to understand the nature of mind except on the basis of their understanding of physical nature. But to import materialistic prepossessions into the study of mind is unphilosophical. Mind is, *prima facie* at least, different from matter, and therefore must be studied as it presents itself and without any bias derived from familiarity with the method of physical science. If we study it so, we find that its essence is to reflect in its own ideas reality which is other than itself. This, I think, is the whole essence of idealism. And it is also the ground of value ; for value is nothing else than the result of harmony between reality outside mind and the ideas of mind. Very often there is a discrepancy between the two. There is bound to be a discrepancy as long as a mind is finite and is therefore an imperfect reflection of reality. And then there is a process of adjustment set up in which the finite mind either tries to adjust itself to what is outside it or tries to adjust what is outside it to its ideas. In the former case the value it seeks to realize is truth, in the latter case it is moral good. If the mind were to be perfectly clear, *i. e.*, if it were to be infinite, there would cease to be any discrepancy between idea and existence and consequently there would be no judgment and no value at all. The aim of knowledge is such a consummation from one point of view, and the aim of ethics is such a consummation from another

point of view. And religion, which is based on a faith in the conservation of all our ultimate values, assumes that such a consummation is already real and seeks to efface the finite individual in the Infinite.

Idealism Versus Realism—A critical estimate of Dr. Stace's 'Refutation of Realism'

By

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The intellectual atmosphere of every age carries a stock of dominant ideas which favour a particular type of faith. The explicit reasons which are consciously advanced in support of it and are readily found to be convincing, supplies in reality only a part of the grounds for its acceptance, the other part is supplied by the atmosphere of ideas which form the background of the mind of the people of that age. The present world with its practical outlook and work-a-day maxims supplies the best atmosphere for realistic thought. Of the different types of realism, the one that can justify *in toto* or with the least modification the common-sense beliefs, values and hopes of the majority has a far greater chance than any other. No wonder, therefore, that realists have won an easy victory over the idealists who are more or less misfits for the age. A few realists like Moore and Perry feel the necessity and take the trouble of coolly analysing the arguments of the opponents to refute them by adequate reasoning; but a great majority of them, in which one can sometimes find even a pioneer like Russell, carry their points by brilliant dashes which dismiss some of the well established doctrines of great masters like Kant and Hegel, with an overpowering laugh or sarcasm, joke or rebuke. They are unconsciously confident of the *Zeit-geist* and successfully keep in its line without much ado. While realism is thus playing the bully, idealism is playing the coward. One can scarcely find an idealist (at least in Great Britain and America) who boldly preaches his view, without stammering, qualifying and apologising. At best the idealist plays a tame, defensive game guarding his home.

In such a pass it is highly interesting and delightful to find in Dr. Stace, a bold champion of idealism, who is capable of carrying "the war into the enemy's camp" in this realistic age.¹ It is, however, still more amusing to see that the author of "*The Critical History of Greek Philosophy*" and "*The Philosophy of Hegel*" can at times unbend his high idealism to imitate the more valiant fighters of the realistic camp in their brilliant dashes and stabs, rushing a little beyond the idealistic field of cool reasoning, so as to answer tats by tits.

It is, therefore, with great admiration, though not unmixed with amusement, that we have witnessed Dr. Stace's two bold attempts in the pages of '*Mind*'² and '*The Journal of Philosophy*'³ in vindication of idealism. He has succeeded, to a very great extent, in pointing out the precariousness of realism as a theory and especially in showing that in this matter it sails at least in the same boat with idealism—that "They are both founded upon dogmatic unproved assumptions."⁴ But in some places he has been a little unfair to realistic thinkers by underrating some of their contributions and claiming originality for some suggestions which have been put forward long ago by realistic thinkers. We shall mention some of these points here and raise afterwards a more fundamental issue which is of great importance for his conclusion.

One of the most fundamental propositions asserted by realism is, according to him, that "external things exist (some of them at any rate) when no mind is aware of them"⁵

1. *Mind*, July, 1934, p. 148.

2. April, 1934

3. July 5, 1934.

4. *Journal of Philosophy*; p. 367

5. Ibid, p. 366.

Having shown that this proposition cannot be logically proved and, therefore, realism cannot be logically justified, he concedes this proposition, however, a place for practical life. But how, he asks, can this proposition be entertained at all? In reply he states that this proposition can be accepted only by boldly admitting, like a geometer, that it is 'convenient' just as the unproved twelfth axiom of Euclid is. This convenience, he further points out, lies in the simplicity of this belief, as against the complexity of the alternative belief that "there exist multitudes of successive universes, which come into existence and go out of existence with blank intervals of non existence separating them."⁶ He then complains that realists do not see these true psychological reasons which actually lead one to accept the realistic proposition of the interperceptual existence of external things. Comparing philosophers obviously realists, with the geometers he remarks 'The only difference is that philosophers have *neither the wit nor the intellectual courage* which the mathematicians exhibited in the like situation. They keep on *timidly and feebly* running back to the tent of common sense."⁷ Again, "The realist can find no foundation for it but his miserable 'common sense'.....he throws up his hands in despair and appeals blindly to instinct"⁸ "Realism fails to give," he concludes, "nay more, refuses to try to give, any account whatever of its ultimate principles."⁹

But it is amusing to remember that the suggestions he makes are neither new nor unknown to realists. As early as 1912 Russell discussed thread-bare the status of the belief in the continuous existence of unperceived external objects and

6. Ibid,p 368

7. *J. ph.*,p. 367 (our italics)

8. Ibid,p. 368

9. Ibid,p. 369

clearly pointed out that this belief is supported by the comparative simplicity of this hypothesis as contrasted with the opposite one of momentary and repeated appearances of the object during the times of perception.¹⁰ Even in a recent book *The Scientific Outlook* (1931), Russell goes a step further to open the question of the belief in the existence of an external object even while it is perceived. He plainly confesses that no strict logical argument can lead us from the sensations which we have about a reality, 'Jones', to the belief in his extra-mental existence. He further points out clearly that 'Jones' is a convenient hypothesis ! (p 81).

We fail, therefore, to understand how Dr. Stace can retain his suggestion that the principles of simplicity and convenience were unknown to the realists, till he wrote his article in the *Journal of Philosophy*, July, 5, 1934 (where he triumphantly asserts—"How this 'instinctive belief' arose he (realist) cannot explain, and he fails to see that it even needs explanation, much less that it can be explained quite simply. For the account of the matter given in this article is the explanation of the realist's mysterious 'common sense'." p. 368)

'Animal faith' or 'instinctive belief' which is the article for scepticism in practical life is not even an original conception of the realists (to whom Dr. Stace attributes it), though it is being used widely now by realists like Santayana and Russell. Towards the end of his *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* (Sect. 12, part 2) Hume, himself suggests the remedy and shows also that practical convenience is *for* the instinctive belief in external objects and it subverts scepticism. "The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of

10. Dr. Stace himself confesses this fact about Russell in *Mind* (p. 148). But in his criticism of realism, he seems to count the realists without Russell. Vide Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*.

scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life." ¹¹

It is not too much to say, then, that the suggestions for the principles of convenience can be found in some form even in Hume. But some contemporary realists, like Russell, have stated it more explicitly, and at least as clearly as Dr. Stace has done.

Coming to the merit of his conclusion, we must acknowledge that Dr. Stace has rightly and efficiently pointed out that both realism and idealism are ultimately founded on faith; logic cannot lead them right up to the position they want to reach, regarding the interperceptual existence of external objects. Legitimately one can speak of the existence of an object only while it is perceived. To deny or to assert the existence of it 'during interperceptual intervals' one has to leave behind the *terra firma* of certainty and travel in faith.

But curiously enough he does not continue to hold the balance evenly between the two sides, but leans towards idealism even after this confession, on the plea of the burden of proof.¹² Calling the proposition, 'External things exist (some of them at any rate) when no mind is aware of them,' P and its contradictory not-P, he goes on to assert that "the burden of proof is on those who assert P and not those who assert not-P. And as neither can discharge this burden the case goes to the asserters of not-P."¹³

In defence of this he submits the following explanation :—
"You assert that the table exists when no one is perceiving it. Then it is for you to prove that. It is not for me to prove

11. *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*
pp. 158-9 (Oxford Edition)

12. J. Ph., p. 370, also Mind, p. 148.

13. J. Ph., p. 370

that it is not true. I am logically entitled to accept or believe it till you give some demonstration of it.¹⁴ But since, "the burden of proof is on those who assert that P is true," he concludes "and since they cannot bring even an iota of evidence to prove it, we cannot accept it. It is better for us to believe in not-P."¹⁵

The logic of this conclusion is highly objectionable. If P and not-P are two contradictory propositions, not-P can be held only if P is positively contradicted and not if P is simply unproved. Every logician will admit the gulf of difference that lies between 'contradiction' and 'mere want of proof'. If P is unproved and not-P is unprovable (as Dr. Stace confesses) and therefore unproved, we come to a state of suspense of judgment, where both the alternatives retain equal force. How then can the idealist benefit by the realist's failure to prove the existence of the external object?

The fact is that a realist and an idealist are equally embarrassed here and any step that each takes forward commits him to a fallacy.

The guiding thought of the realist is: Why disbelieve the object whose existence cannot be disproved? That of the idealist is: Why believe in the object whose existence cannot be proved. Realists, like Mr. Russell, urge the first consideration in refuting the idealism of Berkeley. Idealists, like Stace, urge the second in rejecting realism. Both transgress the limits of valid thought, when they take it for granted that absence of disproof justifies belief and acceptance or that absence of proof justifies disbelief and denial.

Belief (acceptance) and disbelief (denial)¹⁶ do not exhaust

14. Ibid

15. Ibid p. 371

16. If by 'disbelieve', Dr. Stace means only 'not to believe' or to 'doubt' then his Idealism becomes indistinguishable from scepticism.

all the rational attitudes of a philosopher towards a proposition. Doubt or mere suspense of judgment is the third possible attitude. The failure of the realist to prove the existence of the object and the failure of the idealist to disprove its existence equally point to one rational position, namely suspense of judgment. One who tries to remove the suspense either to assert or to deny the existence of the object invites the risk of shouldering the burden of proof, irrespective of the question whether he is a realist or an idealist.

There is one thing which disturbs this attitude of suspense and inclines us towards the belief in the existence of the object (whether during the moments of perception or during the inter-perceptual intervals). That is the pressure of practical necessity. Dr. Stace himself admits it and Hume showed it long ago, as we have already pointed out.

It appears, therefore, that other things being equal, if any body has any special advantage by which to disturb the suspense it is the realist, whose faith is favoured by its practical utility.

The position then comes to this : "philosophically and logically" (to speak in Dr. Stace's words with necessary modification) P and not P are equally unprovable and, therefore, unacceptable. "But in practice P is preferable to not-P," as Dr Stace himself admits.¹⁷ Therefore clearly it is P which weighs more against not-P.

But, for Dr. Stace, there is a logic-tight wall between (philosophy and logic) and (practice). All thinkers will not support him and some may demand that the test of the truth of a philosophical theory lies in its practical utility. Even if these objections are forgotten, we do not know how Dr Stace can extricate himself from scepticism or suspense of judgment and can fare any better than the realist.

Even after what has been said above, one doubt my stand in the way of accepting our argument. Can we not legitimately deny the existence of a tiger in a room on the ground that we fail to perceive it? If so why should we not deny the existence of the object which we fail to perceive or prove the existence of in any other way? This raises an important problem of epistemology which should be briefly answered here.¹⁸ We can surely deny the existence of an object for want of proof, only if we are sure that if the object existed it would have been surely known. We deny the existence of the tiger in the room, when the place is well lighted, eyesight is sound, there is nothing to conceal it etc. so that we can argue—"Had the tiger been there it would have been perceived." But once we commit ourselves to the view that what we can perceive are the sensations about objects, there is no kind of proof that can lead us beyond the sensations, to the objects behind them, as Dr. Stace himself admits. Therefore we cannot argue here, as elsewhere, that if the underlying object existed (either during perception or during interperceptual intervals) it would have been perceived or known otherwise. Consequently, here want of proof does not entitle us to the denial of the object.

We can conclude, therefore, that if practical utility be any test of the truth of a belief, realism is clearly the more acceptable theory and if not, then idealism and realism should both make room for the more honest theory namely scepticism. An idealist, who takes the unwarranted step beyond this position and tries to defend himself by pointing out that the realist also has done so, only takes recourse to

18. For a fuller discussion of 'non-cognition as a source of knowledge' vide the present writer's '*Six ways of Knowing*,' Book III (George Allen & Unwin).

the childish argument, *tu quoque*. If the premises of Dr. Stace are accepted, idealism is as much guilty of denying the object (during perception or interperceptual moments), as realism is of accepting it.

Kant's view of intellectual intuition

By

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Considering the rôle which intuition plays in the philosophy of to-day, it would be interesting to examine what view Kant held on the subject.

Kant broadly divided intuition into two classes—intellectual and sensuous. The former he denied to human beings and reserved exclusively for God, though even in the case of God its existence could not be proved by any kind of logical proof.¹ For God however, it is the normal method of knowledge. It is absurd, Kant thought, that God should know with the help of discursive reasoning, for the latter involves limitation. As Vaihinger has pointed out, even as early as 1755 in his *Nova Dilucidatio* Kant held the view that God's knowledge cannot be discursive.

God's knowledge, therefore, must be intuitive. But again, it cannot be through sensuous intuition ; for sensuous intuition is always coloured by the forms of Space and Time. Kant, however, is emphatic in declaring that space and time are to be excluded from God's knoweldge. In his Pos-

(1) See Max Müller's translation of the Critique of Pure Reason 2nd edition, revised, p. 735 ; "For the reason mentioned before, the latter intuition (intellectual intuition) seems only to belong to the First Being and never to one which is dependent, both in its existence and its intuition (which intuition determine its existence with reference to given objects). This latter remark however must only be taken as an illustration of our aesthetic theory and not as a proof."

thumous Works, Vol. XXI. 396, he affirms. "The present, past and future do not exist for God" ²

Thus we find that from his pre-Critical days onwards, Kant has held the view (1) that God's knowledge cannot be discursive, (2) that it cannot be through sensuous intuition. Therefore, by a process of elimination he concludes that it must be through intellectual intuition. Of course, we can not state it as a proved fact, for we cannot prove that God has knowledge, or indeed, anything about the nature of God.

In spite of his repeated declarations³ that we cannot in any way prove anything about God and His knowledge, it is clear that in Kant's view three things can be asserted about God and his knowledge,⁴ namely :

- (1) God is for us no object of intuition.
- (2) God is for Himself no object of sensuous intuition.
- (3) God's method of knowing things can only be intuitive and not discursive.

Leaving aside for the present the first point, one can say two things about God's knowledge, namely, (a) that He is for Himself no object of a sensuous intuition, and (b) that He knows things intuitively and not discursively. The reasons which Kant gives for these views are briefly as follows :

(a) Sensuous intuition is dependent upon the existence of objects. A God, therefore, who would know through sensuous intuition would be no God. In order to draw

(2) This quotation I have taken from Vaihinger, *Commentu Zu Kant's Kritikete*, p. 506.

(3) These declarations Kant is bound to make, for to say that we have any knowledge of God or about the nature of God's knowledge would be inconsistent with the teaching of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

(4) Vide Vaihinger, *Commentary* p. 508

pointed attention to the fact that God's knowledge of Himself can under no circumstances be dependent on the existence of objects, Kant uses the term *intuitus originarius* with reference to God's intuition, as contrasted with *intuitus derivativus* which alone he grants to man. God's intuition is original, because it is not dependent upon or derived from, any object, but on the contrary, all objects owe their existence to the intuition of God. Human intuition, on the other hand, is derivative. It cannot function except through objects which are already given for it.

(b) Discursive thinking is limited by the categories, and for God no categories can exist. Categorial knowledge is, moreover, always indirect knowledge; it is the knowledge of a thing through universals, and therefore, no complete knowledge. It is impossible, therefore, to speak of God's knowledge as discursive.

Now, what exactly is Kant's meaning in asserting that God's knowledge is through intellectual intuition? Vaihinger quotes a remark of Kant's on Swedenborg's conception of "intuition" which seems to throw a flood of light on the real meaning of Kant. Kant says,⁵ "Swedenborg says: The world of spirits constitutes a peculiar real universe; it is the *mundus intelligibilis* which must be distinguished from the *mundus sensibilis*. He says:—All spiritual natures stand in intimate connection with one another, etc..." "Now our souls as spirits live with one another in this connection and communion, and that in this world; only we do not see ourselves in this communion because we have still a *sensuous intuition*; but though we do not see ourselves in it, yet we are in it. If now the obstacle to a spiritual intuition is removed, we see ourselves

(5) The passages quoted here have been taken from Vaihinger's *Commentu Zu Kant's Kritikete* Vol II. p. 513.

in this spiritual communion, and this is the other world; now these are not other things but the same which we, however, intuit differently."

The meaning of these passages is quite clear. It is only the presence of sensuous intuition that stands in the way of human beings seeing things as they really are. If once this veil of sensuous intuition is removed by intellectual intuition, things would present themselves to us in a different light. They would no longer be phenomena but noumena.

Knowledge *qua* knowledge, therefore, is not limited to the phenomenal. It is only the veil of sensuous intuition, which is a peculiar defect of human beings, that limits knowledge to phenomena. That knowledge itself has not got this limitation we see plainly in the case of God's knowledge which clearly discerns things as they are in themselves.

This is the general standpoint of Kant in his pre-Critical stage and also the one with which Kant started in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But Kant introduced two important modifications of it in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the first place, as a compensation for his limitation in the theoretical domain, Kant offers man unlimited scope in the region of moral life. The contact with the domain of unconditioned reality which is denied him in the sphere of knowledge, is allowed him in the region of moral life. Secondly, Kant revives another of his pre-Critical views, namely, his view of the "transcendental object," or the absolutely undetermined thing-in-itself, existing completely outside of consciousness. Thirdly, as Kant proceeds with the *Critique*, a higher conception of reality dawns upon his mind, namely, that of a completely unified whole, to which he gives the name *Idea of Reason*. I propose to deal with these points *seriatim*.

(1) The net result of his view of intellectual intuition, as also of his view that access to unconditioned reality is through the region of practice, is epistemological pheno-

menalism. That human knowledge can only be of phenomena, that noumena are for ever shut out from this scope of human knowledge—this conclusion is entirely due to Kant's adopting the view of intellectual intuition I have just mentioned. Why is human knowledge phenomenal? Because it can never get rid of its sensuous covering. If only the veil of sense could be removed, human knowledge could penetrate to the region of noumena.

Kant does allow this veil to be removed, but not in the case of knowledge. Human reason can be freed entirely from the clutches of the senses, but not in the sphere of knowledge. In knowledge she is for ever chained to a foreign element which she can never make her own. I have compared this position of reason in knowledge elsewhere ⁶ to that of Faust in Goethe's celebrated drama. Just as Faust is chained for ever to a devil, so in knowledge reason is for ever chained to sensuous element which she can neither get rid of nor make her own. Caird also has pointed out ⁷ that what Kant seeks is a complete unity of reason with herself which Knowledge cannot give, because it cannot get rid of the element furnished by the senses.

One reason why Kant wants such limits to be put to knowledge is that he has not been able to shake himself free from the religious prejudices of the Middle Ages. It seems to him nothing short of sacrilege that knowledge, by which he means Categorical knowledge resting upon a sensuous basis, should extend to the sacred domain of morality and religion. His oft-quoted words, ⁸ "I am not allowed

(6) Vide *Logic of the Real* (Proceedings of the Second Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Benares 1926) p. 178.

(7) Vide *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, 2nd edition, Vol I. p. 370

(8) Max Müller, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Translation) (Second Edition, revised), p. 700

therefore even to *assume*, for the sake of the necessary practical employment of my reason, *God, freedom and immortality*, if I cannot deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insights.....I had therefore to remove *knowledge*, in order to make room for belief," indicate a distinct religious bias.

Another reason is that Kant believes it is a sufficient compensation for the limited sphere which he has allowed to knowledge, that he has given reason an ample field in the region of practice. Kant, indeed, tauntingly remarks that the restriction of knowledge, if it can be called a loss at all, is a loss "that affects only the *Monopoly of the schools*, and and by no means the interests of humanity."⁹ The loss is undoubtedly a serious one, and it is a very poor compensation for it that a more extended sphere is given to reason in her practical domain. It is like killing a man's son and then trying to compensate him for his loss by offering gifts of money or other material goods. There is no common measure between what is taken away and what is given as a substitute.

(2) I come now to the second point I have mentioned above, namely, the doctrine of the transcendental object which, as Norman Smith has pointed out, is a pre-Critical survival.¹⁰ This doctrine plays a very important part in the First Edition of the Critique but is almost completely dropped in the Second Edition. It is thus defined by Kant.

"Appearances are themselves nothing but sensuous representations which must not be taken as capable of existing in themselves (an sich) with exactly the same character (in

(9) Ibid, p. 701

(10) Vide *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 204. Norman Smith claims to be the first to discover this.

eben derselben Art) outside our power of representation."¹¹ (A104).

"They have their object, but an object which can never be intuited by us, and which may therefore be named the non-empirical, i.e. transcendental object—*n*" (A, 109).

This transcendental object is further conceived as one which gives order and connection to our representations, and therefore performs the function which in the central portions of the Critique of Pure Reason is assigned to the empirical object. It is thus totally opposed to the central teaching of the Critique, as Norman Smith has very clearly pointed out.¹² If no other evidence was forthcoming, this circumstance alone would stamp it as pre-Critical. It is quite evident that when Kant formulated this doctrine in the First Edition of the Critique he had not yet grasped the phenomenalist standpoint which is the real standpoint of the Critique.

The thing-in-itself, conceived as the transcendental object, is expressed in negative terms: it is a 'non-empirical object,' 'an object which can never be intuited by us,' etc. From this purely negative conception it is a great advance when it is regarded as a *nuomenon*, that is, as the object of an intellectual intuition. It is true that in the chapter on 'Phenomena and Noumena' it is on the whole regarded as a limiting concept, but in the same chapter it is also said that it is a limiting concept only when it is viewed negatively, that is, regarded as *not* an object of sensuous intuition, and it is clearly stated that it has also a positive aspect as an object of a non-sensuous (that is, intellectual) intuition.

(11) This, and the question which follows, are both given in the form in which they occur in Norman Smith's *Commentary* p. 205.

(12) Ibid, p. 206.

This positive aspect is more clearly presented to us in the section on 'The Amphiboly of the Reflective Concepts.' In that section Kant makes a statement¹³ which clearly indicates the positive character of the noumenon. It is true Kant regards it as problematic, but at the same time he clearly admits that it is indispensably involved in the constitution of our empirical knowledge.

What I want to say is that this doctrine of a noumenon as an object of an intellectual intuition is also a pre-Critical survival. I have already shown that it is found in a very early writing, namely, the *Nova Dilucidatio* (1755) written twenty six years before the first Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is also quite as abstract as the doctrine of the transcendental object. The change, in fact, from the transcendental object to the noumenon, as Caird has pointed out in a remarkable passage of his *Critical Philosophy of Kant* is one from the 'abstractly real' to the abstractly ideal. The passage in question is so important that I do not hesitate to quote it here in full :

"When we retrace these steps, it becomes evident that the end and the beginning of Kant's Critique have close relation to each other, although in the beginning the thing-in-itself appears as an object which produces affection in our sensibility, whereas in the end it appears as a noumenon which the mind requires because it does not find in experience an object adequate to itself; in other words, it appears in the

(13) This statement is quoted by Norman Smith in his Commentary p. 411 and runs as follows ; "For it (intellectual intuition) merely says that our species of intuition does not extend to all things, but only to objects of our senses ; that its objective validity is consequently limited ; and that a place therefore remains open for some other species of intuition and so for things as its objects" (A. 286 — B 343).

beginning as abstractly real, and in the end as abstractly ideal."¹⁴

To the concept of the noumenon also there clings, therefore, the same abstract character as does to the concept of the thing in itself. Consequently, from the point of view of concreteness, there is no advance in the change from the standpoint of the transcendental object to that of the noumenon.

(3) Such a change, however, occurs when we pass from the noumenon to the Ideas of Reason. It is a pity Caird does not see this, although he all but points to this when he says :

"And the lesson of the *Dialectic* is that this necessarily connected experience is still an inadequate knowledge of objects, till it has been reinterpreted in the light of the relation of all objects to the unity of the self for which they are. Kant goes so far in this direction as to admit the necessity of viewing experience in the light of the Ideas of Reason, but the method of abstraction has such hold upon him that he regards it as impossible that experience should ever be brought into conformity with these Ideas" ¹⁵

I believe that it is the confusion between two things, namely, (1) the abstract character of reality itself, (2) the abstract character of knowledge which makes it impossible for knowledge to get access to reality, which is the reason, why Caird does not see that in the Ideas of Pure Reason, Kant ultimately comes to a conception of reality which is perfectly concrete. Caird is no doubt perfectly right when

(14) Caird : *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, 2nd edition Vol II. p. 136.

(15) Ibid, pp, 142-43

he says that even in the Ideas of Reason, there is an opposition between them and knowledge, which Kant could never reconcile. But this opposition is due not to the Ideas themselves being abstract, but to the fact that to the end Kant stuck to the view of the abstract character of knowledge. The Ideas of Reason seek to realize that completeness and all-inclusiveness which knowledge wants to possess but is inherently incapable of attaining. The all-inclusive Ideas cannot realize themselves in knowledge, just because the latter is so constituted that it can never be all-inclusive. Knowledge no doubt shows a hankering after this all-inclusiveness, but it is a hankering that is never to be satisfied. Indeed, this never-to be-satisfied longing of knowledge is the great tragedy of speculative reason.

Reality, as conceived through the Ideas, consequently, is a higher reality than that given through intellectual intuition. As Norman Smith points out, "the concept, whereby Reason limits sensibility, is not properly describable as being that of the thing-in-itself; it is the unique concept of the phenomenal. Our awareness of the conditioned as being conditioned presupposes, over and above the categories, an antecedent awareness of Ideal standards; and to that latter more fundamental form of consciousness all our criteria of truth and reality are ultimately due".¹⁶

It is not possible, therefore, I think, to identify, as Sir S. Radhakrishnan has done,¹⁷ intellectual intuition with Reason. Kant had passed beyond the stage of intellectual intuition when the idea dawned upon his mind that reality is an all-inclusive whole. It is this latter conception that the Ideas of Reason make clear to us and in this there is a definite transition to a higher view of reality.

(16) Norman Smith: *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 416.

(17) Vide *Idealist view of Life*, p. 165.

I hold, therefore, that the doctrine of intellectual intuition belongs to that phase of Kant's thought to which the transcendental object belongs. It is, in fact, the complement of the latter. As Caird has put it, the object of intellectual intuition is abstractly ideal, just as the transcendental object is abstractly real. The one abstraction is exactly the complement of the other. But Kant passed to a higher and a more concrete conception of reality when he viewed it in the form of the Ideas of Reason. It is true the problem of knowledge remained where it was : to the last it retained its abstract character. Consequently the improvement in the view of reality did not lead to an improvement in the theory of knowledge.

The nature and status of Logical Proposition.

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The doctrine of Proposition has attained some special significance in recent logical discussions. Logic is not where it was in the time of Aristotle and has passed through various transformations. With Aristotle it was a formal science of reasoning ; with Mill, Jevons and Venn it was Methodology of the sciences ; with Bradley and Bosanquet it was rather metaphysical ; with Schiller and Dewey it is pragmatic and lastly with Russell and many modern logicians it is symbolic, mathematical and again a purely formal science. It is in the hands of these last mentioned logicians that the doctrine of proposition has grown into special significance. It is an old controversy whether logic deals with thought or thing or language and the conflict between conceptualistic, realistic and nominalistic schools has led to a synthesis or rather a compromise amongst them and it has been maintained that logic deals with thought of things couched in suitable language. So we find Joseph in modern times defining Logic as a study of our thought about things. Indeed this correlation between the subjective and the objective has been the backbone of the Aritotelian tradition. So Venn in his Empirical Logic warns us against the pitfalls of the over-subjectifying and the over-objectifying tendency in logic. But modern logicians in their attempt to reach the ultimate conditions of validity of inference by carrying the method of analysis very far and taking the clue from the recent developments of Mathematics have declared that the subject-matter of Logic is neither thought nor thing but something

beyond both thought and thing, yet involved in both. Indeed Logic like modern Mathematics has got a domain of its own. It is here that we come across the doctrine of proposition in the modern sense of the term.

But Proposition in this sense does not mean the same thing as with the older school. By Proposition they meant "the verbal expression of Judgment," whereas according to the modern logicians judgment is a mental attitude towards a proposition, which, again is to be regarded as an entity independent of our judgment and thinking. Just as external physical objects have existence of their own independent of our perception, so, the realistic thinkers contend, propositions have a mode of being independent of our judgment and believing. They are, in other words, independent entities having a realm of their own just like Platonic ideas and mathematical truths; and it is with them, specially with their forms and relation that Logic is essentially concerned. According to older logicians Logic deals with thought, with judgments and reasonings, and judgment when expressed in language becomes a proposition. But the modern logicians think that when we analyse a piece of argument we find it consists ultimately of a system of propositions and the validity of the argument is ultimately based upon the formal properties of relations subsisting between propositions. It is these propositions, then, particularly their forms and relations that constitute the subject matter of logical discussions. This paper proposes to discuss the nature and status of these logical propositions.

What, then, is a proposition? It has been variously described as "a sort of thing that can be believed, doubted or supposed; as the objective constituent of a judgment, and as the sort of thing that can be true or false." But none of these descriptions tell us what a proposition is in itself. "Is it composed of the words in which it is stated? Is it something which exists only

in the mind ? Or shall we say that it is of the stuff that facts are made of, existing as these do independently of minds and of the language in which mental states are expressed ? (Mace—*Principles of Logic*).

The proposition has indeed sometimes been defined as the sentence indicative. It is no doubt true that words or sentences made up of words are the first thing given to us. But words or sentences surely cannot be regarded as proposition. Words or language is the means through which propositions are expressed. In modern logic particularly we find the use of quite a lot of non-verbal symbols. So the words and the non-verbal symbols constituting a *statement* are not the proposition. They are simply the expressions of propositions. Propositions are what the statements or sentences *mean*. It is the meaning which constitutes the proposition and it is with such meanings or propositions understood in this sense that logic is concerned.

But if it is meaning which constitutes proposition, then it may be contended, that the proposition is something mental, for meanings can be grasped and apprehended only by a mind and as such their 'esse is percipi or concipi'; they can exist only for a mind and in and through a mind. Indeed the idealistic logicians would accept that line of thinking. According to them judgment is the mental construction of reality. But modern realistic logicians offering a different theory of the function of mind and knowledge tell a different story. With them mind or consciousness is more like light that reveals than anything with a creative faculty. Mind therefore, does not constitute its object in knowing, as Kant contends, it simply reveals what it finds. Therefore the proposition or meaning or whatever you may call it, is something objective, already there in the objective universe ('there' in this reference need not, indeed does not, indicate any spatial relation). Propositions thus, will have a mode of being as objective and

independent of mind as any object of the world of sense experience, yet can become the contents of our judgment. What then, is the precise relation between a Judgment and a Proposition ? According to the older logicians, proposition, we have seen, is simply the verbal expression of the judgment. But modern logicians maintain that when in course of an argument or discourse the statements are given us they mean something which the mind apprehends or understands and this something is the proposition; the mind then may have different attitudes towards it, viz. doubting, supposing or believing or disbelieving i.e. judging. Judgment, then, is only one of the attitudes which the mind may have towards the proposition, which, it is clear, is thus something different from the judgment. For, apart from the judging attitude there may be other attitudes which the mind may assume towards it. In any case this much is conceded that the proposition thus understood becomes the content of judgment or other modes of thinking, yet urging all the while that by becoming the content in this way it does not become mental in any sense of the term. Judgment as a function of thought is, no doubt, mental, but its object or the content viz. the proposition, is not mental at all.

Is it then, something belonging to the objective world of existence—the world of space-time continuum ? Propositions have been described as either true or false and this true-false characteristic is a feature of the proposition only. Now their truth or falsity is determined by their reference to 'facts'. But what is a fact ? There appears to be an ambiguity, as Mace points out, in the use of the term 'fact'. When a thought passes from a mere supposal to an assured knowledge through a hesitant belief, what in turn is thus supposed, believed and known is constant throughout and this is the proposition. When it is known assuredly it is a fact. Fact in this sense is nothing but a true proposition. But what is it that makes a proposition

true ? This takes us to the second sense of the term 'fact'. Fact is 'a portion of reality to which a proposition conforms or corresponds'. As Miss Stebbing puts it, 'anything that is the case' is a fact. Facts simply are. They are neither true nor false. It is propositions about them that are either true or false and their truth or falsity is determined by their relation to facts. Propositions then, are not facts, but yet are vitally related to facts. On careful analysis it is found that they are made up of the same stuff as facts are and it is in this sense, Mace remarks, they are objective. Ultimately it is out of such elements as 'particulars', 'qualities' and 'relations' that both propositions and facts are made in different modes of combinations (Mace). This explains the possibility of their correspondence or otherwise.

Proposition, then, is neither the sentence nor the judgment nor even the fact but is something different from and yet vitally related to them all—it is something that is expressed by verbal or non-verbal symbols viz. , the meaning they want to convey, something to which when presented to and grasped by the mind, it may assume the attitude of believing, disbelieving, doubting or merely supposing, something again, which may or may not correspond to the facts of the objective universe. It has a mode of being independent both of mind and the world of existent universe, like the realm of Platonic ideas, mathematical truths and other logical entities like qualities, relations etc. In the language of some modern American realists, it belongs to the realm of the *merely subsistent* though we already find among some prominent English Realists e. g. Russell and his followers, a clear note of dissent in this respect. I shall refer to this doctrine later on.

But what has led philosophers to posit this independent realm of propositions ? It is chiefly to refute the subjectivist accounts of Judgment that they have advanced the theory. Under this head may be included the pragmatist view of

Schiller, according to whom the meaning with which we are concerned in logic is the personal psychological meaning intended by the speaker at the moment of the assertion, and also the view of Bosanquet, according to whom Judgment is a mental construction of reality—the ideal content which we affirm of the real is a construction of the mind—the former refers to the psychological meaning, the latter to the logical and epistemological meaning. Both are in a sense mental, for, whatever might be the fundamental difference between these two schools of thought, the propositional meaning, which is the content of our judgment is as much mental as the process of judging, though obviously there is a vital difference between them, in so far as the former, at least in Bosanquet's sense, is logical and universal while the latter is psychological and particular. But according to the realistic epistemology the content of knowledge is not mental at all. Reality becomes the content when it enters the knowing situation. Why then not say that the physical reality is the content of our judgment and introduce instead the doctrine of an independent propositional entity? When a sentence is given us or rather stated to us, and the mind apprehends the meaning, these realistic logicians contend that the meaning thus grasped and presented is not the physical reality as is supposed by naive realism and also by some advocates of modern realism, but the proposition which is different from and independent of the physical world equally as it is different from and independent of the mental process of apprehending and judging. If we try to determine precisely what is immediately presented to our mind when we think and judge, we find it is the meaning or proposition in this sense. This becomes obvious when we try to ascertain the content of an erroneous judgment. Obviously the content in this case is not admittedly anything in the real existent world and yet is not meaningless. It is also different from and independent of the mental process of judgment.

Be it noted that the realist restricts the sphere of the mental to the process of judging, doubting etc. apart from the content. If so, the content of an erroneous judgment i. e. the proposition itself, is as much objective and independent of the mental process as the physical world of existence. And if the domain of proposition is thus established as an independent realm in the case of erroneous judgment, it requires a little thought to see that the same holds good in the case of a true judgment. For the distinction of true and false does not apply either to judging as a mental process or attitude or to the objective existent world of facts. For both of them simply *are*; they cannot be either true or false. It is only the propositional content that becomes true or false by its relation to the world of existents. In this respect the modern advocates of the propositional theory go further than the American realists like Holt. For the American realists maintain that only in the case of errors we have got to find room for them in the Third Realm of the subsistents, whereas these moderners say that not only in the case of false judgments but also in the case of true ones the propositional contents have got a mode of being in the mid-neutral region of the subsistents.

As already said above, these advocates of the propositional theory refer to the reality and independence of the physical world and also of the mathematical truths as lending support to their own view. Just as the physical world of existents is objective and independent of our perception, so is this realm of propositional meanings, this third neutral realm of subsistents, as much objective and independent of our judgments. Again, just as mathematical truths are objective and independent of our knowing and believing so much so that no amount or degree of intense believing can make them more certain, so is the case with the propositions. Once again, the very possibility of interpersonal communication through language and other symbols indicates that the

meanings which we want to convey and which we can well understand and grasp is not a private affair but a public property and as such is objective and independent of the personal psychical processes involved in such communication and understanding. Indeed because there is such an objective realm of propositions that the science of Logic as a doctrine of pure form is possible—in fact all the entities with which modern Logic is concerned, viz. class, relation, universal, proposition etc., belong to this realm.

Some again, Mr. Mace for instance, suggest that propositions are ultimately nothing but what Mr. Russell calls "logical constructions" Mr. Russell who once advocated the doctrine of independent being of the entire sphere of the subsistents including 'number,' 'relation,' 'Homeric gods,' 'chimeras' etc. found difficulty in maintaining such an absurd position as "there is a round square". This led him later to the theory of Description. There are descriptions which do not describe anything and yet are not meaningless. Now, as Miss Stebbing points out, "since descriptions may apply to nothing propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur must be analysed in such a way that the description does not appear as the name of any constituent of the proposition". It is therefore important to distinguish 'descriptions' from symbols which name something. Mr. Russell calls such descriptions 'incomplete symbols'. He also uses the expression 'logical fictions', 'logical constructions' and has sometimes suggested that 'incomplete symbols', 'logical fictions', and 'logical constructions' are synonymous. Mr. Russell has not defined 'logical construction'. He has given certain examples. Thus 'I,' 'the table' 'wall-paper', 'classes' are logical constructions. They do not stand for any constituent of any proposition in whose verbal expression they occur. They are thus not demonstrative symbols standing for a particular

with which one may be acquainted. They are mere *conveniences, logical fictions* or rather *logical constructions*. There is undoubtedly, as Miss Stebbing points out, some obscurity and even contradiction in Mr. Russell's discussion of the topic. It is also doubtful whether Mr. John Wisdom in his series of rather elaborate articles on the subject in *Mind* (Vols. XL-XLII) has succeeded in making the matter easier. And as Mace observes "under the best circumstances Mr. Russell's theory of logical construction could hardly be made simple." We cannot, however, pursue the subject further in this short paper. Only we may point out in passing that there is thus an important split in the realist's own camp on this doctrine of independent proposition. This at least shows that there is some real difficulty in accepting it.

Modern New Realism was hailed by some as bringing about a millenium in the realm of epistemology in so far at least as it advocated the doctrine of epistemological monism as against the old representationist dualistic theory of knowledge. Mind directly knows the object or reality without the need of any medium such as ideas. The 'tertium quid' of ideas is thus dispensed with. But the doctrine could not have quite a smooth sailing. It was stared in the face by the problem of error; and how Holt, Montague and others struggled against it is a well known story in current philosophy. They made contradictions and error as much a part of the realistic universe as the most real physical world, only the former is subsistent, the latter is existent, thus extending the range of the real. But as we have seen above, the advocates of the propositional theory have gone further in maintaining that not only in the case of erroneous judgment but also in true judgment there comes the false or true proposition as a third something mid-way between judgment and fact, thus going back to the old representationist position in this respect, only

what comes between is not an idea but a proposition and this proposition is not mental but having a status and mode of being independent of mind and the physical world of facts. But are we justified in admitting this *independent neutral* realm of propositions? Propositions, we have seen, are constituted of meanings of sentences. Can meanings be said to have a status independent of mind? Meanings are no doubt objective, they are the objective contents of our thoughts and judgments and they are ever to be distinguished from the subjective psychological processes of thinking viz. believing, disbelieving, doubting, supposing etc. occurring in the psychological history of an individual. It is no doubt unfortunate that the same word, e.g. judgment or belief, has been used to signify the process of judging or believing and the content, viz. what is judged or believed. But the distinction between them does not warrant us to regard them as having separate existences of their own. Proposition is what we come across in understanding the meaning of a sentence and in judging as the content of a judgment. But can there be a propositional content apart from judgment and thought? The relation between them, as Mace points out, may be like that between 'running' and a 'race', 'singing' and 'a song' 'playing' and 'a game' in such cases as 'running a race' 'singing a song' and 'playing a game.' Judging or believing a proposition would then be only a special case of thinking a thought. Judgment and its propositional content will thus be two distinguishable yet inseparable elements or parts of one concrete situation. If we consider the meaning of meaning in its ordinary sense we find that there are two things involved in it, say a word or a sign and that which it signifies or stands for, that is, the sign and its referend. But these two factors in themselves will not constitute meaning in the strict sense of the term, unless there be a mind to interpret it. This element of interpretation is a vital thing

for meaning. Meaning has thus an objective basis no doubt but that perhaps is not everything. For its life and operation the activity of the mind is equally an important factor. As a matter of fact meaning like values arises within a total situation in which the subjective and the objective factors cooperate. Again, the doctrine of the independent being for proposition gets strength and support, as we have seen, from the eternal objectivity and independence of mathematical truths. But all truths, mathematical and non-mathematical can only arise, as Prof. Alexander points out, from out of the intercourse between the subjective and the objective, between mind and reality. As Bosanquet says, "truth seems to me to have no meaning unless (1) it is reality ; (2) is in the form of ideas. It is the form which reality assumes when expressed through ideas in particular minds. It is unintelligible if this unity is broken." And this is the only way in which the paradox of finding the truth and making it can be solved. But this does not mean that in truth reality is qualified by a series of psychical enents. "The qualification of reality by ideas is from the beginning a qualification by *meanings*". Again, if knowledge is a mental construction of reality in the form of a significant whole, each part of which attains specific significance or meaning as parts or organic members of that whole, the meaning that thus accrues to the parts is a meaning within a whole and as such it can not be said to have any being and status apart from such a contextual whole and it is only by the organising activity of a mind that such wholes and parts within such wholes could become significant. If this be so, the entire doctrine of proposition based upon a forced severance of meaning from its place within an ideal whole is an unwarranted abstraction.

Reality and Experience

By

G. R. MALKANI.

Our notion of reality is that of something which merely is. It is something in-itself. Its existence is not dependent upon anything else, least of all upon its being experienced by some-one. It is what it is because of itself. As opposed to this, there may be something which is that something only to me. It has no being in-itself. We call this illusory. The illusory properly speaking is not. It appears to have being but has no being.

We appear to know reality in sensible experience. But is this reality? Can reality appear to us? One thing is certain. Anything that appears to us is a matter of doubt. Scepticism is quite natural with regard to it. We can always ask, is it really that or something different? We may silence our doubts by an appeal to practical considerations. But what is known by us implies us. It is that something in relation to us. And yet there is no means at our disposal for resolving the implication and proving that what is *to us* would also be *without us*, or that it is not merely something to us but also something in-itself.

Can reality be known? Can it be an appearance to us? This appears to be doubtful. At the same time, one thing is quite certain: reality cannot be wholly unrelated to us. If it is, how shall we distinguish the real from the non-real? The non-real is never related to us and is not anything to us. The real will conform to the standard of the non real as far as we are concerned.

Reality may be relatable to us. But let us suppose that this relation is an external one. This is implied in the notion of knowledge. We shall analyse this notion to bring out its implications. Firstly, knowledge can be of the real alone. Knowledge in this respect has a necessary implication which is absent from the concept of reality. While it is of the essence of reality that it should continue to exist whether it is known or not, it is the essence of knowledge that it must refer to reality. Knowledge cannot *be* merely; it must be knowledge *of* something. This something again cannot be anything other than reality. Knowledge is of the real alone. It reveals the real. Secondly, as a necessary pre-supposition of this revelation, there must be prior ignorance of the thing. Thirdly, both the ignorance and the knowledge must belong to one and the same subject. The subject which is ignorant alone can know.

Knowledge does not affect the real. If that were affected, the thing as known and the thing as independent of knowledge would not be the same thing; and we could not say that the thing as known has being in itself or that it continues when knowledge has ceased. Knowledge also cannot affect the subject or the knower. If the knower were affected by knowledge, the subject that has ignorance would be different from the subject that knows. This would be as good as saying that A is ignorant, and this ignorance can be driven out by the enlightenment of B. Also knowledge would be in a way constitutive of the knowing subject, and it would be hardly true to say that I know or that a person knows. Knowledge would be something more fundamental than what we call a self. This would lead to a materialistic explanation of knowledge. Knowledge then does nothing to the real or to the subject knowing. The only thing that knowledge does is to drive out ignorance. To understand knowledge, we must understand what is ignorance.

It may be said that this is not necessary. The reference to ignorance is only secondary. Knowledge is an original relation of the subject to reality. When the subject comes to have this relation, knowledge may be said to arise. We have not therefore to ask whether there was prior ignorance. We have simply to ask whether the relation in question is there. The fact of knowledge is intelligible as an original given fact and apart from any reference to the fact of ignorance.

Let us suppose that this is so. But then the subject must be able to distinguish the inception of the relation from its non-inception. Is this possible? It is admitted that the relation of knowledge is not one of those relations of interaction which modify the terms related. When two physical objects come into relation, we may suppose that both stand in a different state of internal tension, and if these objects were endowed with intelligence they would detect this difference and may be said to feel the presence of the new relation. Knowledge-relation is not a relation in this sense. How then does the subject recognise it? Not by any internal change in itself. Not by any change in the object. We have supposed that no change occurs in either by the relation. We contend that the subject could not recognise the occurrence of knowledge without reference to prior ignorance on its part. If this reference cannot be sustained, there can never be any consciousness of knowledge arising. The fact of knowledge is intelligible as that fact only as it has a necessary reference to prior ignorance which it drives out. Knowledge is what drives out ignorance. In itself, knowledge-relation is no kind of relation which can be said to occur. It would not be knowledge at all.

We should suppose that the concept of ignorance is quite intelligible in itself. The fact of ignorance is given in experience. But are we ever conscious of ignorance as pure ignorance? In deep sleep, there is supposed to be pure

ignorance, but evidently there is no consciousness of it. An endless sleep would never be known as a state of ignorance at all. Whenever we are conscious of being ignorant, this ignorance is not pure and simple ; it relates to some object that we know. Indeed our ignorance is supposed to extend beyond our actual knowledge. I cannot be said to be ignorant of what I do know. But is this really the case ? What I do not know is nothing to me. How can I be said to be ignorant of it ? What then am I ignorant of ? If I cannot specify the object, I cannot specify my ignorance. It is ignorance that is as good as no ignorance to me. To put the same thing a little differently, what ground is there that there is anything beyond what I know of which I can be said to be ignorant ? If there is any ground, that ground can only be provided by my present knowledge. It is only in view of a possible knowledge extending beyond the present knowledge that ignorance becomes a fact to us. If I went beyond my room, I would see such and such a thing ; if I looked into your pocket, I would find a certain thing ; if I looked into a distant star, I would see scenes of a particular kind, etc. It is only as I reconstruct possible knowledge, that I become aware of present ignorance on my part. Ignorance can only be defined as what is opposed to knowledge and driven out by it. Without reference to subsequent knowledge, it is no kind of fact to us.

The notion of knowledge as revealing the real implies ignorance. But ignorance itself is not intelligible without reference to the revealing knowledge. There is mutual implication between the two concepts, and neither is intelligible in itself. We have to rely upon the intelligibility of the one in order to define the other, and vice-versa. The result is that neither concept is properly defined, and we cannot be said to have a perfectly definite meaning for each of them.

Let it be granted that the notion of knowledge as revealing the real is quite intelligible. But is there any genuine piece of knowledge which we can be said to possess in this sense? It might be said here that this question should not arise. If there is apparent knowledge, there must be real knowledge somewhere. It is only when a certain piece of knowledge is cancelled by right knowledge that there is such a thing as an appearance of knowledge.

We do not deny that there must be real knowledge somewhere. What we want to know is whether it is of a piece with all cases of apparent knowledge and has nothing in its internal structure to distinguish it from the latter. The question would not arise, if any *prima facie* fact of knowledge were real knowledge. But this is far from being the case. Whenever we appear to know, we are not really knowing as a rule. What we take to be real to start with does not always turn out to be real. We must therefore have in knowledge itself the means of distinguishing the real from what is not real. If there is no such means, there is no guarantee of real knowledge at all; and we can only conclude that our characterisation of knowledge is not based upon any real knowledge and is to that extent self-contradictory.

It might be argued here that a criterion of knowledge is quite a different thing from its meaning. We may have no satisfactory criterion at all; but that does not affect our meaning. Knowledge means such and such a thing whether we can determine a particular piece of knowledge to be real knowledge or not. But is this view tenable? What do we understand by meaning? There is a theory that the meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification. We mean by a proposition what would verify it. What would verify a proposition would be some actual experience. The proposition means that if we were in certain circumstances we would have certain experiences. These experiences then constitute

If the meaning there is in a proposition. What cannot be experienced is meaningless. Whether we accept this theory in its entirety or not, one thing appears certain,—there is a close relation between meaning and experience. We cannot determine meanings arbitrarily. They must be based upon facts of experience and justified by them. Knowledge means such and such a thing, because our experience in the matter is such and such. If this reference to experience is eliminated, if we cannot point our finger to any fact which embodies our meaning, we can well question whether we should mean what we do mean by knowledge. But if experience is essential to meaning, we must have in experience a decisive factor to distinguish the fact of knowledge from other facts likely to be confounded with it. We cannot rely in this upon further empirical evidence unless that evidence does not fall within the scope of the problem and is both self-evident and decisive. In order therefore to be able to say what I mean by knowledge, or what are the factors that can be got by analysis from knowledge, I must be able to point to an undoubted fact of knowledge and be able to vindicate it as against other facts which seem to be in all respects like it and yet are declared to be no instances of it. Then alone shall we be able to say that our meaning is based upon the genuine fact itself, and that when we analyse this fact our analysis can be appropriate to no other fact.

It is evident now that there is no knowledge of object which any intelligence can have which may not prove to be illusory knowledge. From the point of view of the subject, the difference between the real and the illusory can never be made out or appreciated. The reason is plain. We do not know A and also know that A exists. It cannot therefore be said that in the case of real knowledge, we know a certain object and also know that that object exists. We have simply no intuition of the existence of A which is over and above the intuition of A

itself. As long as there is no subjective difference or difference in the mode of our apprehension, there can be no difference in the status of the object either. Thus no possible intelligence can distinguish real knowledge from false knowledge on the internal evidence of knowledge itself. Have we then real knowledge at all? And is our characterisation of knowledge as the revealing of the real based upon any real fact of knowledge? It appears that we must look elsewhere than to our knowledge of objects for a real case of knowledge.

Let us say that to know the real the intelligence must get over the subjective standpoint. We view things subjectively. The thing is such and such to us. This reference to us simply cannot be eliminated. And as long as it is there, we are confined within ourselves and estranged from reality. But the question is, how are we to get out of ourselves and know reality as it is?

It has been suggested by some philosophers that thought materialises what is in itself spiritual. It takes only a static and an outside view of things. We must, by an effort of intuition, place ourselves at the heart of things and inside of them. Now this may be in a way possible. There may be different degrees of sympathetic insight into things such as the poets and the mystics of all ages have. Reality to them may be quite spiritual. But would this be knowing of reality? And even if we admit that it is knowing, what ground have we for asserting that the poets and the mystics have truly divested themselves of every bias and every subjective element in their outlook upon things? The very fact that their versions of reality differ, and their insight admits of degrees of depth and of comprehension is evidence that this form of knowledge cannot be free from doubt.

The truth which we seek in philosophy is truth indicated by reason itself. And so far as reason is concerned we may

well ask, is reality *other* to the intuition of it or it is not? If it is not, then all talk about placing ourselves inside of things etc. is meaningless. There are simply no things, and no inside and outside of them. If it is, how have we got out of the subjective stand-point? Reality for us would be thought-determined. It can never be quite immediate to the intuition of it, and we can never be said to intuit it as it is in itself. To get out of our subjectivity we must realise that the real can be no *object* to us. The objective is the illusory. The real cannot be externally related to us. It cannot be *other* to the intuition of it. The only relation appropriate between the two—the real and its intuition—is that of complete non-duality. The question is whether this reality is indicated in our own experience.

Our answer is that it is the only reality indicated. We are generally agreed that if anything claims to exist, it is the objects of our knowledge. We do not doubt their existence. If we doubt the existence of anything, it is the existence of something that can be no object of our knowledge. What we now want to suggest is that the real position is just the reverse. We doubt the existence of the object only. We can never doubt the existence of what is no object to us. Further, this reality which is no object to us is the only undoubted thing in our knowledge of objects. We call this reality *the self*. Something is object only in reference to the self which is no object. When I say that something is there, I implicitly mean that I am different from the something, that I am neither there nor here, that I am not a *given* at all, and that without reference to this reality which is not-given there would be nothing that is given. We can doubt the existence of the object; we cannot doubt that without which the very appearance of the object would not be possible.

Objectivity itself is a derived character. It is not a self-evident character of what we call objects. If we were confined merely to objects, objectivity would not emerge as their common character. Since everything possesses it, it would not distinguish anything from anything else. It is only when we can distinguish the entire universe of objects taken as a whole from what is no-object, that objectivity can emerge as a common character of objects. It is only as this no-object is realised as fact in our experience that we can significantly speak of anything being an object to us.

This also disposes of the contention that the notion of being is a simple notion, that it implies nothing beyond itself, and that there can be no necessary relation of being to experience. It is only on the supposition that reality is external to the knowledge of it, that the above contention can be justified if at all; we can abstract from the relation of knowledge without in any way undermining the reality of the real. Indeed we shall be hard put to, to make intelligible to ourselves the notion of this being when we have abstracted from our intuition of being what we may call the positing of being or the subjective affirmation of being. But at least once the abstraction from experience has been conceived, the idea of being may be looked upon as evident enough. If however we realise that reality cannot be external to the knowledge of it, and that reality and intuition do not constitute two terms but a fundamental non-duality which we break up owing to our limitation, how can we regard the so-called simple notion of reality as at all intelligible? Being becomes the same thing as intuition and the two cannot be held apart even in idea. The notion of being as *mere being* and as having no necessary relation to knowledge is an incomplete and abstract notion. It does not do justice to real being. Real being is not mere being. It is *real* because it is the very self of knowledge. We call this real being, pure

intelligence or the Self. It reveals everything. There is nothing to reveal it. Or what is the same thing, it may be said to be revealed only as it reveals. There is no other revelation proper to it.

Modality and Judgment

By

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Whately makes a distinction between the pure propositions and the modal ones. As he puts it "The Categorical propositions are subdivided into those which assert simply (purely) that the subject does or does not agree with the predicate, and the modal which express in what mode (or manner) it agrees."¹ He takes, "Brutus killed Caesar justly" as one of the illustrations of the modal propositions. But 'Brutus killed Caesar justly' is not a simple proposition. It is in fact a compound proposition expressing two distinct judgments, one of which is a judgment of fact, namely, "Brutus killed Caesar" (But such judgments are not judgments as such which are concerned with contents presented, but they are inferences in disguise which stand on testimony. These I have discussed elsewhere), and the other is a judgment of value in which the person in question expresses his approval. So in the above instance, modality is out of the question. Dr. Keynes's criticism of Whately's position that in "Brutus killed Caesar", the addition is obviously a question of modification of the predicate and there is no reason why it should not be logically included in the predicate, misses the main point. The other illustrations used by Whately may be brought into a bold relief but despite the defects of some of his illustrations, we can put our finger on the fundamental trend of his thought. On the whole, he seems to suggest that modality affects only the form of judgment and not its content.

There is an affinity between the position of Whately and

1. *Elements of Logic*, p. 42.

that of Kant. According to the latter, the problematic and the apodeictic propositions express only logical and not objective possibility and necessity respectively. "The modality of judgment is a very peculiar function", says Kant, "For it contributes nothing to the content of a judgment (because besides quantity, quality and relation, there is nothing that could contribute to the content of judgment) but refers only to the nature of the Copula in relation to thought in general"²

The Copula is a part of a proposition, and if a proposition is the expression in language of a judgment, the Copula is not superfluous. It has its own necessary function. In judgment there is a counterpart which answers to the Copula in a proposition. It is, in fact, the linguistic expression of an act of assertion. So to say that modality affects only the Copula, is tantamount to the position that modality affects merely the Form, and not the content. Thus Kant suggests that the distinction between the different types of modal judgments, hinges upon the measure of subjective belief expressed in them. The modal types, therefore, can be arranged in a hierarchy. We may begin with the lowest stratum 'problematic,' pass on to 'assertoric' and then proceed to the highest 'apodeictic.'

Dr. Venn seems to be at one with Kant, when he suggests that the difference between a problematic judgment and assertoric one is determined by the difference in the quantity of belief expressed ; but he parts company with Kant in so far as his position as to the distinction between a necessary judgment and an assertoric one is concerned. "The belief with which an assertory judgment is entertained is full belief," says Dr. Venn "else it would not differ from the problematic ; and therefore in regard to the quantity of

2. *The Critique of Pure Reason* tr. by Max Muller Vol 1.
P. 56,

belief as distinguished from the quality or character of it there is no difference between it and the apodeictic."

It is quite true that the difference between assertoric and apodeictic is not determined by the quantity of belief. The assertoric judgment, 'it is raining now,' is not less certain than an apodeictic one. e. g. 'it must rain this evening.' As Dr. Venn contends, the assertoric expresses full belief as does the apodeictic. But he commits a mistake along with Kant in insisting on the difference between the problematic and the assertoric, as determined by quantity of belief. Belief is belief. We believe in a thing or we do not. There cannot be different degrees of belief. If the problematic is a judgment, the full measure of belief cannot be withheld from it. Hesitation has no room in the situation in which a judgment arises. So the measure by quantity fails in the case of the distinction between the problematic and the assertoric as it fails in the case of the assertoric and the apodeictic. In order to clear up the issue, we have to consider the fundamental presumption in modality. We have to bring out by analysis how far the problematic, the assertoric and the apodeictic are judgments and how far modality concerns itself with the nature of judgment as such. We shall take the problem later on. For the present let us address ourselves to the consideration of a very important topic raised at the beginning.

Bradley has brought into prominence the discussion as to whether modality affects only the form or the content of a judgment. According to him, if modality is taken in its psychological sense, there will be no limit to modality, and the psychological modality is not concerned with the nature of a judgment as such and is thus extra-logical. As Bradley insists, logical modality must affect 'the content.' In the instances 'S is P,' 'S may be P,' and 'S must be P,' it is not the self same content 'S-P' which is asserted in the three

cases. A close analysis will reveal that the contents asserted are diverse, namely, simply 'S-P,' possibility of 'S-P' and necessity of 'S-P,' respectively. Modality affects not the affirmation, but what is affirmed."³

Dr. Bosanquet joins issue with Bradley and others and sides with Kant in his contention that modality affects the Copula and consequently, the assertiveness of assertion. Dr. Bosanquet is right in protesting against the artificial separation between the form of a judgment and its content. We can not settle the dispute, unless we can clearly understand the distinction as well as the connection between the form and the content of a judgment. Content may mean ideal content, which is 'meaning' or it may mean objective content which is given. But there is no actual separation between the two. Ideal content involved in a judgment is known only in an abstract analytic introspection. But in so far as a judgment is concerned, ideal content operates in thought or consciousness, and in its operation, coalesces with the objective content, given by way of suggestion on which judgment takes place. So the content of a judgment, may be taken simply for what is given as suggested. Now then the form of a judgment cannot be determined by any thing on the contentual side. If we at all speak of the form of a judgment, it cannot mean any thing less than its generic nature, which is a mental act of assertion. The form of a judgment as such is then constant, although we may speak of different forms of judgment only with reference to the diverse contents. The word "Forms" of judgment is rather misleading. It is more accurate to speak of "Forms" of propositions. We take propositions as linguistic expression of judgments. But it is not that a judgment is already an accomplished fact as a mental act merely, and then wait for its linguistic clothing.

There is after all no separation between thought and language. But they are also not identical. The act and the expression in language proceed *pari passu*; they are in fact the two sides of the same process. So if modality is taken to affect the Copula in a proposition, it must affect also the corresponding function in thought. The Copula stands for the mental act which is the essence of judgment. Not if modality affects the form of a judgment, which, taken broadly, is simply affirmation, we have to consider how far a judgment as such can survive such a modification. Affirmation is affirmation. It is not susceptible of qualification. If we attach any kind of qualification to the "assertiveness of assertion," it will take away the vital part of it and will degenerate the judgment so much as to demolish it.

Let us now examine the position that modality affects only the content. In the judgments, 'It is raining,' 'It may rain' and 'It must rain,' the contents are taken to be respectively the actual fact of raining, the possibility of raining and necessity of raining. Now possibility or necessity is nothing objectively considered, though they are connected with some objective contents. A fact is a fact. It cannot in itself be possible or necessary. All possibility and necessity are significant only with reference to some subjective attitude. But the notions of possibility and necessity are not so simple. They point to a complete situation in which a peculiar mental attitude is one of the elements. Taking for granted that possibility and necessity are simple facts, and as such can be contents of judgments, we may ask, are these contents indifferent to the forms of propositions, and for the matter of that to the form of corresponding judgments? One may point out that there need not be any corresponding modification of the form, for, the judgments, 'it may rain,' 'It must rain' may be reduced to 'Raining is possible,' and 'Raining is necessary,' respectively, and these are of the same

form as the assertoric. But here the difficulties, in regard to 'possible,' and necessary 'possibility of raining,' and 'necessity of raining,' cannot be taken on the same level. The content, 'raining' in the assertoric is given. Possibility and necessity may likewise be regarded as given. But they are not given so much from the side of the objective sphere as from that of subjective thought. The notion of possibility and necessity emerges in consciousness only through some ideal construction upon some data given immediately. We shall pursue our analysis in this direction later on. For the present, we may press as to what is meant by 'raining' being possible or necessary. Elucidation is expected to be found in the form, 'it may rain,' 'it must rain'. The words 'may' and 'must,' however, do not bring out so much the content aspect of these so-called assertions as the subjective attitude indicated by them. Judgment as such does not proceed in a halting manner, and the Copula 'is' in a proposition points to the straight way affirmation. As 'may' and 'must' cannot in any way, be reduced to 'is,' we have to recognize a radical difference between them. If so, the modification in the propositions, 'It may rain,' 'It must rain' as necessitated by 'may' and 'must' has to be taken to interfere with the generic nature of a judgment as affirmation. Thus we come to cognize the futility of the position that modality affects only the form and that it affects only the content of a judgment. As we have seen, if we adopt the first, it directly destroys judgment, on the other hand, the second involves interference with the nature of judgment not directly, but only indirectly. It is in fact not to the point to discuss whether modality affects only the form or the content of a judgment. For, either of these involves an artificial separation between the form and the content of a judgment, and so beginning with either of them, we are led on to the same catastrophe. It is, however, more reasonable to consider how

far the question of modality is relevant to judgment *qua* judgment.

We can make an approach to the solution of the problem by taking into consideration a theory according to which the problematic as well as the necessary judgments are the forms of the hypothetical. Necessity, it is contended, implies mediation; it points to a ground or a because. When I say, 'it must rain this evening,' one may press a why, and the answer brings to light a because. In the case of the necessary, the full known conditions are presented, whereas in the case of the problematic, the conditions are partially presented, and the rest are merely supposed. So if the necessary is reduced to the hypothetical, the problematic is shown to be a species of the necessary. We may begin with the necessary. The form of the hypothetical is '*if then*' which in its turn indicates that a synthesis of two elements only by way of necessity is asserted without any regard whatsoever to their actual embodiment at any particular point. Now the form of the necessary judgment is '*since-therefore*.' '*If*' points to a supposal though supposal need not be merely accidental or arbitrary, and '*since*' refers to a fact or facts. The whole thing therefore, hinges upon the reduction of '*if*' to '*since*'. In '*since there is smoke on the hill, there must be fire*', the antecedent is a fact given in experience, and so we cannot read a hypothetical in it. But it may be argued that even the elementary form of perceptual judgment is, in the ultimate analysis, hypothetical, for, it to be categorical, presupposes the whole series of space and time, which of course cannot be given in perception,

Now in this connection, it will not do to forget that we perceive a fact first and then may search out its full conditions. But that does not, in any way, reduce the fact to a mere supposal. The locus of a perceptual judgment is '*this*' which is the point of contact between the percipient

and a fact. But 'this' as such cannot be explained away; for there is no relevancy of the contention that a singular judgment of perception, in order to be categorical, presupposes the whole spatio-temporal series as its conditions, for, Logic is no Physical Science. Taking for granted the cogency of the contention, we may not perceive the bounds of space and time; we nevertheless perceive some part of the series, so 'if' cannot cover the whole field. It has to make room for 'since'. Thus the assertion 'since some conditions are and the rest supposed,' therefore 'this' can hardly be brought into line with the hypothetical, e. g. 'If smoke, then fire', in which neither the antecedent nor the consequent is a fact given here and now. The procedure in the two cases is different. In one case, we begin with a fact presented, and pass on to its conditions, and then we may connect by an ideal operation, the conditions and the being of the fact, by way of necessity, expressing, the connection in the form, 'If A. B. C. etc., then X'. But this does not affect the nature of the perceptual judgment, which fixes upon this as the immediately given in experience, for, a fact cannot be presented in experience, unless its conditions are present. It is true that the full conditions may not fall within our normal experience, but that does not alter the situation. So hypotheticality in regard to 'this' is out of the question.

Further, since there is smoke on the hill, therefore there must be fire presupposes the hypothetical, 'If smoke, then fire.' We cannot pass from 'smoke' to 'fire,' unless we know that 'smoke' implies 'fire'. Implication is the symbol for the relation of necessity between two elements, which is brought out by the form 'if-then.' But if we now insist that the necessary, 'since there is smoke on the hill, there must be fire,' is alter all a hypothetical, we are reducing the necessary to something, which is its presupposition. But this is absurd.

The hypotheticality of the necessary, is, however, sought to

be deduced from another point of view. Necessity, as such it is contended, is hypothetical and that the actuality of the antecedent does not affect the situation. Logical necessity is, of course ideal. In 'if smoke, then fire,' the necessity between smoke and fire is not a fact like either of the two to be presented, but it consists in a process, known only in thought. It is one thing to say that logical necessity is ideal, and it is another to say that it is hypothetical. Logical necessity is ideal, but it does not mean that it is imaginary. The ideality of necessity is determined by the conditions of reality. I have already discussed the nature of the hypothetical as such and it is needless to discuss it over again. But I may point out that we fix upon the hypothetical form 'if-then' in order to give expression to our knowledge of necessity between two elements, which we come to by way of the result of our experience or experiences. So we should not confuse between the hypothetical as such and the necessity expressed in it. In the necessary judgment as in the hypothetical, a consequent follows upon an antecedent. If we fix upon this common point and try to deduce the hypotheticality of the necessary, we argue on a false analogy, for, we do not take into consideration a very important point of difference, namely, that the antecedent in the necessary, is a fact given in experience. There is the irreducible difference between the hypothetical and the conditional. The conditional presupposes the hypothetical; it is in fact the application of the hypothetical. The necessary as such is conditional. In 'since there is smoke on the hill there must be fire,' the knowledge of 'fire,' is not immediate, but it is mediated by that of 'smoke.' The necessary thus in the ultimate analysis, turns out to be an inference in which a hypothetical functions as the ground.

Let us now consider the so-called problematic judgment. Taking for instance, the problematic, 'It may rain this evening,' we may ask, is it a hypothetical or an inference or a

judgment? The partial presentation of the known conditions is the differentia which distinguishes the problematic from the necessary. So at the basis of the problematic, there is a 'since.' But 'since' there does not function in the same way as in the necessary. In the problematic, 'since' points to the partial presentation of the known conditions which render the assertion of a fact necessary. But inspite of this difference, both the necessary and the problematic stand on a common platform in as much as both of them have some fact or facts as their basis. So if we cannot reduce 'since' to 'if,' the hypotheticality of the problematic too is out of the question.

But can we then take the problematic as an inference? Broadly speaking, inference is a passage in thought from the known. The problematic, 'it may rain this evening,' is not arbitrary. But in this case, we fix upon some fact as the ground of the problematic. But this ground of the problematic cannot be regarded as the ground of an inference in it; for, the ground of the problematic does not include the full conditions which induce belief. The main point is whether the problematic involves belief. Belief in an inference is induced by the data or premises. In the problematic, the data given are some of the known conditions. But a part cannot be the whole. A part cannot perform the function which is relevant to the whole. It may be contended that the presentation of some of the conditions raises a presumption as to the existence of the rest, and these together create a situation of belief. But it can be pointed out that supposal as such cannot be the basis of belief. So 'may' in the problematic is significant. It falls far short of direct affirmation. Nevertheless, the problematic cannot be taken to indicate a state of indcision, thus involving mental oscillation between two alternatives or more. I just say, 'It may rain.' But is it that I am also thinking of the alternative, namely, that it may not rain this evening?

If there is belief there is direct affirmation, and to take the problematic as involving belief is to identify it with the necessary. If the partial presentation of the known conditions is the *Differentia*, it necessarily indicates a corresponding difference in the mental attitude. But the attitude is not one of indcision. In the problematic, 'it may rain,' there is the *directing* towards the fact of raining to occur. The crux in the problematic is the nature of this *directing*. Now some are of opinion that though full belief is lacking in the problematic, yet there is a degree of belief. It is urged that there are many ways in which a definite content can be *directing*. Now some are of opinion that though full belief is lacking in the problematic, yet there is a degree of belief. It is urged that there are many ways in which a definite content can be entertained. So if we can take them on a scale, so to speak, doubt is the lowest degree at which we oscillate between two alternatives which negate each other, and a modicum of belief is said to save us out of this unpleasant situation. But can we speak of any quantitative measure of belief? Belief itself is a characteristic mental attitude which is affirmation. Affirmation is in the form of 'is' and 'must'. But with 'may' we have to pause and ponder. The problematic in fact transcends the stage of doubt. It is not on the other hand full affirmation. The problematic stands midway between doubt and affirmation and also between judgment and inference. The mental attitude expressed in the problematic is merely a *tendency* towards belief. The problematic thus represents the ante-chamber to inference.

Can we then speak of the degree of tendency towards belief? We ordinarily speak of less or more of probability. A degree of probability is intelligible only as an approximation towards belief. But belief is not generated by the addition of the different degrees of probability. We attain to belief by completely changing our mental attitude in the

problematic. The metamorphosis of the mental attitude takes place, when we pass from probability to belief. Tendency or inclination towards belief as an attitude is something psychical, and as such does not admit of any quantitative measurement. A, B, C, D are the known conditions of X. On the presentation of A or B or C or D, X is probable. Again on the presentation of ABC, or ABD, or ACD etc. X is still probable. But we cannot say that in the latter, probability is greater, for, probable is just probable. And 'probable' cannot become actual or necessary, by way of the accretion of the different degree of approximation towards it, but by a fundamental change of the mental attitude, involving a passage from mere inclination to affirmation.

To sum up, it is idle to discuss whether modality affects the content or the form of a judgment. As we have already noticed, there can be no separation between the two. The more relevant question to be asked is whether modality is concerned with judgment *qua* judgment. Modality is taken to mean a mode of certainty. Now judgment as such is self-dependent and does not require any mediation. For assertion it directly fixes upon some content given in experience. Presentation in perception or in thought is after all presentation. We cannot, in any way, question the presentation itself. It is, in a sense, absolutely certain. So in connection with judgment which is always in the form of assertion, the question of a mode of certainty does not arise at all, in as much as the latter presumes the possibility of different degrees of certainty in regard to judgment. The question of the mode of certainty is pertinent only when we pass from the known to the unknown. The mode of certainty depends upon the relation between data known and the fact to which we proceed in thought. As we have seen, the so-called necessary judgments are strictly speaking inferences and the problematic indicates merely the fringe of the sphere of inference. So we should revise the

traditional way of treating the problematic, the assertoric and the necessary in a hierarchy. The division should not be tripartite, but two-fold. The assertoric, same as the categorical, points to judgment *qua* judgment. So it should not be thrust into a company which is not congenial to it. There cannot be assertion, in the complete sense of the term, in the assertoric without the maximum of certainty with which the given is given. And it is not that as we pass our attention from the problematic to the assertoric, or from the assertoric to the necessary, we are not getting any greater degree of certainty. For, as we have seen, degree is here out of the question. The necessary represents necessary in which the notion of necessity is based on that of mediation and for the matter of that, on that of full justification. We should not be misled by the form of language, which has its own use. In a sense, the difference between 'is' and 'must', is none except in an emphasis the latter expresses. But closely viewed it appears that 'must' brings out more clearly the inferential character of an intellectual process. The problematic has been found to be only a preliminary step to inference proper. So our much-valued modality evaporates away on analysis, and what is left is judgment, and inference *qua* inference with a preliminary. Modality and the arrangements of judgments according to it, are therefore, two artificialities of Logic, that are to be cast into the 'limbo of oblivion.'

Mysticism as a Philosophical Creed.

By

S. N. L. SHRIWASTAVA.

Mysticism may be defined as the direct, immediate and veridical experience of reality in its ultimate essence. The philosophical tenability of mysticism depends on the truth of the three fundamental assumptions which more or less every form of mysticism necessarily implies. These are :—

- i. That our rational interpretation of reality is not final ; Our set logical categories fail to reach the final truth ;
- ii. That reality is at bottom and in its ultimate essence purely spiritual ; and
- iii. That it is possible to transcend the logical understanding and rise to a higher level of intuitional experience, where Ultimate Reality is immediately and veridically perceived.

I.

The first assumption is a direct refutation of what is tacitly assumed in all intellectualistic philosophies viz., that the reality which philosophy is called upon to reflect over and explain is only understandable and explicable in terms of the universal and *a priori* presuppositions of reason or certain ultimate and fundamental categories of thought. "If you ask me what reality is", says Bosanquet "You can in the end say nothing but that it is the whole which thought is always endeavouring to affirm."* This quotation is typical of the attitude of intellectualistic philosophies. In opposition to this the mystic view is that the Real, the Ultimate Real, is immeasurably wider than the rational, that the rational

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account of the universe is not its final truth, and that there is the possibility of a deeper illumination which rises superior to the discursive and relational character of rational experience and yields a unitive and immediate vision of the ultimate essence of existence.

What challenges the finality of a rational explanation is the fact that experience itself carries with it a *positive* indication of a supra-logical reality which is not only *veridically given* in experience, but is what makes logical or rational experience possible. The *subject* of experience, we shall attempt to show is such reality.

Let us start with what is the most general character of reality, viz., that reality is subject-object, a knowing or perceiving consciousness or intelligence on the one hand, and a known objective on the other, a *totum objectivum* by which we shall mean here not only all that is *actually* known, but also all that is *knowable* as such—the totality of the known and the knowable, the entire region of *objects* which *qua* objects are distinguishable from the subject in having the character of knownness or knowableness. For a proper understanding of what follows these two distinct spheres of reality, the sphere of the subject and the sphere of the objective, with their characteristic differences well deserve to be borne in mind.

When we say that the universe is rationally interpretable or explicable in terms of the categories of thought, all that we can legitimately mean by such a universe is the sphere of the objective alone in the sense explained above, and not the sphere of the subject. The subject does comprehend the objective on a rational plan, but it *itself* transcends the rational order, it itself, as Kant pointed out, cannot be characterised by any of the categories of thought. The subject exceeds our set logical categories; it is supra-logical. The reason, perhaps, why Western philosophical thought in general is

predominantly rational and the Indian prevailingly mystical, is that the former has always been impressed by the logical character of the objective ; while to the latter the indication of the supra-logical real has been a perennial source of mystical inspiration.

It is a principle of cardinal significance that through the mechanism of what we call our rational understanding, only the objective can be appraised and apprehended, and not the subject which, as all that is objective is *for* it, is the primal fact in existence, the initial reality.

To bring out fully the supra-logical character of the subject, we must elucidate a little the meaning of the subject. By the subject is here meant the ultimate comprehending consciousness which is the presupposition and precondition of all that is objective, the entire region of the known and the knowable. Thus construed, the subject is distinguishable from all that is comprehensible as a content of knowledge, even from the egoity or "I" which is usually called the self. The "I" with all that it connotes is a *comprehensible*, and therefore properly speaking, belongs to the sphere of the objective. The real subject is not the "I" but the transcendental condition of the comprehensibility of "I". What we appraise by our categories of thought is the objective not the subject.

The subject is the principle back of the reasoning process and is the precondition of rational experience. Rational knowledge is in its very nature discursive and relational, reasoning is harmonising or discriminating of facts. The universals with which our logical understanding works are identities in difference. Conceptual activity involves the combining or welding together of concepts that enter into every single act of judgment,—concepts that are discrete, isolated and appear successively. This process of synthesising the several distinct concepts and welding them together into a single

act of judgment, requires as its precondition a non-relational and transcendental principle of consciousness, which is the *ground* of the process, the nexus which binds together the diversity of facts and concepts. That is the real subject, the *prius* of rationality and the rational universe. It is not thought or reason which is the *prius* of reality, but the Ground Consciousness (*Kootastha Chaitanya*) or the subject which is the precondition and *prius* of thought or reason itself.

The subject, then, is wholly beyond the categories of thought ; it is the supra-logical Real. And once we have conceded this, we are constrained to concede further that a rational account of the universe cannot be *final* for the incontrovertible reason that the categories of thought appertain only to the objective counterpart of reality and not to the *whole* of reality ; the subject being left out. To appraise the *whole*, it would require what Kant called *intellectual perception* which "would not know its object discursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous perception." (Watson : *The Philosophy of Kant* ; p. 133) The only satisfying *terminus* of knowledge can be a unitive consciousness where the dualism between subject and the objective is got over. "The idea of an intuitive understanding", writes Caird, "an understanding which *in the consciousness of itself includes the consciousness of its object*.appears, therefore, as the necessary terminus or goal, toward which all our knowledge points ; or, as the only kind of consciousness in which we could find a *final* satisfaction of the questions of our intelligence" (Caird : *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. II, p. 13.). This unitive consciousness is the common premise of the mystics all the world over. There is hardly a system of serious philosophy which does not end by pointing out the inadequacy of reason to be the oracle of final truth. If philosophy be an attempt to appraise reality in its wholeness, then the problem of the possibility of a unitive mystical

consciousness, is one which concerns it most. So the first assumption of mysticism is one which cannot be challenged.

II

If the ideal of a-unitive consciousness, the ideal of *intellectual understanding* in the Kantian sense be ever realisable, then the disparity between the subject and the objective, must in the end be only an *appearance* and not reality. Knowledge or experience can only be revelatory of what already *is* ; if the unity of existence which obtains in the mystical experience were not already a fact, it would never be revealed there. If mysticism be philosophically tenable, then philosophical analysis must show that spirit is the sole and fontal reality. The case for mysticism depends on an *all-spiritual* view of reality. The one common affirmation of all mystical experiences is *that reality in its entirety* is spiritual. Does philosophical reflection lend support to such a view? I am persuaded to believe it does. In the last analysis, there is no element in the structure of reality which is *unspiritual or material*. The world, as we will all admit, is a *known* world, a world which as Bosanquet says "exists in the medium of our knowledge." All that is real, all that exists, is inevitably conditioned by *knowability*. All that is real must be *knowable*, though not necessarily *known*. The real is knowable. Having conceded this there should be no difficulty in determining the nature of the real. The real that can only be comprehended through the medium of knowledge, cannot in itself be opposed in nature to knowledge. Community of nature between knowing and the "known" is the very condition of the possibility to knowledge. If we admit the 'thing' or the 'object' known to be alien in its essence to knowledge, we are led to the necessity of positing a *tertium quid* which will account for the co-ordination of the two. Such a *tertium quid* by no stretch of imagination we can discover. To posit non-spiritual elements as the ultimate data of knowledge, is for

ever to defeat the possibility of knowledge. Whatever be the analysis of science regarding the ultimate constitution of matter or atoms, the fact remains that in so far as they are capable of being known, their ultimate essence cannot be non-spiritual. This metaphysical truth will remain unshaken and is independent of all *objective* researches of physical science. Whatever be the terms whereby we choose to designate the ultimate data of experience 'objects', 'sense-data' etc., they are *qua* data of knowledge, simply such stuff as knowledge is made of. The 'objects' in the last analysis, are simply points of reference in the *all-knowledge* objective continuum. Knowing is an immanental reference from one point or centre to another within the oceanic stretch of the *all-knowledge* objective continuum. The world is throughout such stuff as knowledge is made of (Jñāna-swarupa). The objective is of the nature of knowledge, *ideal* in the most general sense.

The *ideality* of the world explains both its sublation in the mystic experience and the unitary nature of the latter. It is the ideal alone that can be negatable in any state of experience. The world is an ideal projection of spirit or consciousness which is the Sole Real, the fundamental Reality. So the second assumption of mysticism is not philosophically untenable.

III

The question of the possibility of transcending the rational level of experience is the crux of mysticism. Now, what can *prove* the possibility of mystic experience is mystic experience itself. There cannot be a logical proof of what is *ex hypothesi* supra-logical. The case for mysticism, therefore, depends not on any logical *credenda*, but rather on those experiences of life which outsoar the boundaries of rational apprehension. Instances are not wanting in life when the trammels of reason

are laid aside and

“Our souls have *sight* of that immortal sea,
Which brought us hither.”

Artistic and poetic intuitions and the exaltations of music are instances of supra-rational apprehension—instances which afford us glimpses into *De Profundis*. In these romantic flights of the soul, we have not merely the raptures of feeling, but also a veridical appraising of the *truth* of reality. The saying of the poet “Beauty is truth, and truth is beauty” brings out an important characteristic of aesthetic intuitions, viz., that they appraise reality and give *truth*. Shelley also in his *Hymn to Intellectual Beauty* indicates the same position :—

“Thy light alone—like mist o’er mountains driven
Or music by the night-wind sent
Through strings of some still instrument
Or moonlight on a midnight stream
Gives *Grace* and *Truth* to life’s unquiet dream.”

A comprehensive philosophical view of experience can no longer afford to ignore the elements of artistic appreciation ; for the world of experience is not only a world of facts, but also one of values—and values are as much constituent factors of reality as facts. Not only our factual judgments, but also our judgments of value are revelatory of reality. The significance of artistic intuitions consists in this that they are positive instances of veridical supra-rational experience.

We have spoken of aesthetic intuitions as being supra-rational and we may note further that they are also trans-individual. The putting off of ‘individuality’ is a remarkable feature of mystic experiences and we have this characteristic in all genuine aesthetic intuitions. In Schopenhauer’s theory of aesthetic intuition, we have the admission of the possibility of trans-individual experiences. In the perception of *Ideas*, says Schopenhauer, the perceiving subject loses his indivi-

duality. The following passages make it clear : "The transition which we have referred to as possible, but which is yet to be regarded only as exceptional, from the common knowledge of particular things to the knowledge of Ideas, takes place suddenly ; for knowledge breaks free from the service of the will, *by the subject ceasing to be merely individual*, and thus becoming the pure will-less subject of knowledge." Then again, if a man "gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks himself entirely therein, and lets his whole consciousness be filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, a mountain, a building, or whatever it may be ; inasmuch as he loses himself in his object (to use a pregnant German idiom) i.e. forgets even his individuality, his will, and only continues to exist as the *pure subject*, the clear mirror of the object, so that it is as if the object alone were there, without any one to perceive it, and he can no longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but both have become one, because the whole consciousness is filled and occupied with one single sensuous picture,.....therefore, *he who is sunk in this perception is no longer individual*, for in such perception, the individual has lost himself, but he is pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject of knowledge." (Quoted in Prof. Lossky's *Intuitive Basis of Knowledge* : Pp. 183-84).

Another positive instance of trans-individual experience is *susupti* or the deep sleep state. It cannot be denied that the deep sleep state is a positive state of conscious experience ; were it not so, were it only a void or a lapse into *unconsciousness* as it is usually supposed, no recollection of it would ever be possible. Yet the I-sense or egoity is clearly absent in the deep sleep state.

A second significant feature of the *suṣupti* state, besides the absence of egoity, is the complete cessation of the functioning of the mind or the intellect and the senses. The *suṣupti* is described as *Chetomukhah* or having consciousness alone as the faculty of apprehension. Therein we have apprehension by the pure light of consciousness, unmediated by the instrumentality of the intellect and the senses. The *suṣupti* is a distinct instance of positive experience where the intellectual mechanism is laid aside, where the functioning of the sense-organs is completely suspended, and where the spirit apprehends by its own unaided light. The significance and metaphysical import of *suṣupti* is missed when we take it as a lapse into unconsciousness. Far from being this, it is a more intensified, more in-gathered state of consciousness—*prajñā-naghana* as it is styled.

To conclude, what is the bearing of these observations on the philosophical tenability of mysticism? Can mysticism be maintained as a philosophical creed? The prevailing tendency in most of the contemporary philosophical circles is to regard mysticism as extra-philosophical. This tendency may be attributed to two things:—

- i. Inadequate analysis of experience, and
- ii. The uncritical acceptance of the principle that reason is capable of being the oracle of final truth.

It is the inadequate analysis of experience, a narrow perspective, the failure to bring within the purview of philosophical comprehension, such significant facts of experience as the *suṣupti* and the aesthetic intuitions. What we usually call the *facts* of experience do not exhaust the elements of experience; experience also contains as its constituent elements *values* and these have to be reckoned with in any ultimate theory of experience. With regard to the second point, we have made it sufficiently clear that our set logical categories are only fitted to appraise the objective and not the subject,

which is the *primal* reality. If the primal reality be itself supra-logical, how can any logical theory claim to set forth the final truth of existence ? If philosophy has for its aim an insight into the ultimate nature of experience based on a comprehensive consideration of its diverse elements—facts and values and also such states of conscious experience as the *susupti*, it will necessarily *point to* mystical experience as the terminus of its enquiry. There can be no philosophical objections to mysticism, although mysticism finally means the transcendence of philosophy. Experience, we have seen, does contain facts which lend support to the possibility of mystical experience with its supra-logical, supra-individual and unitary characters. Mysticism is, in the end, a faith ; but not a *blind* faith, not a faith which philosophy can dispute or experience challenge.

The Doctrine of Maya

By

P. G. Dutt.

The modern tendency amongst Indian Philosophers is to interpret the doctrine of Maya in such a way as to ascribe empirical reality to the manifold of experience and not to treat it as empty nothing, though they maintain that reality is an indivisible one pervading the whole universe and is identical with Brahman or Atman. But with the orthodox Vedāntists the phenomenal world is a great illusion having no reality either empirical or spiritual. In the sense in which reality is used in the Vedānta it cannot be ascribed to the empirical world, because the expression 'empirical reality' involves self-contradiction in the Vedāntic sense. The empirical world is full of changes and is ever changing, whereas reality as reality never changes. If that be so it would be inconsistent and unreasonable to maintain that the Vedānta accepts the practical or empirical reality of the world of our experience.

The ancient Indian philosophers however had to accept the empirical world as real in their practical life—in their thought and action. All the modern followers of absolute Idealism or mentalism have to accept in their practical dealings the reality of the phenomenal world. Thus there seems to be a great inconsistency between Idealism on the one hand and the practical life or attitude to the phenomenal world on the other. If we accept Philosophy to be the rational interpretation of the manifold of experience then as long as this inconsistency remains it would be hardly reasonable to accept Idealism, Mentalism or the Vedāntic principle of Māyā.

To remove this inconsistency the Buddhists abandoned the Atman or Brahman altogether and considered the belief in the Atman as heresy. But the acceptance of eternal change without the reality which changes, as well as the doctrine of transmigration cannot be understood without accepting some reality, self, or matter which changes or transmigrates. Besides, the ancient people were so very simple in their attitude that it was not possible for them to accept a duplicity in life of such a nature as to require them to treat the world as real in practice while believing it as nothing but illusion or projection of dreams. It is well known from history that the ancient people could not tolerate difference in opinion and very often appealed to arms in order to compel the holders of the opposite view to accept their own. It was for this reason that religious persecution and wars for the sake of religion took place all over the world. It is also one of the causes for which the Jews are being persecuted in Germany and the Buddhists and the Atheists were punished like thieves in the time of the Ramayana. The indignation of the ancient Indian people towards duplicity can be well understood if we care to take into consideration the great value which the ancient Aryans attached to truth or *Satya dharma*. Thus we can safely conclude that it was incompatible with the nature of the Aryans to accept the doctrine of Maya and to treat the world as wholly real in their practical life.

Besides we have a great deal of internal evidence in the Vedas and the Upanishads to show that the Aryans did not treat the empirical world as illusion or dreamland. It is rather easy to prove that the Aryans of the Vedic times as well as of the time of the Upanishads, believed in an extremely crude, material, mundane world and a superior world of happiness known as heaven. These Aryans were used to perform sacrifices for their easy translation to Heaven in the time of

the Vedas. Though in the Upanishads these sacrifices are discredited yet the idea of heaven and the trust in the reality of both heaven and the world loomed large in the mind of the early Aryans. So it is rather too much to believe that the Maya was a living faith with the ancient Aryans.

Even now it will be difficult to find any one to believe in Maya and follow it in his worldly activities. But there are many who discredit this doctrine and are ready to disprove it like Johnson by kicking at a block of stone. If this doctrine be unacceptable to the modern people it was more unacceptable to the people of the ancient time. It is rather too much to think that the simple-minded ancient people believed a theory which directly contradicted the world of their common sense and could never be translated into practice.

Though it has been repeatedly proclaimed by the greatest philosophers of the time that it is the duty of the philosophers to guide the destinies of the world and to show the right path, yet the modern people refuse to come to the philosophers for inspiration and guidance. They now go to the politicians, capitalists and industrialists for ideal and direction. Thus modern philosophers have lost their hold on the people. But it was not so in the time of the Upanishads. The great sages of old used to come forward with their new truths and discoveries and placed them before the assembly of sages and asked the people at large to realise these truths in life. The people also sincerely tried to live up to these new truths. The dynamic force of a new truth becomes clear to us if we bear in mind the eagerness with which people followed the various prophets of the world. It is quite unlikely that a sage in the ancient time would have come forward with a theory which contradicts the world of common sense. So it is difficult to maintain that the doctrine of Maya in the sense in which it

has been explained by the great Sankaracharyya was in vogue in the time of the Upanishads.

Dr. P. D. Sastri has taken much care to show that the word, Maya, and its derivatives can be found in the Vedas and the Upanishads to disprove that the doctrine of Maya is a creation of Sankara and his teacher's teacher Goudapāda. He has also shown that throughout the Upanishads we find the acceptance of the Atman or Brahman as the only reality and that Maya is almost a corollary of this doctrine of Atman. The view that the world is real is also compatible with the belief in the Atman because it is also repeatedly said that the Atman pervades the whole universe.

All these points show that the right interpretation of Maya has yet to be discovered. As long as the orthodox interpretation is unshaken, it will remain a mystery how such an unacceptable doctrine could make a deep impression on the Indo-Aryan mind.

But the greatest difficulty in finding out the true significance of this doctrine lies in the fact that according to the sages knowledge cannot be attained by mere reasoning (*naishā tarkena matirāpaneyā proktānyenaiv sujnānāya preshta*.—Kāthakopanishad. i. 2,9) and particularly on account of the very nature of the Atman. (*Atarkyamaṇu pramānāt*.—Kātha. i. 2,7). It should also be remembered that the doctrine of Maya is intimately connected with the Atman and if one of them be unintelligible the other also must remain so. Though from the modern standpoint the theory of the Atman is a representative fiction yet to the sages of the Upanishads it is the most absolute reality and it is known directly by the truly instructed who feel it to be true, not by reasoning but by a mysterious faculty of our mind. Besides it is often treated as a heresy to question the authority of the Upanishads as they are treated as part of the Vedas, and so any statement made in the Upanishads should be

treated as true and we should start our philosophical investigation from such a truth. Thus there is no epistemological difficulty in Indian Philosophy. Everything starts from the testimony of the Vedas and the Upanishads. But from these sources we get not only the unreality of the world or *Māyā* but also the reality of the crude material world. If testimony be accepted as a true source of evidence there will hardly be any justification for us to accept the one and to reject the other. In order to remove this difficulty the great Sankara had to divide knowledge into two kinds, viz., *parā vidyā* (higher knowledge) and *aparā vidyā* (lower knowledge). In other words, Sankara admitted indirectly that in the Vedas and the Upanishads there is a great confusion between the *parā* and the *aparā vidyā*, and it was from the standpoint of the *aparā vidyā* that the world has been described as real. This is no synthesis. It is rather another way of admitting the contradiction existing between the conclusions of our knowledge and the evidence of our sense-experience. Besides we know that *Vidyā* in the time of the Upanishads meant the worship of the Vedic gods and not the metaphysical or empirical knowledge. In *Iśā* 7, it has been pointed out that he who worships *avidyā* enters into the world of darkness and he who worships *vidyā* also enters into that region.

The doctrine of *Māyā* rests on the propositions (*Tat twam asi*, and *Brahma satyam jagat mithya jīva Brahmopi napara*) 'That thou art' and 'Brahman is real, the world is false, and the living beings are Brahman and not different from Him.' Now in understanding these propositions the notions of identity, similarity and inclusion should be clearly explained. This notion of identity is really a quantitative relation and is expressible by the sign of equality (=) and cannot be expressed by the verb to be. When we say that A is B we do not mean that $A=B$, because A is B is not a convertible

relation. In order to express the identity between A and B we should say that A is B and B is A ; but this even does not seem to express the entire idea contained in $A = B$. The notion of unity is behind $A = B$, whereas duality is prominently present in A is B. So when we say 'That thou art' we do not mean that Thou = That. Hence it is bad logic to infer the Maya from 'That thou art.' Similarly from *Jiva Brahmopī napara* we cannot infer that Jiva = Brahma. On the contrary 'That thou art' and 'the Jiva is Brahma' show the reality of *thou* and *jiva*. Then comes the proposition *Jaganmithya*—the world is false. The very word *mithya* or false supposes some person to whom the world is false. Besides the proposition is extremely vague as it is not clear whether the noumenal world is false or our information of the world through the sense organs is false, or our inference of the plurality and diversity from the world of sense experience is false. Besides to treat a statement as false we must compare it with the reality implied by it and to show that there is disagreement between them. But when we are totally ignorant of the world as it is and of the Brahman, we are not justified in saying that the world is *mithya* or false.

All these show that the orthodox view of Maya does not give us its true significance. The Vedānta emphatically maintains that the reality is one and is identical with Brahman. The various *Jivas* who appear to possess separate isolated existence independent of one another and of Brahman are really identical with Brahman or are manifestations of Him, or they are in Brahman and have no existence apart from Him. *Māyā* therefore comes in when we consider the world of experience or nature. The facts and phenomena of this world seem to be isolated from one another and to possess independent existence of their own. But as a matter of fact, the Vedānta points out that all these are in Brahman

and have no existence apart from Him. The ascription of isolated independent existence to the facts and phenomena of this world of our experience is really Maya, mithya, or false. We are all subject to this cosmic illusion and on account of its influence we view the things and beings of this world as having independent existence of their own. One rises above this Maya when he understands that this world is in Brahman and has no existence apart from Him.

This interpretation of Maya does not reduce the world of our experience to empty nothing and harmonises our practical life with the Vedantic point of view. The world therefore is not unreal. What is unreal or false is the appearance of the facts and phenomena of this world as having independent isolated existence of their own. This is also the legitimate conclusion from Sankara's statement that the objects seen in the waking world are unreal because they are capable of being seen. Reality or being lies on the other side of seeing or experience or transcends it.

The Problem of Error in Samkhya

By

Prof. S. N. Roy.

The Samkhya philosophy is one of the oldest systems of thought and occupies a prominent place in the History of Indian Philosophy. It will be interesting to enquire into its attitude towards the problem of Error and the light it throws on the problem may guide us to deal successfully with the question as to how error arises in knowledge.

The Samkhya starts with a fundamental assumption namely that the Purusha is the knower and Prakriti is the known, the former is pure consciousness while the latter is material and unconscious. This pure consciousness becomes reflected in Buddhi the first determinate product of the indeterminate Pradhana. The Buddhi principle is itself unconscious but it becomes conscious so to speak (Cetanavat) due to the reflection of the consciousness of Purusha in it. As a result of this the Buddhi principle creates in our mind the notion of a self which is subject to pleasure and pain whereas in reality the Self or Purusha is never affected by pleasure or pain. Thus, the Self appears to be knowing things through Buddhi which is Nischayatmika and the modifications of Buddhi are attributed to the Soul. But the Soul is never subject to birth and death and is beyond all modifications. From this it follows that the Buddhi principle which is a product of Prakriti is real but the Buddhi functioning as a conscious agent is unreal, because Soul alone is the conscious principle and not Buddhi. Error arises when it is thought that the Buddhi principle is conscious and the Soul is but the Ego which is a product of the principle of individuation namely Ahamkara. Error is, therefore, the absence of the knowledge that the Self and the

Buddhi are two different principles. The example of Java-sphatika is to the point. Java and Sphatika are both real but when Sphatika is considered to be red, whereas in reality the Java is red and not Sphatika, error arises. The redness of Java is real but the redness as it appears in the Sphatika is unreal. There is thus Sadasatkhyati. In explaining Sadasatkhyati Vignanabbikshu has said in his *Pravachana Bhashya* that "Lauhityam Vimvarupena sat Sphatikastha prativimvarupena cha asat." That is, redness is real in itself but so far as it is attributed to the crystal it is unreal. The Samkhya denies Satkhyati as well as Asatkhyati and holds Sadasatkhyati. The supporters of Satkhyati point out that knowledge is possible only of the real. In the perception of silver in shell, both shell and silver are real. The supporters of the Asatkhyativada hold that in the perception this is silver, silver is unreal. The Samkhya points out that if reality is always known there is no possibility of error. If, again, we know the unreal, the distinction between truth and error vanishes. Thus, error cannot be accounted for by the theories known as Satkhyativada and Asatkhyativada. It can be only explained by the theory that the Buddhi fails to know the distinction between the real and the unreal and therefore error arises. In perceiving the Shukti (shell) as Rajata (silver) the Buddhi principle fails to recognise the distinction between Shukti which is real and Rajata which is falsely attributed to Shukti. As Vignanabbikshu has said "Rajatam Vanigvithistharupena sat shukti—Adhyastarupena cha asat"

Thus non-discrimination (Aviveka) is the cause of error. This Aviveka is an inherent property of Buddhi because as long as Buddhi functions, this non-discrimination prevails. But nothing can be known except through the instrumentality of Buddhi. Hence, all intellectual knowledge is inherently false.

It is assumed that the Buddhi is made conscious by the

reflection of Purusha in it, but as a matter of fact the Buddhi principle is not conscious. The seat of error is therefore Buddhi which functions as a principle of determination (Adhyavasaya). Now the question arises : Can we get true knowledge ? (Yathartha Jnana). If so, how ? It has been pointed out that Buddhi is responsible for error and suffering, but if this Buddhi is purified more and more so as to become nearly as pure as Purusha then it enables Purusha to know itself. That is, if the Avarana of Buddhi becomes extremely thin, then the knowledge of the Self dawns on us and the Buddhi ceases to function. Buddhi therefore may help us to the realisation of the Purusha, although through it the true nature of the latter cannot be known. When Samyag-Jnana dawns upon us we understand that the knowledge and the Buddhi are two different principles, and at that stage operations of Buddhi completely stop. The Buddhi principle may be withdrawn gradually from gross matter to the sense data and from the sense data to the activity of the internal organs (Antahkarana) and finally the activities of Buddhi may be completely withdrawn into itself thus making rise of true knowledge possible.

We may say that true knowledge i.e. knowledge of the true nature of the self and of the world can be had only when the Buddhi in which error is inherent ceases to undergo modifications. But ex-hypothesi things of the world can be known by the Self only through Buddhi, and if the Buddhi ceases to function no knowledge of things is possible. From this it follows that true knowledge is essentially different from intellectual or discursive knowledge because the latter is always partial and incomplete and can never attain to complete truth. To gain true knowledge we should adopt the Neti Neti method, i.e., it is not this, not this (Neti neti tattagnanat). The self is not gross matter, it is not the sense data, it is not Manas, Ahankara or Buddhi, but it is pure

consciousness and is beyond all gunas. In this way we may get true knowledge of the self which will then be understood as different from Prakriti. This means that we must be able to subject ourselves to strict discipline of thought and action in order to attain true knowledge.

We have been told by the Samkhyakara that in knowing things of the world the Buddhi becomes modified and assumes the form of the things. When a Ghata is perceived Buddhi assumes the form of a Ghata and thus the Purusha knows it as such. But does it represent things in their real nature ? To this question we give the reply that Buddhi and the things of the world are made up of the same stuff namely the three gunas, and thus there is really no opposition between them. The external things modify Buddhi by acting upon the sense organs and there is no reason to believe that the Buddhi vrittis are merely the intermediaries between the knower and the external objects. But error arises in perception simply because under no circumstances the external object is wholly known through Buddhi. Only a part of the thing is represented in Buddhi and therefore complete knowledge of the thing is impossible. In other words the thing as perceived, on account of incomplete representation, may be wrongly known. For instance in the perception of Rajata in Shukti, Rajata which is known is not completely perceived and therefore, there is confusion of Rajata with Shukti that is, there is non-discrimination of Rajata from Shukti.

We may consider truth in its two aspects :—in its absolute aspect and in its relative aspects. Absolute truth is attainable only when reality is known as a whole and in its entirety. Partial truths are attainable when neither Buddhi nor the sense organs are defective. Subjectivity accounts for error but not wholly. There are some objective circumstances which are responsible for the improper functioning of Buddhi,

that is, they prevent Buddhi from discriminating one object from another.

We may now examine more minutely the theories known as Satkhyativada and Asatkhyativda. According to Satkhyativada when we perceive Rajata in Shukti we have the knowledge of real Rajata, the features of which are actually present in Shukti. There can be no knowledge of Asata or unreal. According to Asatkhyativada when we perceive Rajata in Shukti we have the knowledge of Rajata which is unreal. The error of perception is not due to real Shukti appearing as Rajata being attributed to Shukti, but our perception is false because there is no objective counterpart of our knowledge of Rajata. These two views do not account for error, because according to the first view our knowledge is always of the real and according to the second our knowledge is always subjective and has no objective reference. The Samkhya therefore rejects these views and also does not accept the Anyathakhyativada according to which a thing appears as something else. In other words this view holds that if a thing becomes apparently perceptible this implies the existence of the thing in some quarter. In our perception of silver in shell the silver existing elsewhere makes its appearance in shell. The error is due to Doshta i.e., defect in the sense organs etc. But how can we have known of Rajata existing elsewhere? We perceive Rajata actually existing before us and therefore the inference that Rajata exists elsewhere is not true. Knowledge of the Vishistha or the qualified something cannot arise unless there is Sannikarsa between Visheshya (subject) and Visheshana (predicate). We do not know a Dandee from our perception of person without a Danda (staff).

The Samkhya philosophy therefore holds the view of Sadasatkhyati according to which knowledge is neither of the real only or of the unreal only, but is grounded on the per-

ception of both Sat and Asat, or more precisely Asat in Sat. The Jagat is Sat but the consciousness as attributed to it is Asat, but unless the Buddhi functions no knowledge is possible.

We may now examine the theories advanced by the Western thinkers. The correspondence theory holds that error means absence of correspondence. But what is correspondence ? In what does correspondence really consist ? If I perceive a snake in a rope, is the error due to want of correspondence ? In my mind there is the idea of snake and in the outside world there is rope ; hence it is held that there is no correspondence. But so long as I perceive a snake, the snake is believed to be existing in the outer space. It is only when the rope is perceived that we do not see the snake. If the thing is supposed to be extra-mental we are never sure if our ideas ever correspond with it. The pragmatic theory is also faulty, because it makes truth dependent upon utility and thus takes away the universal character of truth. The same conception may be useful to some but not to others. The idea of a heaven may be useful to me but definitely injurious to others.

The Coherence theory also fails because it does not leave any room for error. Does error exist or not ? If error does exist, the coherence cannot be the test of truth, for errors also may co-here. If it is held that errors do not exist, then errors will be chimeras of imagination which they are not.

The Neo-Realists mainly hold that things are directly known and knowledge makes no difference to things. Things exist but they may or may not be real. Common sense assumes that the real is objective and the unreal is subjective. But Neo-Realists hold that non-contradiction is the test of reality or truth. True and false are respectively the real and the unreal. Bertrand Russel however holds that Truth and error are properties of propositions. Thus,

immediate apprehension of facts is neither true nor false, but when we make judgments they are either true or false. This seems to be a correct view of the nature of truth and error. But what is error due to? Is it purely subjective? If so, then there will be no distinction between error and products of imagination. Error is said to be lack of harmony between subjective order of experiences and an objective order of facts. This, however, reminds us of the correspondence theory which we have rejected.

The Samkhya view of Truth and Error leads to important consequences. Intellectual knowledge is intrinsically wrong for intellect fails to acquaint us with reality. If chittavritti is completely stopped then the knowledge of the real nature of the knower and the known flashes in ourselves. So far as facts are concerned we can know them truly provided the senses and Buddhi function properly, and there are no extraneous circumstances which prevent them from functioning properly. Error is due to Aviveka i.e., non-discrimination of one thing from another. It is subjective in the sense that it is the product of Buddhi distorting reality. It is not wholly subjective, because the Samkhya admits that there is reality which is known by the Self. The Self in knowing reality knows it through Buddhi, but when Buddhi fails to represent reality error arises. In a given case of knowledge the object is not directly an extramental thing but the modifications of Buddhi constitute the object of knowledge. Buddhi's function is ascertainment of the nature of things, e.g., it tells us "this is ghata", this is pata. In knowing Buddhi differentiates one thing from another and applies definitive qualities to things, but in so doing it may assign false attributes to things. In knowing Shell "this is Silver" the Buddhi falsely identifies 'this' which is given with Silver which is not given and therefore non-existent. In so doing it becomes modified as silver which is the object of knowledge

whereas the 'thing' actually present is 'shell' not 'silver'. A distinction has thus been made between 'object' and thing' by Samkhyakara. In a piece of true knowledge the 'thing' (vastu) is the 'object' (visaya) but in a case of false knowledge the object is different from the thing. But how are we to determine if knowledge in a particular case is true or false ? This can be determined only by reference to our knowledge of a thing being sublated (vadhita) by our later experience 'of that thing. If our knowledge of a thing is sublated it is false, if not, it is to be accepted as valid.

This will be more clear if we consider the nature of true knowledge (prama) from the standpoint of Samkhya. Prama or true knowledge consists in determining definitely the nature of things not yet determined (dvaorekatarasya vapyasaunikristathaparichhittih prama). The thing exists in the outside world and when it is brought in contact with the senses it becomes manifest, otherwise it would have remained unknown for ever. The Citta (mind) is supposed to go out of the senses to the object and assume its form (chittasya indriyapranalikaya vakyavastuparagad visyakaraparinamithvam). The thing presented to the senses is manifested to the Drasta Purusha by Buddhivritti or activities of Buddhi. When we see an object, the sense organ 'eye' is affected and as a result of the object being sensed, the Buddhi becomes modified and assumes the form of the object and thus knowledge of the thing arises. It is, therefore clear that the thing (vastu) exists in the outer space and becomes known as an object (visaya) through indriya and Buddhi. When the thing is rightly known, the object harmonises with the thing, otherwise our knowledge although it refers to the thing, fails to grasp it.

Sensory Phenomena in Mystic Life.

(An Explanation)

By

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Sensory phenomena¹ have universally characterised the Mystic way. Various theories have been advanced to explain them. Such explanations can be generally classified, according to the nature of the causal principle employed, into three heads.

Firstly, it has been contended that sensory phenomena in mystic life are the result of the use of drugs.² Leuba has thoroughly explored the possibilities of this kind of explanation under the title of "Drug Mysticism."³ He has critically considered the experiments and observations of Weir Mitchell, Davy, Robinson, Ellis, Jacobsen, and Dunbar on the use of drugs and narcotics like stramonium, cohoba, mescal, hasheesh, ether and nitrous oxide, and his own observations on the use of alcohol. His conclusion is that the use of drugs and narcotics does produce "alterations of sensa-

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1. Illustrations of sensory phenomena, the life-study of any mystic would provide. Specifically, refer to (1) E. Under-hill's "*Mysticism*," ch. on 'Voices & Visions' and the following ; (2) William James' "*The Varieties of Religious Experience*," lectures IX & X.
 2. The popularity of cannabis, datura, opium, cocaine and the like with the Indian sadhu will readily occur to everyone's mind.
 3. J. H. Leuba : "*The Psychology of Religious Mysticism*," ch. II.

tion and feeling.”⁴ The mind does not perform its functions normally but exhibits an activity which is to an abnormal degree independent of external stimuli. The type of these perturbations vary with the drug.

Such an explanation is necessarily partial ; for not all the mystics are given to the drug-habit,⁵ although sensory phenomena are common to all of them. This difficulty is, however overcome by the second kind of explanation, namely, in terms of physical excitement. Physical means include deprivations of food and sleep, isolation, active tortures, rhythmic bodily movements and shouting and singing, breathing exercises, various bodily postures, and yogic processes⁶ of similar nature. The theory has much to commend itself, though one will have to go, as will be shown later, beyond the superficiality of physical excitement deep into the psychophysiology of the matter.

The third type of explanation seeks to account for sensory phenomena in psychic terms. Sensory phenomena are, in the first instance, explained by the principle of Auto-suggestion. They are supposed to arise out of the mystic's religious beliefs, theological prepossessions and social education. Such a theory may well explain Ram Krishna's⁷ beatific vision of

4. Ibid. p. 27.

5. The Yoga-Sutra of Patanjali, IV-I, it may be interesting to note, does not recommend but only recognises the use of drugs for the attainment of special mystic powers.

6. The following references from ancient Sanskrit religious literature support the above hypothesis : (1) Nāḍabindu Up., 31-35 ; (2) Yogachudāmaṇy Up., 9-11, 115 ; (3) Advya-tāraka Up.; (4) Yogashikā Up., I 73-75 ; (5) Yogāvachāra's Manual, p. (?) 5.

7. R. Rolland : “*Life of Ram Krishna*,” pp. 40-41.

Mother Kali, but how can it account for Pascal's⁸ experience of "from half past ten till half past five, Fire !"? In other words, certain groups of sensory phenomena, e.g., experiences of personality are no doubt capable of explanation in this way. But the theory cannot explain the sensory experiences proper say, of fire or lightning.

In the second instance, sensory experiences have been regarded as 'effulgences' from the sub-conscious. The mystic, while experiencing a sensory phenomenon, is supposed to be in a state of self-hypnosis in which the sub-conscious suggestion is accepted as a reality. The difficulty with this explanation is that though it can explain meaningful experiences, and experiences in the nature of wish-fulfilments, it fails to account for other types of sensory experiences. Moreover, the contents of the sub-conscious belong to the individual whereas sensory phenomena are universal.

The explanations considered so far have proved to be incomprehensive and inadequate. Some of them are merely restatements of the mystery (?) in another form. It is proposed in this paper, therefore, to present an explanation of the problem in terms of well recognised and well founded principles of empirical psychology.

To begin with, it should be made clear that mystic life, psychologically considered is a process of transformation of mental states, bodily functions, and behaviours. And mental states and behaviour according to the writer's standpoint in Psychology are determined by four factors, to wit : (1) stimulus conditions, whether general or specific ; (2) past history of the individual, both conscious and unconscious (3) social stimuli ; and (4) bodily factors—temporary and permanent. Hence sensory experience in mystic life must be explained in terms of these determinants.

8. E. Underhill : "*Mysticism*." p. 228.

So to the first. Now what are the stimulus conditions in which a mystic is placed? In other words, what are the types of stimuli to which he is exposed?⁹ Since mystic transformation is governed on the one hand by external circumstances, and on the other by the interrelation—conflict and tension—of mental states and behaviour; and mystic life seems to attempt to alter both of these by withdrawing from external objects, and by establishing a balance between mental states so that conflict may be resolved. Hence, in the nature of things, peripherally excited sensations in mystic life can hardly be given rise to by adequate stimuli.

Adequate stimuli, however, are abundantly present in mystic life for organic and kinesthetic sensations. A study of sensory phenomena in mystic life reveals the large extent to which such phenomena are due to these sensations. The alternations of sensation and feeling noted in drug-mysticism are frequently produced by a multiplication, intensification, and qualitative variation of the feelings arising from the moving limbs and from internal organs. Again, it is a well known fact that in fasting, isolation, deprivation of sleep there is an acute awareness of organic sensations. Breathing exer-

9. It should be recalled here that stimuli have been divided into adequate, and inadequate, and into external and internal. A stimulus is said to be adequate for a sensation when it can affect only a particular sense organ and set up the excitatory processes peculiar to it. Light for example, is adequate stimulus for vision. A blow on the head which makes us see sparks is inadequate for the same. Hearing through the bones, instead of the auditory receptors, is another example. Stimuli are distinguished as external and internal according to their place of origin. The former are physical or chemical processes outside of the observer's body, the latter corresponding processes within it.

cises, bodily postures, and similar Yogic processes are important for mystic life in as much as they reveal the disturbances of heart-beat, IE ratio, and a keener awareness of sensations from the internal organs. Physical means provide extra-organic stimulation also.

The most important point, however, is to recognise the existence of inadequate stimuli as a basis for sensory phenomena in mystic life. Such inadequate stimuli are mostly internal. May it be submitted that an aspect of mystic transformation consists in an increased capacity of the organism to respond to more numerous inadequate stimuli than a normal organism does. To illustrate by an analogy from dream-consciousness. In dream state a simple stimulus of smell translate itself into a vision of a garden of variegated flowers. Is not a similar process possible in mystic consciousness?

To come to the second factor then. The past history of a mystic also determines the nature of his sensory experience. The unconscious past history of the mystic is evident in the wishfulfilment type of sensory phenomena. The conscious past history accounts for the fact why Eknath¹⁰ should have a vision of four handed God, and Catherine of Genoa¹¹ a vision of Christ bearing the Cross.

The influence of social stimuli can be easily traced in the case of those mystics who live in religious institutions like monasteries, nunneries, *maths* and *ashrams*. Social stimuli should be specifically studied with reference to (a) emotion, (b) predisposition or *aufgabe*, and (c) inter-stimulation. The practice of *sankirtan*, communal prayer, and revival meetings are good examples of social stimuli.

That bodily factors play a part in determining sensory

10 R. D. Ranade : *Mysticism in Maharashtra*, p. 226.

11 E. Underhill : *Mysticism*, p. 220.

phenomena will be readily admitted. It is necessary to consider the heredity of the organism under this head. A study of temperament, an elusive thing no doubt, cannot be neglected, for the importance ¹² of temperament in determining our responses is being realised more and more. The theory of image-types, though scientifically inexact, can nevertheless be applied with profit. The susceptibility to synæsthesia and eidetic imagery, should also be considered. All these and sundry other studies have to be undertaken in order to arrive at a comprehensive explanation of sensory phenomena in mystic life. This work is yet to be done.

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12. G. A. Coe : *The Spiritual Life*.

The Nature of vitanda and its Relation to the Methodology of Advaita

By

P. T. RAJU

I

The word *vaitaṇḍika* is a term of abuse in most of the systems of Indian philosophy. *Vitaṇḍā* is defined by Gautama as that kind of *jalpa* in which there is no attempt to establish the theory by the rival. *Jalpa* is defined by him as a debate which possesses the five parts (of inference, viz., *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharana*, *anugama* and *nigama*) and which uses *chala*, *jati*, and *nigrahasthanas* as the means of attack. *Chala* is attack by equivocation. *Jati* is attack by superficial analogy and difference. *Nigrahasthāna* again is fallacious reasoning. Thus all the helps which a *vaitaṇḍika* makes use of are defective reasonings. In addition, he has no position of his own.

Under these circumstances, not only is it not easy to argue with a *vaitaṇḍika*, but also useless and harmful. His efforts are not aimed at seeking truth, but at criticism for the sake of criticism. His interest lies only in vanquishing the opponent, but he wants to fight without anything to stand on. At the most, the ground on which he fights can only be the ground of his opponent, and his endeavour is to destroy that very ground. And like the proverbial fool in the Sanscrit literature, who cuts the very branch on which he stands, he falls down, and makes the opponent share the same fate. Hence the reluctance to argue with a *vaitaṇḍika* is not without justification. To argue with him will not merely not lead to a positive result, but may land us in utter confusion and scepticism.

So much can be said in favour of the prejudice against vitandā as a method of argument. There are in short, two defects in vitandā. The first is that the vaitaṇḍika makes use of *chala*, *jāti*, etc., which are fallacious, and the second is that he has no position of his own to establish.¹

Of course, we cannot but admit the justifiability of the first reason for the bias against vitandā. For to win an adversary by equivocation and the like can never be in the spirit of truth-seeking. It is the idea of victory by any means that supplies the motive for the vaitaṇḍika.

But what are we to say of that philosopher who does not profess to have a position of his own, but examines and criticises the theories of others to find out whether any is consistent and acceptable? One cannot refuse to consider his arguments simply because he has no position of his own. On the contrary, his arguments would be more valuable than those of many others in that he is not prejudiced in favour of any particular theory, and consequently his arguments are not advanced in its interest, and so do not beg the question.

Even when the fallacious methods of reasoning like equivocation are avoided, vitandā does not reduce itself to *vāda*. For *vāda* involves *pratipakshaparigraha*. That is, in it the positions of both the opponents should be defined. And the argumentation is conducted in order to ascertain which of the two is valid. But in vitandā minus *chala* etc., the position of only one opponent is defined. This fact makes a good deal of difference between the modes of arguing in the two. In the case of *vāda* each opponent would be trying to point out defects in the other and at the same time show that these defects are overcome in his theory. But where the position

1. It is also said that he has a position, but that he makes no attempt to establish it. The point is, however, of little moment for our present purpose.

of one only is defined, the interest of the other lies in finding out whether it is consistent.

Does not the latter method lead to truth? One may say that the attitude of criticising every theory without the critic himself holding any is that of mere scepticism. Or, this attitude must be engendered by intellectual pride which is certainly an impediment to the search of truth.

But advantage, it seems, can be derived by the proper employment of *viṭaṇḍā*. The Socratic method of argument is truly a form of *viṭaṇḍā*. In argumentation, Socrates never gives his opinion, but elicits the truth by continuous questioning until a satisfactory answer is obtained. For example, he does not give his own definition of justice as against his opponent's, but goes on objecting to his opponent's definition and its reformulation until he is satisfied. The mere desire for success in *viṭaṇḍā*, is, of course, deplorable. If the motive of the participants in a discussion is the idea of success, then even *vāda* would be of no scientific value. Varadarāja is in the right spirit, when he defines *vāda* as *viṭarāgakathā*, and says that its result is *tattvanirṇaya*. *Vāda*, according to him is the discussion of those who are devoid of passion, and its result is the determination of truth. We are here reminded of Descartes who asks us to weed away all passions from our mind before we begin to think. Hence, so long as we are in the right spirit, it is not necessary to start discussion with a certain traditionally accepted theory of our own.

On the contrary, the search for truth is hampered by preconceived notions. Bradley defines metaphysics as the "finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct," and adds that "to find these reasons is no less an instinct." The traditional view may be a superstition that is no longer worth holding. To start a discussion for supporting it, unless it were in the debating society of school boys, would be of no use. Even if the disputants are guided by the right spirit

of truth seeking, it would require on their part additional effort to abandon their own traditional views after criticising the wrong views of their opponents. The true scientific spirit requires that one should not start on an enquiry with preconceptions, but with an open mind.

Not only is vitandā not inconsistent with the spirit of truth seeking, but it is the only method to defend oneself when some direct experiences are questioned. The truth of mystic experiences is a controversial point. Those who do not possess them speak of them lightly. They are regarded as mental aberrations, self-delusions, and hallucinations. But how will the mystic be able to meet the jibes of his opponent? How will he be able to meet the formidable array of their arguments to prove that he is a dupe, if not an imposter? He cannot establish through arguments that his experiences are true, that their truth can be deduced from some universally established facts. For the mystic experiences are not amenable to exact formulation and communication, and so cannot be either the conclusions or the premises of inferences. So the only weapon left in the hands of the mystic is vitandā. He has to meet his opponent in his own field. He has to prove that his opponent's conceptions, from which the falsity of mystic experiences is deduced, are inherently inconsistent. Of course, to prove that one's opponent is in the wrong does not amount always to proving that one is in the right. But when one's experiences cannot be defined, in order to defend its truth one can do no more than disproving the opponent's contention, that is, preventing the contradiction of one's experience.

Not only in the case of mystic experiences, but in that of all categorical knowledge, vitandā is the only way in which one can meet opposition. I see a red blotting paper before me, and it is easy to question the fact that it is red. It is of no avail here to attempt to prove that it is red by measur-

ing the number of vibrations of the light rays that proceed from the paper. For before we have correlated red colour with the number of vibrations, we must have started from the concrete sensuous fact red, and then measured the number of vibrations. And now to prove that it is red by pointing to the number of vibrations would be moving in a circle. So if it is denied that a particular sensuous fact before me is red, the only reply possible is by disproving that it cannot be red. This disproof is possible only by attacking the grounds on which the opponent's argument is based. Lester-Garland, speaking of von Hugel, says "He starts with the incontrovertible fact that both in the sphere of Metaphysics and that of Religion man is conscious of 'intimations' of Objective Reality of varying strength and depth. The presumption is that this belief is justified. If any one says that it is illusory, the *onus probandi* lies with him. The method to be adopted by one who believed it to be true is therefore not to attempt to establish it by argument, but to rebut the arguments of those who say that it is false."¹

In all systems of philosophy which admit an irrational or supra-rational element in experience, *vitaṇḍā* plays an important part. Every experience has an uniqueness of its own which defies definition. For a definition of a fact is to be given only in terms of other facts. Man may be defined as a rational animal, but neither animal nor rational is the same as human, and we cannot understand how both are combined to constitute man. So the experience of man possesses an integral and intuitive nature which cannot be conceptualised and analysed. And when the truth of that particular experience is questioned, the experiencer has no other means of rebutting the questioner's arguments than *vitaṇḍā*.

1. *The Religious Philosophy of Baron von Hugel*, p. 16.

II

One can surmise by the trend of the discussion that vitandā has a close relation to the methodology of Advaita. It is a philosophy which more than any other recognises the uniqueness of every fact. For it the whole phenomenal world is *anirvachaniya*, pervaded by an irrational element, and reality is beyond description, is supra-rational. Truth, according to Advaita, is self-revealing. Its existence cannot be proved by any kind of argument except immediate experience, and the insistence on the importance of *Srutipramāṇa* by the advaitins is necessitated by their view of the indescribability of reality. In this century the emphasis on *Sruti* is to be interpreted as the emphasis on the intuition of people who were *vītarāgas*, not affected by passions. Reference has already been made to the opinion of Descartes that before we begin to think our minds should be freed from all preconceptions and passions. If purity of mind is required in order even to reason, much more is the need of purity in case of intuition. For imperfect beings that we are, there is much chance of our taking every fancy to be the object of right intuition. But the seers of the *Sruti* are men who have for long, disciplined their minds and removed all passions from them. Therefore they are the least liable to be misled. And the basic truth of this view is the fact that truth is self-revealing and can only be intuited. And because it is beyond description, and consequently every description of it is liable to error, forms of proof other than direct experience are inadequate to it.

When this point is borne in mind, we can fully appreciate Sri Harsha when he so zealously defends the view that *Sruti* cannot be refuted by other kinds of proof.² And the method he adopts is vitandā. In fact, the argumentation from

2. *Khandanakhandakhādyā*, pp. 167 sqq. (Dr. Jha's edition).

beginning to end in *Khaṇḍana* is *viṭaṇḍā*, only because the reality of the advaitin is indescribable, and any attack on his view can be repulsed only by showing the untenability of the rival's position. Truth is non-contradictory, and it can be defended only by refuting its contradictions.

According to advaita, not only the ultimate truth but also the finite is indefinable, because every fact is unique. It is true that we come across a number of definitions and descriptions in many works of advaita. But none can deny that the logical culmination of advaita philosophy is *Khaṇḍana*, the *anīrvachanīyatāsarvasva*. The epistemological theory that truth is revealed by itself, whereas falsity by its other is closely related to this view.³ The Hegelians too maintain that truth is self-revealing. But this self-revealing truth for them is the Absolute, and every finite truth is made truth by its coherence with other finite truths. In order to know whether a certain judgment, "The sky is blue", is true or not, we have to know all other possible judgments that can be made in the universe and find out whether the judgment in question agrees with them. Thus it is made true by its coherence with the rest. That is, because here truth is mediated, it cannot be self-revealing. And this view is closely connected with the Hegelian reduction of particular facts into groups or systems of universals.⁴ But this reduction destroys the uniqueness of facts we experience. If this uniqueness is to be retained and defended, coherence should not be taken as the absolute criterion of truth. As unique, even the finite truth must be self-revelatory. And as self-revealing, it must be known, not by knowing its agreement with other truths, but through itself. Yet the falsity of a

3. Svataḥprāmāṇyavāda, and aprāmāṇyavāda.

4. Cf. Bradley's view that even the singular judgment is an imperfect hypothetical.

cognition can be known through other cognitions, whereas the truth of a cognition is known through itself.

Now therefore, when a finite truth, which, as unique is self-revelatory, is questioned, it is impossible to defend oneself satisfactorily by trying to establish it by argument. The only method possible is *vitaṇḍā*. That is why, the *advaitin* in his disputations with other schools of philosophy, assumes the role of a *vitaṇḍika*. And his logic is the outcome of his metaphysics.

On 'Indeterminability'

(A Study of Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty and its
Philosophical Implications)

By

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The principle of Uncertainty (called variously as the principle of Indeterminacy, Indeterminism, Unpredictability etc.) has been extended by physicists as well as philosophers to cover the doctrine of free-will and to lend authoritative support to it. It has been acclaimed with great enthusiasm as the precursor heralding a revolution in physical science, which will demolish the obstacles in the path of philosophical progress; and with equal enthusiasm it has been declared to be only a passing phase in scientific thought, and that determinism will once again be restored to its proper place. Sir Arthur Eddington says, 'Determinism has dropped out of physics Mental indeterminism is conditioned on physical indeterminism and the new foundation of physics opens the door for the first time to mental indeterminism.'¹ 'Determinism' says Prof. Wilson, 'has definitely gone for the time being, at any rate, so that the idea of free-will is no longer untenable.'² 'Only because the world in a physical sense is not wholly reliable can it have any human meaning.....This important philosophical deduction from the new principles of physics introducing a new discussion of free will is expected to cause great interest.'³ While physicists have been stressing the suggestions in

1. Eddington : '*Physics & Philosophy*.' (Philosophy. Vol. 8. 1933).

2. H. A. Wilson : *Mysteries of the Atom*.

3. *Science News*, April 4, 1931 (From a summary of A. H. Compton's Lecture on Heisenberg's Principle).

Heisenberg's principle, metaphysicians have been, on the whole, reluctant to go the full length with them. They have clung to the old deterministic position. 'I am, therefore, unable to see that the principle of Indeterminacy or the experimental evidence which has led to its formation, has the decisive and revolutionary consequence for epistemology which recent writers have attributed to it.'⁴ A large majority of papers written in recent years, have taken up an attitude similar to that of Prof. Lovejoy, and have advanced arguments to bolster up determinism. That physics should be willing now to yield the ground that metaphysics has been fighting for since the days of Democritus, and that metaphysics should be reluctant to occupy the territory so readily given up by physics is rather strange; but this strange phenomenon is merely symptomatic of a deep seated trouble.

European philosophical thought has been built up on a solid foundation of Science. We do not deny the solidarity of the foundation. As often as there was a change in the outlook of science, so often was there a change in philosophical outlook. Now that a fundamental general principle which in the opinion of Sir Arthur Eddington, seems to rank in importance with the principle of relativity has been discovered, it is but natural that thinking minds should concentrate their attention on it and work out its implications.

Has philosophy any reason to be jubilant over the discovery of the Uncertainty principle? Does this discovery promise a safe haven for the ship tossed about in the stormy sea of metaphysical controversy? The answer is definitely in the negative. Our contention is that in the principle of Uncertainty mathematical physics is committing suicide, and a similar fate awaits philosophy if it does not forthwith forsake the unattractive business of following the lead of Positive

4. Lovejoy: *The Revolt against Dualism*. P. 293.

science. 'We have exhausted the resources of mathematical physics and reached what is mathematically the blank wall of real being.' The present position in physics points unmistakably to the conclusion that the metaphysician who applies the scientific method to the solution of ultimate problems is bound to come up against a dead wall sooner or later, and that if he would succeed in his attempts he should employ a method far other than that of analytic abstraction.

The principle of Heisenberg, which is bound to create a profound change in the general outlook of the physicists appears to be innocent enough. It states that 'no information can be obtained about the velocity of a particle the position of which is known with absolute accuracy. Certain information can be arrived at, if we admit a certain amount of inaccuracy of position. Thus the two inaccuracies remain tragically linked together in the formula :

Inaccuracy of position \times inaccuracy of velocity = constant.

The inaccuracy, which is an insurmountable obstacle in the measurements of position and velocity of the electron, is held to be a characteristic of all physical measurements. We have, therefore to revise our notions regarding the absolute certainty of physical laws based upon such measurements. Prof. Schrodinger says, 'Fortuitousness is the primary state for which there is no plausible explanation, while lawfulness only appears in the microscopic world owing to the cooperation of numbers of accidentally operating molecules' This unpredictability is not merely an experimental defect. It resides in the very nature of things. Thus something like free-will is placed at the basis of natural phenomena. Sir Arthur, in his brilliant analysis of the implication of Heisenberg's experiment, has pointed out that just like the epoch-making experiments of Michleson and Morley, this experiment has dragged to light the fact that we have been looking for things that do not exist. Determinism has not objective

existence. The physicist has so long been pursuing a mirage. He has now realised rather suddenly that what he was pursuing was only an illusion.

But a moment's reflection will convince us that there is nothing new in this principle of Indeterminacy. It is impossible to determine accurately both the velocity and the position simultaneously of any moving body (even if the body be a gross body). In the case of the gross body we are easily satisfied with approximate results. Indeterminacy should be a matter of common sense experience but it is hidden underneath a cloak of approximations and averages. Moreover Zeno pointed out ages ago the absurdities lurking in the procedure of physical measurement. If movement be analysed into a succession of stable positions, and if duration be cut up into a series of static moments, then the dilemma of infinite divisibility of space and time is irrefutable. Long before Heisenberg, physicists realised the statistical nature of the basis of their laws and epistemologists had a suspicion that something was fundamentally wrong with the method of science. As early as 1843 the physicist Waterston pointed out the unsatisfactory nature of the fundamental concepts of science. What, then, is it that invests Heisenberg's principle with the epoch-making importance claimed for it? It is the experimental basis which Heisenberg has discovered for what has hitherto been merely a theoretical speculation.

$$“\Delta p \Delta q \quad h”$$

The product of the two uncertainties is of the magnitude of 'h'. It is this 'h', the cosmic constant of Planck's constant, that has endowed the principle of Uncertainty with revolutionary importance. The cosmic constant has come to occupy a preëminent place in Quantum mechanics. Hence Uncertainty has been placed on a purely objective experimental basis. It is beyond all cavil.

But it is exactly at this point that opponents of the principle attack it. How could that which is uncertain have a basis of certainty? If Indeterminacy is in the very nature of things how could it point beyond itself to an ultimate ground of certainty? Hence, it is argued, that determinism is after all the foundation of science. Elaborate arguments have been constructed to reclaim determinism. In one of the ingenious arguments it is pointed out that Heisenberg's principle is only the logical conclusion of an indeterministic starting point, and instead of pointing to an ultimate Uncertainty in the constitution of 'things', it serves to turn our attention to the indeterminacy in the premises from which we started. Sir Oliver Lodge says, 'Break down causality, and we are left with chance. That is really unsatisfactory. It may be true that the jumps of electrons in the atom cannot be predicted, they often seem to occur by chance. But not in that way would I aim at freedom.' He believes that the cosmic rays will reveal the secret hidden behind the appearance of Uncertainty and that *ether* will resolve the difficulties arising out of Heisenberg's discovery.

Now on the metaphysical side the old dispute between determinism and indeterminism has been renewed with fresh vigour drawn from the new discovery in physics. Both the determinist and the indeterminist see in the physical principle of Uncertainty clinching argument for their respective positions. The most significant conclusion drawn from the principle is that just as the freedom of the atom rests ultimately on a deterministic basis, so free-will in man rests on self-determination. Freedom of action does not amount to anarchy. The electron does not fly off at random. Its vagaries are confined within strictly defined limits. So is free action of man confined within the limits strictly defined by his nature. At the prospect of such a conclusion the metaphysician is thrilled.

But there is no reason for jubilation. To the serious thinker Heisenberg's discovery serves as a grave warning against the futility of relying too much upon the abstract analytic method of science. European metaphysics has been led by the nose by science. Science explains, while philosophy ought to *know* facts. The explanations of science based upon the fourth degree of abstraction reached through successive stages of analysis, classification, induction and generalisation—each stage carrying the process of abstraction farther than the previous one—can but give us a very superficial knowledge of reality. It is difficult for the contestants in the dispute over determinism to realise this. It is almost impossible for them to realise that the absolutistic attitude, which they in subservience to science have taken, cannot but lead them into a cul-de-sac.

The direction in which an escape out of the present impasse is possible has been pointed out by Sir Arthur Eddington, who admits that the category of *purpose* should be introduced into scientific explanation. Waterston pointed out long ago that ultimately physics should look to biology for the solution of its more important problems. In his book '*The Grand Strategy of Evolution*,' Patten argues that the structure of the atom as well as the structure of human institutions can be explained only on the basis of psychological principles of cooperation and purposive activity.

'It was the French philosopher Bergson, whose trenchant criticism, formulated with astonishing literary skill, delivered what proved to be the decisive blow (to scientific determinism).....(He) claimed to show by observation and experiment that the principles in use could not but make insoluble the problems which they were devised to solve.'⁵

5. J. L. Stocks : *The Eclipse of Cause* (Hibbert Journal, vol. 30, 1931-32).

It is time that the philosopher took a warning from the muddled state of affairs in science. The metaphysician should use science as a stepping stone, transcend it and finally approach reality in the spirit of Bergsonian Intuition. Along that path and no other lies the hope of escape from the maze into which he has entangled himself by following the lead of science.

The Concept of Philosophy

By

T. R. V. MURTI.

The Thesis suggested in this paper is that the subject-matter of philosophy and, consequently, its method are different from those of science. Despite the commonly held notion, philosophy is not general or universal science ; nor does it explain : it is not a theory but a spiritual discipline concerned with the discovery of the self. One direct advantage of this concept is that there is no conflict between science and philosophy, the subject-matter and method of the two being different. This is not however adduced by way of proving our conception. The proof will lie in showing that the concept of universal science is self-contradictory.

§. 1. Science is systematised body of *demonstrable* knowledge. Systematic coherence is not the essence of science ; for, this serves to distinguish it only from commonsense, the rough and ready rule of the thumb. Fine art, e.g., literature and even pure mathematics, is not less systematic, rigorous. It differs from science however in its non-reference, or avowed inapplicability, to fact : it is not a theory or explanation of the given. For fine art there is no given ; no initial problem ; it creates its matter as it proceeds. It is a self-contained universe with its own canons of æsthetic propriety. To demand of, as a test of good poetry, that it should explain

a set of facts is to totally misunderstand the nature and value of poetry. For fine art its concepts are intrinsically valuable ; they are æsthetic *pictures* with everything on the surface, rather than *patterns* with hidden intentions. Science on the other hand employs concepts as patterns or symbols for the given facts, which it tries to understand *through* the former. To ask for the significance of a proposition in science is to ask for the conditions under which it could be verified, demonstrated by an appeal to facts. This is possible because some other propositions already established corroborate the new ones. In the last resort, the appeal is to the successful working of the propositions in life. We have no means of deciding between two rival hypotheses which did not make any difference to other scientific propositions and had no application whatsoever ; they would then be speculative luxuries, not science. The propositions of science are verifiable in principle.

Can any universal proposition true of all things fall within science, i.e. provable at all ? Such a proposition, if it is not to be a speculative luxury, must be subject to verification by other propositions which are, for the time being at least, not under question. It is evident that these testing propositions, because of their validating function, do not fall within the scope of the supposed universal proposition ; they would have to be excluded from our sweep. And even if a subsequent effort were made to cover them, the supplementary proposition shall itself require to be tested by others and so forth. The process might be repeated to weariness without our alighting upon a verifiable universal proposition. It might be thought that this predicament is inevitable when we start with an *a priori* or theoretical scheme and then apply it to facts. Instead, one may proceed inductively from the given to arrive at the most general features that underlie

all things. This hope however, is futile. We have no legitimate means of passing from phenomena to the noumenon, from the given to the transcendent. All the processes of knowledge, inference etc, are from one given fact to another, which at least can be given, and not to something that transcends the given. The attempt is like seeing the limit of the visual field when *ex hypothesi* all that we see is within the visual field and not anything beyond it that can serve as its boundary. The two notions, universality and science, work contrariwise and cannot be combined without nullifying the nature of each.

It is not by accident then that there are sciences, each science with a restricted field, rather than one universal science, and that each science makes use of postulates and principles which it does not try to question. For these are the very factors which make for their exactness and eminently verifiable character, i.e. constitute the science in them. To think that we can still have science even when the boundaries between the sciences and their postulates are done away with is to fail curiously in critical reflection. It is as Kant with great felicity of expression says: "The charm of extending our knowledge is so great that nothing short of encountering a direct contradiction can suffice to arrest us in our course.....The light dove, cleaving the air in her free flight, and feeling its resistance, might imagine that its flight would be still easier in empty space." (*Critique of Pure Reason*, Introduction, Pp 46-7 ; Prof. Kemp-Smith's Translation.)

The fallacy underlying this conception of universal science is that difference of subject-matter does not entail difference in the method, or that the one is not organic to the other. Cognate with this is the notion of the universal in quantitative terms as something big. The true universal however is to be conceived qualitatively, as what is self-contained, involving no

reference to anything outside itself ; it is what is complete by itself. It can readily be seen that the notion of verifiability is incompatible with universality : for to verify is to test a proposition by certain conditions external to and independent of it. We seek to verify a theory, a symbol which stands for other things. For we then ask whether our conceptual, and therefore necessarily hypothetical, pattern answers to the facts which it seeks to bring under its formulation. This externality is at once the strength of science and the cause of its restriction. It follows that if anything is to be universal, self-contained, it cannot be a symbolic representation. It cannot make assertions which necessitate it to go beyond its datum ; its activity should be strictly analytic, not synthetic or symbolic. Universality would rather lie in divesting the concept of its symbolic function to know it as such. This is made possible by the consciousness of the breakdown of this function due inevitably to its illegitimate extension to the super-sensible. This is all that dogmatic metaphysics really succeeds in achieving.¹

§. 2. The very attempt to universalise science and establish philosophy as the ultimate arbiter of the sciences contributes to conflict and confusion. Once the restrictions of scientific procedure which constitute their accuracy and exactness are

1. In this we agree with the recent "No Metaphysics" School (the protagonist of which is Wittgenstein) that the propositions of metaphysics, one and all, are undemonstrable, unlike those of science. The conclusion about the impossibility of Metaphysics follows only if science and philosophy had the same subject-matter and pursued the same method. It is here shown that the failure of what may be termed, pseudo-metaphysics points to a realm inaccessible to science and unamenable to scientific methods.

taken away, the flood-gates to unbridled speculation are opened. The result is the warring of philosophies ; and their dissensions and disputations are, by their very nature, interminable. Metaphysical assertions if they are not to cover the same ground as the particular sciences, go beyond phenomena to seek their ground in the transcendent. Such propositions are undemonstrable in principle.

If, for instance, there is an interesting archaeological find, historians and anthropologists may possibly differ in their interpretation ; but it is the paucity of our present information that prevents a definite conclusion. The physicists too may have their own say about the structure of the particular substance, taking it as illustrative of the general structure of matter ; and though they may differ among themselves, their differences are within the ambit of science ; greater accuracy and insight will decide the issue between them. But if two metaphysicians were to assert that the object is but a group of ideas in a certain order or that it is but an evolute of one ubiquitous Prakṛti or that it is a false appearance of Brahman, we at once realise that they may dispute as hotly and cogently, each in his own way, as possible without being any nearer to composing their differences. There is no clincher to decide in favour of the one or the other. Both go beyond the realm of provable. And what more, metaphysical contentions do not help, even heuristically, the procedure of science. They have no bearing upon science. All the findings of science will still be valid on this or that theory and without them even. Kant has formulated the *a priori* underlying science (mathematics and physics); but as is well-known, these have not furthered scientists in their discoveries, showing thereby that metaphysical concepts are neither science nor do they guide science as a path-finder. They are what Kant has aptly termed them, the Ideas of Reason, demanding an infinite

extension of their meaning and application to all phenomena.

The Ideas of Reason have to transcend all phenomena, if they are not to repeat science, and yet this very transcendence is not strictly warranted. Dogmatic metaphysics believes that it is, quite legitimately and on a par with science, passing from the given to the noumena, little realising that the supposed universal science is contradictory. Though dogmatic, such a tendency is far from being unnatural or confined to accredited philosophers. It is a universal affliction of the human mind, its permanent illusion. Adapting the expression of Kant, we may call this, *metaphysics as a natural disposition*; it is a disposition to mistake as knowledge what is not knowledge. We contend that philosophy gets its subject-matter, its datam, only as it recognises the metaphysical disposition as such, only as it realises that the Ideas of Reason are illusion, however inevitable and permanent they may seem.

There is only the disposition when we indulge in assertions about the super-sensible, treating them as on a par with objective entities and even asserting that we arrived at them in a perfectly natural and logical manner, i. e., by employing the same methods as in science. This would simply be the metaphysical disposition and not a conscious awareness of it *as* such. An analogous case will explain matters. To be in illusion is certainly different from being conscious of being, or having been, in illusion. In the one case, we do not contemplate illusion, for we are in illusion; in the other, we make illusion a topic of our enquiry, whatever interest that may have for us. How then, it might be asked, do we become conscious of the metaphysical disposition as disposition; for in the case of illusion there is actual cancellation? Here it is the illegitimate

use of the concept beyond the sensible and the inevitable contradictions and antinomies that result. We may place no credence in the merits of the various metaphysical disputes; in fact we disbelieve them. But the dispute itself is indisputable. This then is a realm inaccessible to, and untouched by, science. An Idea of Reason is not a particular concept or set of concepts but any and every concept infinitely extended; and, as we have seen, this infinite extension is actually and invariably made. We are here referring to a *direction* of the concept as such and not to any individual concept. Therefore to recognise the Ideas of Reason to be illusion is to recognise everything as illusory. There is nothing that is left out of the scope of philosophy. Its subject-matter is all-embracing, as it takes account of the concept as such. In philosophy, we do not therefore reach as a conclusion, that the world is illusory, our very starting-point is impossible without this recognition.

§. 3. The question that can naturally be raised is: "*How is metaphysics as a natural disposition possible*", i. e. how could this illusion arise, that something that is not knowledge be mistaken for knowledge, and how is it inevitable, universal and natural.² The enquiry is about the composition of the subjective distemper, as it were.

2. It might be thought that Kant has answered the question. He has not. For what all he does, and he does this thoroughly enough, is to show the presence of the self-functions in perception and science (*Trans. Aesthetic and Analytic*) and that these functions do not amount to knowledge (*Trans. Dialectic*.) That is, he has pointed to us the realm of the subjective and given us an idea of the datum of philosophy. What he does not attempt is an account of the subjective itself and a theory of Avidya, an one might say. Again,

An analysis of any empirical illusion will be valuable as an indication of the structure of illusion ; but it will not give us the analysis of the illusion coincident with all knowing i.e., the world-illusion. *Prima facie*, it might be seen that mistake is possible because of confusion between two or more things. And we may surmise that there is more than one subjective function at work in all experience. A critique of experience will bring out the interlacing and involution of the various grades of subjective functions and their order. It will also be led to account for the confusion of the functions, as the presence of the functions need not be tantamount to their confusion. That is, it will give us a theory of Ignorance, and thus lead us to the origin of all phenomena.

It is far from the scope of this paper to enter into the actual analysis ; we are concerned with defining the subject-matter and the problem of philosophy. Such a critique of experience may well be termed Transcendental Psychology to bring out the subjective or reflective stand-point of philosophy, as opposed to the objectivity or outward attitude of science and common-sense. This is not to be confounded with psychology. Empirical psychology is a science, co ordinate with the physical sciences ; only, its facts are the mental states viewed and treated as a class by themselves, distinct from physical facts. For Transcendental Psychology, the subjective is invariably the meaning-function pervasive of all facts. We have tried to show that its datum is the recognition of the subjective functions as operative in science and common-sense.

to Kant the CRITIQUE is not philosophy itself, but its ante-chamber, a propaedeutic ; the *Critique* is meant to make it safe for faith to get under way. As for Kant is concerned, the *Critique* is a luxury and naturally critics have asked, how long will this whetting the knife will last, expecting that something else should be forthcoming as metaphysics proper.

There is no doubt that the immediate occasion of such a recognition is engendered by the universalising of science, by metaphysics indulged as a natural disposition.

What is the method by which philosophy (Transcendental Psychology) proceeds to answer the question: *How is metaphysics as a natural disposition possible?* If it were to repeat the method of science framing certain hypotheses, verifying them and so forth, it would but be involving itself into further illusion. But the recognition of illusion is not to fall into illusion; to become aware of a theory is not to theorise, but to be self-conscious of it. No new matter or concept is introduced; we only see or seek to see the same situation more clearly, more truly; we do not as in science, understand or symbolise it *through* concepts. Cancellation, where we become aware of illusion, is not a situation or state different from illusion; it is but the analysis or the clarification of the latter. Otherwise, the one will not cancel the other, the object of the two being different. Analysis is concentration of attention, raised to a new potentiality, this being conducive to clearer perception. Negatively, it is but the annulment of distraction only. Philosophical activity is of this nature, purely analytic, and confines itself to the given. Its certitude is also immediately felt; we do not have to know cancellation as cancellation by a subsequent act of knowledge; at least, there would be some cancelling consciousness which cannot be doubted. Explanation on the other hand is a synthetic activity; for therein we frame a theory or a conceptual scheme, which we apply to facts, to verify it thereby. To frame a theory is not at once to be aware of it as such. The two functions are different. The one is a forward movement seeking to relate the concept to fact; it is not necessarily self-conscious, i.e., we have nothing to do with the theorising

activity itself there. This is the method of science. The other is a backward movement, as it were: a withdrawal of the concept from fact, divesting it thereby of its symbolic use ; it is necessarily self-conscious. This is the method of philosophy. The Concept of philosophy then is not the appropriation of certain concepts as philosophical, but the *self-consciousness or the return to itself of the concept, of every concept*. Philosophy however differs from Fine Art. In the latter, the concept is not used symbolically to explain facts, but intrinsically as valuable in itself. There is thus no question of the withdrawal of the concept from fact, as in philosophy. Fine Art is a creation ; philosophy is reflection, recognition of the concept.

It is readily seen that philosophy can have only one end in view—the curing of the subjective distemper. Because philosophy does not make any assertion, frame any theory or explain, it cannot be helpful to, or helped by, science. Nor is it a substitute for science as its function is different. Philosophy is the withdrawal of the concept from fact, the return of the concept to itself, the recognition of its selfhood its universality and actuality. The Concept is the self-function, self itself, though it may take on many guises. The self is not an entity among other entities, for this is the conception of the object, but the *spirit or self-hood* of entities. Science, Common-sense, Fine Art etc. are but the various *directions* of the concept. And this we recognise, realise reflectively, only as we withdraw these functions, apprehend them as illusion, as not independent realities. The Self is or can be said to be known only in this manner ; it is not an entity requiring a particular mode of apprehending it. Negatively, it is as we annul the object or externality that we know the self, but not through any special sense. Philosophy as the unravelling of the concept is the freeing

of the concept, the return of the self to its pristine purity. To philosophise and to realise the spirit are one and the same thing, for the concept, as we have seen, is the self function itself. The question of practical realisation is not left over. There is no divorce here between theory and practice. philosophy is an actual spiritual discipline; it is not a body of tenets but an activity—the freeing of the Concept.

The Object Of Perception

By

RASVIHARY DAS

I wish to discuss the question whether what we immediately perceive is a physical existent. By a physical existent I mean an existent which has spatial and sensible characteristics, and is not dependent for its being on our perception, and which in its identical character can be perceived by several perceivers. Most philosophers nowadays seem to be agreed that what we immediately perceive are what they call sense-data, and the physical object is reached or obtained by us by logical construction or symbolic reference or by some other mystic process. The sense-data at most are sometimes parts (of the surfaces) of physical objects, but very often they are not physical at all, as for instance, when we see an elliptical patch of brown in the place of a round penny.

Against all this respectable opinion, I wish to uphold the common sense view that whenever we (externally) perceive anything we perceive a physical object. The arguments against this position are quite familiar, and do not call for any detailed statement here. They may be summarised as follows :

If by perception we mean direct and immediate knowledge, and by physical object what is capable of existing independently of perception and of being perceived in common by several percipients, it is clear that the physical nature of a thing is never given in any perception, because the fact that the thing perceived can exist unaltered outside the perception and is or can be perceived in the same way by several perceivers is not revealed in the perception itself.

A thing presents different appearances to different persons looking at it from different angles of vision or from different places. It is these appearances which are primarily given in our perception. But since they differ among themselves and the physical object is supposed to be one, we cannot say that in knowing any of the appearances we know the physical object.

Since these appearances alone come within our knowledge and one appearance as appearance is exactly of the same sort as any other, we cannot even suppose that there is a standard appearance which is one with the physical object, so that in knowing this particular appearance we know the physical object.

Let us try to meet the arguments as far as we can. Although we may not perceive any object *as* physical, i. e. *as* independent of our perception and *as* seen in common by other perceivers, it does not follow that what we perceive in a particular case is not in fact a physical object. When I see a man I may not see him as a son of his father, because sonship is not a visible character, but nevertheless it remains true that the person I see is really a son of his father. Similarly in the case of physical objects. Our thesis does not demand that what we perceive should be *perceived as* physical, but only that it should in fact be physical.

We may even go further and say that we perceive physical objects as physical. The pre-eminent physical characteristics are spatiality and possession of some sensible qualities, and we certainly perceive things as spatial and as possessed of sensible qualities. It is part of the meaning of an object as such that it exists independently of the act of cognition in which it is revealed, and so it is not a defining character of a physical object. Also to be a common object for several perceivers is no part of the definition of a physical object, for

there would be physical objects even though there were no perceivers.

If we do not directly perceive physical objects, we may legitimately ask, what is it that we directly perceive? People may answer that we perceive sense-data, and thus also rebut our foregoing argument by suggesting that there are entities which are spatial and possessed of sensible qualities, but are at the same time quite distinct from physical objects. I am persuaded that the contemporary philosophers who are preoccupied with the problem of sense-data are merely playing with chimeras. For what we are most concerned with in life are substantial persons and things and not mere surfaces without depth, which seem to be the meaning at best of the so-called sense-data. I suggest that there are no such things as sense-data and nobody ever believes in them. It is always a chair or a table or something else which we see, and never mere patches of colour floating in the air. We have to start with perception, since we do not know any other experience more primitive than this, and all our perceptions which are external fasten on some material object or other.

If sense-data are anything at all, we must be able to find them somewhere in their proper character, i. e. as distinct from physical objects. I fail to find any sense-data which I do not associate with some physical object or other. At most we can say that we perceive physical objects to begin with and arrive at sense-data as their abstracted aspects. In themselves sense-data are mere abstractions.

It may be suggested that it is on account of the practical bent of our ordinary understanding that we jump to the belief of some underlying substance conceived as physical, but for a theoretical or artistic understanding there may be appearances capable of being contemplated merely as such. But such contemplation, I imagine, merely holds in abeyance the natural function of knowing, and cannot determine the

nature of things as they are or as we believe them to be. Rightly or wrongly we cannot know, and so cannot also perceive, without bringing in the notion of substantiality. And since we are not prepared to regard sense-data as substances, in which case there would be nothing to distinguish them from physical objects, I conclude that we cannot perceive sense-data as such.

If there are no sense-data, then, we may be asked, what are those entities which are given in our perception and which differ among themselves while we look at one and the same physical object?

Let us see what these are. If we think of them as existent they may very well be the different parts of the surface of the thing we see. But if they are mutually incompatible and still referred to the same place, then we cannot possibly think of them all as real. In that case some of them must be illusory. To appear in knowledge without being real is the very characteristic of what is illusory.

But even if they are illusory, it may be argued, it remains true that they are perceived by us, and so the thesis that what we perceive in every case is some physical existence becomes falsified, because the illusory is certainly distinct from the physical. Let us now see in what sense the illusory is perceived. Perception is a species of knowledge, and knowledge is possible only of a thing which is real; otherwise we have mere imagination or something else but no knowledge. The illusory, as it appears and at the place where it appears, is not certainly real. This being so, we cannot properly speak of illusion as a case of perception. When we have merely an illusion and take it as perception, it is because already there is an illusion or mistaking of some other mode of consciousness, e. g. imagination, as perception. We have to recognise however that an illusion before it is recognised to be such is taken to be a perception; and this is due to the fact

that there is a deep underlying element of perception even in illusion.

We can distinguish broadly two elements in perception. There are, first, an unmistakable consciousness of some substantial being, immovable and particular, and, secondly, a consciousness of some superficial character, which in itself is homeless and universal. These two elements correspond roughly to what according to Whitehead is given by causal efficacy and what is given by presentational immediacy. These two elements are fused in perception and the first element, which is the more important of the two, is present even in illusion. An illusion thus so far as it is perception has for its object some substantial being which is physical. So far as it is merely illusion it makes us aware of a character which may be real elsewhere but not at the place where it is referred in illusion. From this point of view we can understand what seems to be meant by the Naiyayikas when they uphold the theory of *anyathakhyati* and assert that there can be no mistake about the ultimate subject of predication (*dharmi*).

It is argued that since appearance is the same in illusion as in perception, we cannot strictly distinguish between them. But this is only a practical difficulty, and our failure to distinguish a case of illusion from that of perception cannot disprove the view that the object of perception is a physical existent. Our present question is, what is it that we see when we do see? and this is quite distinct from the question, how do we know whether in a particular case we are seeing or merely imagining? And the truth or falsity of our answer to one question is not determined by our success or failure to answer quite a different question. As a matter of fact however we can and do distinguish between perception and illusion. The criteria used in making such distinction may be pragmatic or otherwise defective. But there is no mistake

about the fact that when we believe that we are perceiving, we certainly believe that there is a real spatial object with sensible character of which we are made conscious in perception.

We certainly believe in physical objects. The most effective justification we can give of this belief is that we directly perceive physical objects. Those who do not accept this position can justify this belief only by a causal argument, *i. e.* by supposing that the physical objects are the causes of what we directly perceive. But merely on the basis of this argument we cannot ascribe any positive characters, except those that are purely formal and logical, to physical objects. An unknown and unknowable X might as well be the cause of all that we perceive, since there is no necessity that a cause must be similar to its effect, and so we cannot even know whether the cause is physical at all.

Dr. Ewing in his recent book on *idealism* has suggested that physical objects are groups of unsensed sensa, in the sense that physical objects consist of entities which are not themselves sensed immediately by any percipients but are exactly the same in kind as the objects that we do immediately sense in perception (P. 357). In this way he has attempted to secure for us some positive knowledge of physical objects on the basis of a representative theory of perception. But I cannot consider his attempt to be a very successful one. When a physical object never comes within your perception, you cannot possibly determine whether its constituent elements are like or unlike what you directly perceive. Moreover there is the further difficulty of conceiving how a physical object can be a mere combination of sensa when we take sensa to be dependent on our mind and body and a physical object must be independent. It is highly improbable that a number of entities that are essentially dependent should attain independence merely through combination.

Thus it appears impossible to me to know anything concretely of physical objects, if what we directly perceive are merely *sensa* which are never identical with any elements in the physical objects. If we do not directly perceive physical objects, we cannot know anything about them, not even whether there are any physical objects at all.

Locke's Treatment of the Relation of whole and Part.

By

J. K. S. REID

Introductory

The curious paradox about John Locke is that he attained greatness through his inconsistency. Developed consistently from its starting point, the result would have been barren and sterile ; illogical and incoherent as it stands, the philosophy is characterised by vitality and dynamic power, because it grew naturally like a wild plant untrimmed and unconfined, and it remains till today a source from which modern philosophy can derive not only historical interest but also fruitful ideas and conceptions. I will try to show that in at least two ways, Locke's inconsistency with his own starting-point at least indicates, if it does not actually follow, a development which is of very great importance in later philosophy.

The relation of whole and part can be best examined from two aspects. First, there is the more apparently obvious aspect—what we may call the microcosmic—in which a thing, whether it be gold, or swan, or man, is the whole. But even here the whole is situated within a larger context, which must be ignored if the smaller whole is to be examined. The other aspect is therefore to regard the thing which above takes the place of whole, within its concomitantly given context, as a part of something which includes it, as a part of what may be conceived at least hypothetically as a macrocosm. I propose to enquire into Locke's treatment of whole and part in each of these aspects. The latter will be treated only towards the end of

our paper ; that will be, not because it is of secondary importance, but because it is the climax in a development of Locke's thought which we are to suggest.

The microcosmic aspect, it was said above, is the more obvious of the two proposed. The question, asked only at a stage when reflection is possible : how do we know ? is naturally formulated in the concrete form : how do we know that swan, that man ?, and so with such an object in view the enquirer begins his search. This start has, as will be shown in our later remarks, serious disadvantages, but it was the traditional method, and Locke who seems to have made his start without any serious reflection on it, began not with a cosmic view, but with what was nearest to hand. We shall set out with him and try to discover the process of thought by which he endeavoured to account for our knowledge of these concrete wholes.

Simple ideas—Inconsistency

Locke begins the relevant part of the *Essay* (Bk. II) in an abrupt way which itself suggests that the underlying assumptions from which no thinking is entirely free are to remain implicit and unacknowledged. Two fundamental points to the whole of the essay are made in the opening chapters. First, "it is past doubt that men have in their mind several ideas" (II.i.1). Second, "concerning these ideas we have,... some of them are simple and some complex." These assertions, apparently so innocent in character, involve Locke in the greatest of difficulties in his interpretation of experience and knowledge. Simple ideas are the *parts* which we must consider in the first instance. They are perceived more clearly and distinctly than anything else ; each is uncompounded and "contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception of the mind, and is not distinguishable into different ideas." No one can "invent or frame one new

simple idea in the mind." The simple ideas of which Locke at this stage speaks are exemplified by softness, warmth, whiteness, taste of sugar, smell of rose. Later in the same Book (II.xv.9), we find in the discussion of "duration and expansion considered together" that these last are justly reckoned amongst our simple ideas, yet none of the distinct ideas, we have of either is without all manner of composition." Quite clearly we have here implied a different criterion of simplicity; the necessary condition mentioned above, uncompoundedness, is directly contradicted, for the very essence of space and time is to be infinitely divisible. The criterion of unanalysability (if the term be pardoned) in the sense of *indivisibility* has given way to unanalysability in the sense of *indefinability*. There is suggested, in words which follow those quoted above, a possible interpretation which would preserve the sense in which the earlier ideas were said to be simple. But even this suggestion, tentatively introduced by an "as it were," is stated to be actually impossible. We can but repeat what we have said in other words, that the initial empiricism of Locke's position is being deserted for a more logical rationalism.

But a further stage has still to be mentioned. A passage still later in the Essay states: "I confess power includes in it some kind of relation—a relation of action or change—; as indeed, which of our ideas, of what kind soever when attentively considered does not?" It is in these passages that we can trace the first great inconsistency. To include power as a simple idea, when it involves 'some kind of relation,' is surprising enough; but the explicit recantation of the opening positions of Bk.II, contained in the words which follow is sufficient ground for both convicting Locke of inconsistency and commenting on the splendid originality of his thought. From this passage, we conclude (i) that the meaning of the term "simple" has developed still further along the

lines suggested above, and (ii) that Locke unconsciously is in the process of more clearly realising the inadequacy of the purely empirical position, as distinguished from a position on a basis of experience.

Construction of Whole

For Locke these "simple ideas" are *parts*; we must examine now how from these parts he builds up knowledge of the whole. Locke finds great difficulty in separating an undoubted objectivity contained in even the simple ideas from their purely subjective existence as "objects of the understanding when a man thinks." For his looseness of thought, implied in his inaccurate language, about them, he apologises thus (II. viii. 8) : "which ideas, if I speak of sometimes as in the thing themselves, I would be understood to mean those qualities in objects which produce them in us. "Locke's neutral term is quality, but it is neutral because it is ambiguous. It may mean *subjective idea*, and it may mean *objective* property. For Locke, it means both. We shall for the present restrict our attention to the subjective, though it will be necessary later to examine the objective aspect which for Locke is not only implied, but seems very often actually to run exactly parallel.

The question may be stated otherwise : how does Locke out of these simple ideas account for the complex ideas, the other kind of idea which man has ? Locke's description of complex ideas is given quite succinctly in II. xii. The differentia of the complex from the simple is that the former are framed when the mind "exerts several acts of its own," and they thus admit caprice and arbitrariness. The first of these acts is "combining several simple ideas into one compound one ; and thus all complex ideas are made." The other two are the processes of comparing and abstracting. These latter two do not concern us in the topic under discussion. Though

they likewise are said to yield complex ideas, the ideas thus formed are of radically different type from those fashioned by the operation of "compounding." In other words, "complex" has also acquired two meanings, the first being more strictly in accordance with the expected meaning and ordinary use, the other so extended as to become equivalent to 'logically secondary.' We proceed to consider the act of compounding other ideas to which it gives rise.

In the place cited above, the examples given are "beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe," which "are, when the mind pleases, considered each by itself as one entire thing." We read also that "the mind has a power to consider several [simple ideas] united together as one idea." Here we have a clear reference to a psychological function for the explanation of our complex ideas. This function is "compounding." If we take the first strict interpretation of the simple idea, how is the complex whole built up out of these simple elements? "As simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together, so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea." Here the objective aspect of the simple idea is extremely difficult to discover from the subjective which we are just now considering, and Locke seems to give no criterion for distinguishing these complex ideas which have an objective aspect, i.e. a corresponding "exterior thing," and those complexes which do not. These are difficulties whose influence we must try to discount. There is here suggested a double and complementary process, which seems to have affinity with the Kantian position. The various simple components, each with its objective reference, become united into a single object to the mind; also the consciousness of each of the various simple components becomes fused into a consciousness of a complex whole. But this account of the process can hardly escape criticism. Simple ideas, observed to exist together, are

still simple ideas, furnished through different sense organs ; though they are called combinations, they are still either series or aggregations and cannot be assumed as unities. But if this is so, "the power to consider several of them united together as one idea" is purely psychological and subjective, and cannot be regarded as having any complementary or corresponding process in objective reality. This difficulty Locke entirely fails to realise, because, as will be suggested below, he does not clearly distinguish epistemology from ontology. And if we try to preserve the complementary unity of the complex and of the consciousness of the complex, then we find the only way, since unity has not been achieved on the side of the complex, is to adduce a unifying process of the mind and to identify the unity of the complex idea with it. Expressed in the different words of James Gibson, we may say that "the composition theory strictly interpreted breaks down even in relation to the complex ideas. ...since it cannot account for the recognition of the unity of the whole, which they have been found to involve." (*Locke's Theory of Knowledge* P. 63.)

The result to which this theory of Locke's leads is that to which Hume's philosophy gave clear exposition. The double process of unification of part into whole fails on both sides. Simple ideas are unable to support the construction of the complex whole which Locke tries to build up out of them ; he fails to show that the idea of an army is in any way different from an aggregation of the ideas of a thousand and separate men, or that the idea of a swan is different from a conglomeration of such ideas as "white colour, long neck, red beak, black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size, with a power of swimming in the water, and making a certain kind of noise." (II xxiii. 14). His other failure lies in not justifying or explaining satisfactorily the unification by the mind. He tries to do so by the traditional method of adducing an

ad hoc power in the mind—that of combining several ideas. But this procedure incurs the charge of subjectivism. And so the parts which Locke has chosen seem unsuitable for the whole which he would fain build. We shall turn later to examine why this is the case.

Triple Distinction.

It will be useful to make here a triple distinction in order to clear up some of Locke's thought. (i) The historical formation of an idea is to be distinguished from (ii) the logical content of the idea, while both are different from (iii) the ontological nature of what Locke calls quality. Locke tends to identify (ii) with (i), a confusion which has been common until the advance of psychology took place in recent times. More serious is the lack of distinction between epistemology and ontology implied in the tendency to confuse (ii) with (iii), and which although Locke himself apologises for it (quoted above : II. viii. 8), he makes no attempt to clarify. As he admits, he confuses idea and quality; and he tries to show that as a complex idea is made up of simple ideas so a thing is made up of qualities and logical distinguishability becomes identified with actual separability. Fortunately, his good empirical common-sense disclosed the fact that a thing is more than mere qualities, and the resultant notion which he postulates is that of substance which we shall shortly examine. Correlatively, the idea of substance is required by Locke to make real the unity of the complex idea. For it is very frequent for him in this way to speak of a complex idea in the double sense of strict ideality and definite objectivity. As we have said, quality means both *idea* and *property* for Locke. In the preceding part of our paper the subjective side has occupied our attention; in what follows immediately Locke seems to confuse the two inextricably, and our discussion will

· apply to both ; only in our amended theory of substance will we have to deal with the definitely objective aspect of Locke's thought.

Objectivity in Simple Ideas.

Simple ideas are for Locke variously "suggested to", "presented to", "impressed upon", "furnished to", the perceiving mind. Locke does not examine the exact nature of this variously described presentation ; for him it was an indubitable fact that a simple idea, however acquired, comes stamped with the signs of objectivity, or as Whitehead puts it, in words which state clearly what Locke almost unconsciously assumed, bearing "the vector marks of its origin." Locke neither realised the importance of this conception, nor clearly and explicitly states it ; but there can be no doubt that, when challenged, the answer would have been this. It is, however, a legitimate criticism of Locke that he never does enquire into the nature and significance of this "vector character" of all ideas. His recognition of it prevented him from succumbing to the attractive simplicity of the extreme Berkeleyan position ; but his failure to appreciate the importance of this additional characteristic involved him in difficulties which might otherwise have been avoided. It is because Locke fails to distinguish sharply between idea and quality, and because we have found the simple idea to bear objective reference, that we are forced further to consider to what they refer. To this end our first step must be to glance at Locke's chapter on "our complex ideas of substances."

Doctrine of Substance.

For our purpose,—I am not prepared to dispute that this account of Locke's philosophical development may be slightly inaccurate historically,—the doctrine of substance may be regarded as an attempted escape from the toils which beset Locke in his quest for a whole which will satisfy ordinary

experience. "Not imagining," writes Locke, "how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result; which therefore we call substance." This substance, we further read, like spiritual substance, is "but a supposed I know not what." It is clear that this account is very inadequate. The process of thought which we may suggest to be in Locke's mind, is this: we certainly have ideas of real unities constituted by parts; the principle of unity we have failed to discover out of the simple ideas themselves; consequently, as a principle of unity, as well as a concession to popular opinion, we must allow the idea of substance. The idea of substance thus regarded is the tacit admission of failure to produce a whole out of the assumed parts. This "supposed I know not what" acts as a convenient recipient of powers enabling Locke to remedy the deficiencies of the whole as constructed. It is the "one thing" to which a 'certain number of simple ideas' which go 'constantly together' may be "presumed to belong." This sentence, which exactly represents in more convenient form what Locke is asserting, is a tissue of unconscious self-deceits, which we may make explicit by asking two questions. Why are these ideas "presumed to belong" to anything? Why are they "presumed to belong to one thing"? To adduce as reason the suggestion which some have considered to lie embodied in this phrase 'we accustom ourselves' is of course to offer no explanation at all. We have only to ask how *in the first instance* it seems impossible that the ideas should exist by themselves, to see the absurdity of the suggested reason. It has taken a long time for philosophers to realise that habit can only fix the already present, and is incapable of generating novelty not already given. Locke is not so foolish as to intend this as a reason, but on his assumptions, there seems to be no way out of an ugly dilemma. Either the source of this presumption

lies in the ideas, or it lies in the activity of the mind itself. If the first alternative be chosen, the early conception of simple ideas must be relinquished, for obviously it is impossible to reconcile such an additional content with their professed simplicity. The second alternative would involve Locke in the acceptance of an extreme subjectivism which is incompatible with his naive common sense outlook. It is in fact the first of the two alternatives which Locke chooses, as may be guessed from what has already been said in this paper. This is most clearly acknowledged in a passage from one of Locke's letters to his constant correspondent Stillingfleet (quoted by James Gibson, 93): "the ideas of these qualities and actions and powers are perceived by the mind to be of themselves inconsistent with existence. Hence the mind perceives their necessary connection with inherence or being supported" In the choice which Locke makes he hints, inconsistently though it is, at one of the most important of modern conceptions.

Reason For Failure in Construction For Whole.

But before we go on to discuss this latter point it will be advisable to retrace a step or two, and enquire why Locke fails consistently to build up the whole out of his initial parts. To Locke, in his early stages, it seemed a very obvious fact that ideas such as man, gratitude, swan,—all complex ideas indeed—could be resolved without remainder into simple ideas. The principle which underlies this unquestioned assumption is that a whole equals the sum of its parts. In these various complexes, it is a matter of no difficulty to find distinguishable elements, and Locke has no hesitation in declaring these to be the simple parts making up the complex whole, both in the idea and in the objective thing. At the beginning his emphasis seem to be upon the '*complex*' rather than on the "*whole*," and so no difficulty is encountered. But what Locke is really doing here is to hypostatise what are only logically distinguishable

elements into really distinct parts, a natural thought process on the assumption that a whole equals the sum of its parts. As Whitehead puts it, Locke is misled by the fundamental misconception that "logical simplicity can be identified with priority in the process constituting an experient occasion," when generally the exact contrary is the case. And so the logically distinguishable—for in this sense alone, as indefinable, does Locke ultimately find simplicity in his ideas,—becomes identified with the historically primary. But all this is in the realm of conscious or unconscious presupposition. It is only when entered upon his theory that Locke finds the difficulties due to his initial starting point confronting him.

An analogy, not to be pressed too closely, of Locke's process of thought is that of the child who takes a watch to pieces and finds it a much harder thing than previously realised to put it together again so that it goes; there is an indefinable correctness in which the parts must be assembled. But in technical language, the same thing may be expressed by saying that the prior process of synthesis is not the exact and simple contrary of a subsequent process of analysis. We have seen the character of the difficulties encountered. Locke becoming aware of their presence, and unwilling by mere subtlety to explain them away, tries to surmount them by a quite radical transformation in his initial position. The problem is to account for the real unity which the idea of the whole as differentiated from the aggregate holds. Locke at first tries to make bricks out of clay; the recognition of this leads him to reach for straw; it is the nature of the straw which Locke finds that we must now consider.

Retrospect.

Just a word in retrospect before proceeding. We have assumed that Locke at first held that the parts are ideas absolutely simple in content. Some sense of objectivity comes nevertheless to be included within even these simple ideas.

Later, we find the conditions of simplicity relaxed to include ideas which, far from being "isolated impressions", in the words of Hume, are merely not further definable. This stage is reached when Locke considers (II.xv.9) "space and duration" and it is again clearly implied in his account (II.xxi.3) of "power"; but in the second of these passages, he makes it certain in a significant aside that some kind of "relation" belongs not only to "power"; but also to all our ideas "of what kind soever". The complex ideas then fell to be considered in their original narrow signification, and with Locke we tried to construct them out of the early conception of simple ideas. We found Locke attempting to amend his failure by a doctrine of substance, which being only the adduction of an unknown to remedy the deficiencies of the known not only failed in the function for which it was produced but demanded for itself a reason, the urgency for which Locke fails to realise. We then hinted that the reason for Locke's failures and difficulties lay in the unquestioned assumption that the whole equals the the sum of its parts. His failure was inevitable, for no mere addition of more parts will make a whole out of parts wrongly conceived as isolated and detached ideas. It is like adding more units to a number of units in the hope of making them easier to count. We must now search, particularly among the later and inconsistent developments of Locke's simple idea, for a theory which will provide parts from which a whole, recognisable as such to the unsophisticated mind of common-sense experience, can be constructed.

Nature of Error.

The nature of Locke's error may be expressed thus. Given that we have a whole; it is required to explain it. In revulsion to the doctrine of innate ideas Locke unquestioningly adopted the alternative of simple ideas given through experience. He attempts to build the whole as given out of these simple parts

and fails. It is natural to conclude that error has crept into the doctrine of the parts of which the whole is to be constructed. It will be our thesis that Locke, unlike other philosophers who have attempted merely to explain away what was incapable of direct explanation in the nature of whole, does himself supply the demand for correction, though in a way which he himself hardly grasped.

Substance and Objective Reference

The clue to an amended doctrine to be found in the conception of substance. Locke is undoubtedly right that something more is required to make a whole than a mere cluster of simple ideas. We will remind ourselves of the nature of his doctrine by quoting certain passages not already cited. "...Our complex ideas of substances, besides all these simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong and in which they subsist" (II. xxiii. 3) 'Our specific ideas of substances are nothing but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas considered as united in one thing' (II. xxiii. 14). In Bk. II generally, Locke finds substance a "supposed I know not what"; in Bk. IV, under the strain of at once postulating a necessary substance, and at the same time asserting utter ignorance of its nature, Locke tends to identify substance with the primary qualities. The first position more nearly expresses the important truth which is breaking through Locke's semblance of consistency, because it boasts no positive knowledge, while the second, in doing so, falls into positive error. What I wish to do now is to follow out some of the ideas we have found suggested by Locke. I do not say—in fact I deny—that Locke either so developed them, or even foreshadowed such a development. I take my cue from what James Gibson says in his Preface: "that the tendency to sensationalistic atomism was bound to work itself out is, indeed, true enough." (This was of course done in

the philosophy of Hume, as much by its failure as by its success). "But the significant fact that the course of the individual thought of Locke, of Berkeley, and even of Hume himself, favoured the fuller recognition of intellectual functions involved in knowing and of the *systematic character of what is known* suggests that there were other directions in which the doctrine of the *Essay* was susceptible of at least equally legitimate development." It is towards a possible course of this latter development that I wish to direct some thought now. I italicise the words "the systematic character of what is known," because under the influence of Whitehead's "*Process and Reality*" that is especially the line which is to be suggested. I am well aware that I owe much if not all of what follows to a reading of "*Process and Reality*." How great exactly the debt is I cannot myself estimate. There will be two steps in our expansion of what Locke's theory implies. The first will concern the objectivity which Locke seems when pressed to assume in even simple ideas; the second will deal with that "some kind of relation (a relation to action or change)" which all our ideas "of what kind soever" include.

Had Locke developed, what he never really doubted, that all ideas have objective reference, he would have been one stage nearer a solution of the problem of substance, and therefore of the whole. It would have given him a sufficient reason for this "necessary connection with inherence or being supported." As it is, the hint is contained by implication in the phrase which Whitehead cites in this connection: "simple ideas...as they are found in exterior things." This answers both questions which we proposed above: why are the ideas "presumed to belong" to anything?; why are they "presumed to belong to one thing"? The answer is: because they are in themselves essentially incomplete without something else. Locke's error is in the first instance that he did not clearly

realise that this additional content was a part of the idea, and, at a later stage, that he failed to make the proper use of it when found. Simple ideas, however simple, point beyond themselves; they bear the marks of essential dependence upon something other than themselves. It is impossible to expound and explain this thesis here. As H. H. Price points out, in his recent book on "*Perception*," this question is the true province of Epistemology. But putting the matter in the most tentative way, even should there be no positive scientific evidence in its favour, it is a legitimate hypothesis, supported as it seems to be by common-sense experience, once we have accepted the most elementary conception of organism in preference to the principle which Locke worked with unsuccessfully and at last practically abandoned, that the whole equals the sum of its parts. If each of the simple ideas—the term now used inaccurately but conveniently—within a complex idea or whole has such a suggested objective reference, it is not difficult to believe that these references each point to some identical something as to their common origin, or necessary condition. It will then be seen that the common element will be able, in place of what Locke called substance, adequately to assume the double functions of unifying into a single whole, and of supporting or, as we can now say, being the object referred to. The unity of Locke's complex idea is to be found in the "exterior object" to which the vector character of the component simples points.

Real Nature of Substance

It is now necessary for us to discover what we can about the nature of this something to which simple ideas point as a necessary complement to their own inadequacy. Locke usually professes entire ignorance. It is no wonder that he does so, for being opposed to and the support of qualities, it cannot be described as itself having qualities. Moreover, his

empirical bias, though not sufficient to prevent him postulating a something which seems required by the parts he has found to complete the whole constructed of them, yet made it impossible to admit any knowledge of this something beyond that it exists, because empirical knowledge, i. e. knowledge of existence (except that of the existence of God), is in terms of sense qualities and simple ideas. And so paradoxically the nature of substance cannot be known by reason of the very fact which made its postulation necessary. We must now take the second step which we suggested above, and make use of another conception in Locke's own philosophy of which he himself, though dimly aware, did not know how to make use. I refer to the casual mention of "another relation" which "all ideas however simple contain," and we shall now deal with quality in its objective aspect as equivalent to property.

To consider this in its most strikingly suggestive form it will be necessary for us to glance, as promised at the beginning, at the macrocosmic aspect of the whole and part. The difference between Bk II and Bk. IV of the *Essay* in just the difference between a struggling atomism conscious of failure, and a hesitant organism with a ring of authenticity, and we cannot do better than quote one or two sentences. (IV. vi. II). "... we are wont to consider the substances we meet with, each of them as an entire thing by itself, having all its qualities in itself and independent of other things...put a piece of gold anywhere by itself, separate from the reach and influence of all other bodies, it will immediately lose all its colour and weight, and perhaps all malleableness too ; which for aught I know, would be changed into a perfect friability ... we are then quite out of the way, when we think that things contain *within themselves* the qualities that appear to us in them ; and we in vain search for that constitution within the body of a fly or an elephant, upon which depend those qualities and

powers we observe in them. For which, perhaps, to understand them aright, we ought to look not only beyond this our earth and atmosphere, but even beyond the sun or remotest star our eyes have yet discovered ... this is certain : things, however absolute and entire they seem in themselves are but retainers to other parts of nature for that which they are most taken notice of by us. Their observable qualities ; actions and powers are owing to something without them, and there is not so complete and perfect a part that we know of nature, which does not owe the being it has and other excellencies of it to its neighbours." Locke has at this point made the transition to objective things. That the transition is not clearly recognised is due to the fact already mentioned that epistemology and ontology are never clearly distinguished by Locke, but remain in the domain of unexamined assumption. It is indeed a transition not so much to another realm, the objective, as to another aspect which has been always actually present in the previous discussion. We shall make this transition with Locke.

There is explicitly introduced in our quotations a kind of relation, already hinted at, which is different from the mere objective reference which the simple idea contains. While we have seen that ideas lead beyond themselves, we now find that the whole to which they point is not self-explanatory, but is itself dependent upon a still wider context of nature. And so, having reached a satisfactory conception and explanation of the ideal whole, built out of parts, we find that the objective whole required to make possible the ideal whole is itself but a stepping-stone in the process, which, unless we blind ourselves to the need for further explanation, as Locke says, leads on "beyond this our earth and atmosphere..." It may be asked what kind of part this stepping-stone can be, and what kind of whole it can make up. These queries can be adequately answered for our purpose in very few words. First,

it is certainly not the kind of part which the crude formula : a whole equals the sum of its parts, has in view. It is the kind of part which is to be found only in an organic tissue. Second, the whole which is made up can only hypothetically be called a whole, in the vague sense in which "universe" is sometimes used. To take advantage of Kantian terminology, it is the kind of ideal concept which Kant thinks that reason affords, though whether this be interpreted in the sceptical or the idealist way may be ignored at present.

Essence—Inconsistency.

The paradoxical and inconsistent nature of Locke's philosophy has another important exemplification in this connection. Locke accepts the doctrine current in his time of "essence," what he calls "the real internal (but generally in substances unknown) constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend," (III. iii. 15). And again (III. vi. 6), Locke states precisely the traditional form of the doctrine when he speaks of essence as that particular constitution which everything has within itself, without any relation to anything without it." Presuming, as I think we must that we can identify this "constitution of things whereon their discoverable qualities depend" (III.iii.15) with that 'constitution within the body of a fly or an elephant upon which depends those qualities and powers we observe in them ; for which perhaps, to understand them aright, we ought to look not only beyond this our earth and atmosphere, but even beyond the remotest star our eyes have yet discerned," we can see but one feature common to each description, viz, our ignorance of this constitution. But the reasons for ignorance in each case differ sharply. In the first case, it is an unquestioned prejudice which makes Locke assert ignorance ; in the second, there is given a substantial reason based on scientific evidence, that to know one thing fully we must know a context that is at

least far greater than we can suppose ourselves to know. Any one thing becomes a part of a wider whole, and depends on that wider whole for its existence and its explanation. It is now the quantity, rather than the quality, of our knowledge which is inadequate for genuine certainty. And it is the eagerness to show this merely probable character of our knowledge which conceals from Locke the true significance of his discovery, and diverts the tremendous power of a mighty conception to the purpose of grinding a trivial and now long disused axe.

New View of whole and part

In this way we come to a different conception of the macrocosmic whole. It is not a mere sum of the smaller wholes which are things, themselves made up of the elemental simple ideas or qualities. It is a whole in which the lesser wholes, in virtue of their parts, which are only logically distinguishable within the whole, are organically connected. The macrocosmic whole to which the implications of Locke's philosophy seem to lead us must be regarded as something more positive than the "heuristische Fiktionen" which constitute Kant's sceptical view of the Ideas of Reason. It is not a mere spur to the jaded intellect of men. But neither is the whole given in its entirety and completeness. The child, James asserts, does not begin with the ordered and the simple, but finds itself within a "blooming, buzzing confusion" in which it learns to discriminate. But the position of the grown man is very similar. What we are given at any moment is a complex situation, without a boundary, and in this sense not necessarily a whole. Using the language of Baron Von Hugel, we can say that the given situation is, like the nature of God, *incomprehensible* but indefinitely *apprehensible*. If we regard it as a whole it is because : (i) the denial of it as such seems to imply the rejection of rationality as an ultimate principle in

the universe ; and (ii) everything, superficially a whole, on examination reveals its merely partial character, to which the natural complement is a whole within which it is a part. And so we find in Locke the virtual though dim recognition that what logically can be regarded as a simple part, in fact has ragged edges ; and that in what intermediately may be viewed as a whole there are similar ragged edges which point beyond the whole itself. That is to say, all logical analysis or discrimination is the disruption from the living tissue of reality of parts which bear upon them still the marks of the violence of the severance.

Summary of implications.

We are now in a position to sum up what we seem to have found the implicit elements in Locke indicating. Locke's firm adherence to the "stubborn facts" of common sense experience made it possible for him to avoid the pitfalls of Berkeleyanism. In the "exterior thing" or whole to which the objective reference of his simple ideas points, we find a justification for the ideal whole or complex idea. But even there we cannot stop. The whole, by implication involved in this way, is not self-explanatory, but requires a further context for its explanation, and things become "retainers to the other parts of nature." It is to be noticed that it is his simple ideas which lead Locke as thus interpreted to the postulation of the active co-operation of both the "exterior thing," and the universe "beyond this our earth and atmosphere." ("Universe" I here use in a non committal way, neither asserting nor denying that it is an actual *one* ; Locke's thesis of the uncertainty of our knowledge seems to be in this connection still relevant). Both "substance" and "essence" or "real internal...constitution" are unknown, postulated and hypostatized to supply the deficiencies of the early simple ideas. But the paradox is that Locke does not himself rest content with the facile adduction of *ad hoc* hypothesis.

In his philosophy is contained the clue to the possibility of tracing these unknown hypothetical elements, admittedly necessary to the explanation of ordinary experience on the basis of the early simple ideas, to known aspects of simple ideas and real things. "Substance" then is to be explained by the relations which examination of the simple idea show to be necessary to preserve its unity, *i. e.*, its "vector character." "Essence" is explained by the necessary relation of the exterior thing, indicated by the simple idea, to a wider context of the universe. But since it is the simple idea in its objective aspect as quality, an aspect which Locke sometimes does not even trouble to separate from the more primary meaning, which shows this necessary dependence of the exterior thing on the universe, the simple idea may be regarded as giving the clue to the explanation of both "substance" and "essence", when once this absolute unknownness is called in question.

The "exterior thing" is a point at which the forces of the universe cross. The simple idea has a history which can be regarded under four aspects, of which the first and last are objective, and the second and third subjective. It is something which has a passive or caused relation from the universe to the "exterior thing," or microcosmic whole; it has a passive or caused relation from the "exterior thing" to the perceiving subject; it has an active or vector relation from the perceiving subject to the "exterior thing"; and finally, it has an active or causing relation to the universe again. When the relation of the part (simple idea) is passive, the relation of the universe is active and vice versa. Thus the microcosmic whole is the macrocosmic part, and the two are mediated by the parts of the microcosmic whole which are ultimately the parts of the macrocosmic whole, (if whole it really be.) The parts of the microcosmic whole are what are called in two aspects qualities or simple ideas. Of course it must be noted that part has now acquired a very different meaning from that which was

given to it in the earlier undeveloped portions of the "Essay."

Conclusion

We may conclude then by summing up under two heads the results of our discussion about whole and part, contrasting the conclusions to which the tendencies in Locke's philosophy point with the initial position which he professes, or at least leaves to be inferred. Locke begins with the parts and tries to construct out of them the whole. But if, as we have suggested, we really start with a complex, the parts with which he starts presuppose an analysis which may be in error. The parts Locke obtains by logical analysis of the subjective idea. Because of the confusion between logical content and historical formation, he assumes that a similar priority explains the historical development of knowledge; because of the confusion between epistemology and ontology, he assumes that a similar analysis is adequate to explain the real exterior object. Epistemologically or subjectively, we have found reason to conclude that the macrocosmic whole, in of course a vague form, has priority over the microcosmic whole and its constituent parts; that it is this which makes all attempts to explain away the objectivity of knowledge seem to common-sense utter folly; and that the constituent parts, logically conceived, are unable to explain even the subjective complex idea, and still less the nature of the "exterior thing." Existentially or objectively, we conclude that the logically separable part is incapable of real existence; and that whole and part have a mutual relation of necessity and dependence. That the Father of Empiricism should have afforded us such obvious clues to a philosophy of organism, is one of the oddest of philosophical paradoxes.

The theory of a special Divinity of Christ.

By

G. C. GHOSH C.I.E.

Christ a man among men.

The life of Christ was not imaginary but historical. There was nothing in it which was supernatural or unnatural, though there was many a thing there not common. Christ was born of human parents and was a man among men, but only by striving and using his inherent potentiality, which is latent in every man, he rose above the ordinary sphere of man. His acquired qualities made him appear like God but never changed his kind : he remained as he was before. It is recorded in the Gospels, Christ repudiated the men of his time whenever they attempted to attribute a special divinity to him by averring that he was one of God's sons like them (Jn.10.36. Moffat and Weymouth's Translations). Christ as a Jew was a monotheist : monotheism was a pride of the Jews. As he believed in the unity of God without a second, as all Jewish prophets and other teachers of men had taught before him, he taught by saying, to quote his words, "Hear, O Israel, God is one", (MK.12.29) "This is life Eternal that they might know Thee the Only True God" (Jn.17.3) etc. It being so, why in the creed of the Church associated with the name of Christ it is declared that there are three persons in Godhead and Christ is one in it ? It is the later teaching of St. Paul's, who never heard Christ but a generation after his death began to preach that Christ was God, is responsible for the theory of a Triune God, which has since been incorporated in the creed of the Church.

St. Paul, who had before fiercely persecuted the followers of Christ, suddenly changed his mind regarding the personality of Christ, as he said, it is written, when on one day he was

journeying towards Damascus, suddenly a light shone round about him and a voice said to him, "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" (Acts. 9. 4). And thence he straight concluded that Christ was none but God. Thus, it is plain that while the generations of man from primal time engaged in quest of God as to what are His name, form, size, appearance, colour, constituents, etc., could not ascertain anything, St. Paul in a single moment solved the question for all time by declaring that Christ is God. Granting his day-dream was not a delusion, but as it is not found recorded that Christ said to him that he was God functioning as the saviour of man, as it is written only that Christ said to St. Paul, "Why persecutest thou me?". And certainly by this it cannot be assumed that Christ meant that St. Paul must know him as God whom he persecuted. Yet strangely after this he went out to preach his new theory of the constitution of Godhead though from ages before the Jews had believed that God, is only one God without a second.

When St. Paul began to preach his new doctrine to the people around him in Jerusalem, the Rabbis of his time refused to accept his strange theology though he took considerable pain to assiduously controvert it with them from day to day for 52 weeks or a full one year, he miserably failed to convert them to his religious innovation. Thus, hopelessly foiled in his attempt to establish his new religion in Jerusalem he left it in disgust and went to seek "fresh fields and pastures new" in other countries for propagating what he called his "new gospel" of salvation in which Christ was the saviour and reconciler of transgressing men to an offended God.

Thus, though it is clearly recorded in the old Jewish scripture that from Abraham down to prophet Isaiah and others after him it has again and again been declared that God is One Lord, without a second, He is the Lord and besides Him there is no Saviour but Himself. and that all

flesh shall know Him so, yet St. Paul did not desist from inculcating his new theory about the special Godhood of Christ.

Similarities in Messiahs.

The student of the history of pre-Christian religions of the world knows how much the rites, ceremonials etc. of Christianity in which Christ is regarded as God have been borrowed from them. All lives to which men have ascribed divinity are generally counterparts of one another. The stories of the miraculous birth, suffering, death and resurrection of Christ are but co-incidences of what have been found narrated in the stories of the lives of Appolo, Krishna, Kama, Zoroaster, etc.,. It is also noticeable that there is a similarity even in the callings of the messiahs of the world, as it is found in West Asia the messiah is called Shepherd, in Persia he is called Goatherd and in India he is called Cowherd, the sheep, the goat and the cow being the domestic animals of these countries respectively. So, the arguments which had been formerly advanced to prove the supernatural origin of Christ to predicate his special divinity are not found much relied on at the present day by sensible and thoughtful men seriously engaged in search for truths in religion.

A Side-light.

The cause of the ascription of the special divinity to Christ and other great teachers of men or messiahs born in the world was a common one, namely, their performance of some wonderful acts or miracles by the development of some latent powers in them. But above this there were other incidents in the case of Christ which led the people of his time to imagine that he was not man but God.

From the earliest time the influence of the idea with which the Jews had been imbued that their first parents were cursed by God for their transgressing against Him and

that they would be restored to His favour by the obedient conduct of one who would be subsequently born in their generation kept them expecting for long the advent of such a deliverer in their midst.

Also a later prophecy of Isaiah that a great man would come to deliver the Jews from foreign subjection, after the birth of Christ strengthened the belief of many that Christ had come to deliver also their souls, whereby it is apparent that by a confusion of thought they mixed up a spiritual blessing with a material one.

There were also other causes which favoured the theory of the special divinity of Christ, and they must needs be mentioned here. For properly approximating the true meaning of a thing or a term one must have to carefully consider what was its significance in the contemporaneous literature of the time during which it existed. St. Paul, who was a disciple of Gamaliel whose views were based on the theology of Philo which was a peculiar medley of the old Jewish Platonic and Neo-Platonic conceptions of God, incorporated the idea of the divinity of Christ in his new religion.

Lastly, as the teaching of Rabbi Hillel a famous follower of Talmud had exercised much influence on the young life of Christ and as Christ in his teaching used such terms as son of God, son of man, kingdom of heaven, regeneration or new birth, redemption, etc., in the same sense as Talmud and Hillel had used them before, but as the Jews of his time were unable to apprehend their meanings, for which he said they were "mysteries," apprehensible only by the initiate, they thought his teaching was a direct revelation of God to him and therefore they concluded, he was not a man but God, which honour, as apart from others, as I have said before Christ invariably repudiated during his life, as he said to them, they were also Gods (Jn. 10. 34).

While many Jews were passing through this state of mind, at the nick of the time St. Paul appeared on the scene and introduced his new religion in which he installed Christ as the second person in the Trinity of Godhead. Thenceforth, the early Fathers, and many of their time, beginning to believe in the Godhood of Christ, it has been incorporated in the creed of institutional Christianity.

Christ as a Reconciler.

The Christian theologians who teach that Christ should be believed as the redeemer of man as he by his sacrifice, as the Lamb of God specially ordained to be slain for the propitiation of and reconciliation to an offended God from the beginning of the world, should seriously consider that such a conclusion only in favour of Christ cannot be justly tenable, inasmuch as *ipso facto* from time immemorial many a messiah or messenger of God besides Christ having come to declare a similar message of God to the world had, sacrificed himself for the purpose of reconciling man to an offended God, but for that none has been believed as a redeemer of man.

Thus, they who unthoughtfully preach the vicarious sacrifice of Christ to ascribe Godhood to him, it is much to be regretted that they have not been circumspect enough in considering the natural consequence of their teaching, as though it might connote a high merit of Christ as God's obedient son in offering homage to Him, it cannot do so in regard to God as a Just Father to punish his innocent son for the sins of others whereby it fails to uphold the high ethical lesson which the life of Christ is intended to impart to the world of man, in his submitting to sacrifice his life to the will of such a Father.

Moreover, it should also be considered when Christ, believing in the teaching of John the Baptist that man must be regenerated through repentance and baptism to be saved, went to him, and asked him to baptize him, John the Baptist

questioned him as to the necessity of his undergoing the rite: whereupon Christ said that he must subject himself to it as he needed it like any other man. Now if Christ was God, this act of his does not at all appear compatible with him if he was God, as God does not need regeneration.

Besides, it cannot be thrust out of consideration that if there is any reconciler between man and God it cannot but be the repentance of the sinner himself which only can lead him to a better life approved of God, as there is no power in universe which can procure salvation to an unregenerate man. Thus, it appears that the teachings of John the Baptist "Repent ye" and of Christ "Go and sin no more" are similar in purport inasmuch as repentance and turning to a better life in both are made an indispensable condition prior to the salvation of man.

Religion of Christ and after.

Christianity would have been the greatest of all living religions if it had been continued to be preached as Christ preached it. Christ based his religion upon the love of God and man but unfortunately after his death its representation by St. Paul, which now passes as Christianity, has been a pure repudiation of his religion. The same small-mindedness which led the ancient Jews to make their Jehovah a tribal deity prompted St. Paul to make God a sectarian one whose mercy is available only by them who believed Christ as God; this was quite contradictory to the whole teaching of Christ who preached salvation for all men saying "Do this and live" in other words, Christ taught that man's highest abiding happiness or salvation was to be secured not by any creed but by his change of heart and his life of deeds of love. Christ's beautiful religion now in its perverted form counts as its followers a large proportion of the human race and passes for the original religion of Christ, in which he based man's love of God whom he cannot see upon the love of man whom he

sees. He taught that God could not be served except through His children in other words in his teaching the religion of deed came before the profession of creed—making its absence an essential feature of his religion. We find that Christ's teaching summed up in the love of God and man is typical of what had been preached before him by the hierarchy of prophets of God and teachers of men for the uplift of the human race.

If we find to-day that considerable material and moral advancement has taken place in Christian countries, its cause should be properly attributed to the influence of the unique life of Christ and the exquisitely uplifting nature of his teaching as recorded in the Gospels of his disciples, but not to the doctrine of St. Paul which after all is a base subversion of monotheism, and also contrary to the law of progress under which God has placed His universe, where man being a part of it is also progressing with it towards a better and a higher state and cannot be stationary how much powerful adverse influences may be working against him. It shall ever change his nature, thought and ideas to what is ever true and real. God shall ever reign in universe as the only One Supreme Lord, Redeemer and Saviour from eternity to eternity.

To the seeking heart religion is a thing in the making ; so that his religion might not subsequently suffer perversion through any wrong teaching, Christ took particular care in exhorting men to "Seek and find." Yet unfortunately most Christians because born of Christian parents or perhaps for a lack of imagination do not feel it their worthwhile to seek and find by themselves. But there are others who though so circumstanced feel it their duty to seek and find by themselves what are the truth that constitute the religion of man. Though God cannot exactly be found but only His glimpse a little and though perhaps the contest between the teaching of old authority and the finding of the seeker of God shall

never end, yet as a search for God is itself a blessing as it leads the life of the seeker to a still better state, it must not cease. Therefore, it is regrettable that Post-Christ Christianity, purely begot of the perverse imagination of one man and afterwards founded upon a faith "once delivered to the saints" and enjoined to be held fast for ever as taught in the Bible, (Jude 3) has impeded its further advance. Its upholders have little considered that man's religion, in which the spiritual is largely conceived in the experience of the material, and therefore, ever changeable by the advent of newer life and acquisition of further knowledge, cannot be held fast for ever. For this Post-Christ Christianity has been found to fare badly in the general contest with other religions of the world, which not so hampered are free to advance with the ever advancing man. Here it may be noted *inter alia* that though the foundation of the new religion, set up after the death of Christ and since associated with his name down to the present day fundamentally lies in the belief of his virgin birth and resurrection after death, it is anomalous that though many present day Christians who do not believe in such teachings yet they have not now the boldness to cease to be called as Christians.

An Immanent Divinity

The objective of the whole teaching of Christ, after declaring that God is One God and that He must be worshipped in spirit and in truth, was that man, latently divine as he is, should understand the mystery of his being which is autonomously capable of attaining divinity in a fuller and yet fuller degree by striving. Therefore, Christ taught that man must seek the truth to be freed from the bondage of darkness or ignorance, old authority, prejudice, etc., and strive to realize, as he himself did, his own selfhood in divinity. "Know thyself" taught the Greek. The Aryan Rishi in search for God after thousands of years meditation in the solitude of

wilderness discovered and taught that man is not : manhood, is Godhood. Thus, as the Greek, the Aryan and the greatest Jewish seeker of God arrived at one conclusion : it must be true. Therefore, the theory of a special divinity of Christ falls to the ground.

So, it is proper to think that as countless souls must be saved, many messiahs or messengers, Avatars and teachers of men must have been coming from God throughout the ages. seeing which in his spiritual vision, both Micah, a Jewish prophet and the Aryan Rishis have said their "goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting." Therefore, the soul of every man, seeking the truth, must have many windows to let light into it from all sides, and he will be amazed at finding that all the world is full of God's glory and goodness.

As the value of pure gold cannot be improved by mixing some chemical gold with it, and as the scent of Rosa Bossora cannot be improved by throwing some otto over it, so, the bare glory of Christ can never be enhanced by putting a tawdry drapery of divinity over him. Christ should be left alone, as without it he is unique and excelling.

The objective

It behoves every thoughtful man not to slave over and waste his valuable time engaged in the polemical discussion about a special Godhood of Christ, but to know that it is his supreme duty to be filled with the inspiration of the life of Christ in his ordinary daily life, and with it to remember as a fact that he is also a partaker of the nature of God as was believed by Christ. The golden rule of human conduct, as taught by Christ, that love should not merely be a part of man's life but its whole component, if acted upon by every man it will also lead him to God and a glorious state like him. It is more sensible to think that flesh will be made Godlike under the irresistible law of progress than God will be made flesh.

The Ethical Basis of Turning the other Cheek.

By

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Carlyle bursts out with his native vehemence and rugged emotion saying "Revenge, my friends, revenge and the natural hatred of scoundrels and the ineradicable tendency to pay them what they have merited is for ever more intrinsically a correct and even a divine feeling in the mind of every man." How to deal with the wrong-doer, and what is the right attitude to be taken towards the criminal—are the questions that have been the subject-matter of interminable controversies in ethical and theological treatises. The traditional rigmarole of the three theories of punishment, namely the preventive, the educative, and the retributive, does not solve the problem ; because, every one of them is riddled with internal contradictions and is inherently defective in many respects.

There are two fundamental points with reference to punishment which have to be settled in definite terms at the outset. Punishment generally means the infliction on the wrong-doer of something unpleasant, which by his offence he is held to deserve. If this be this case, the questions to be decided are, first, what exactly is meant by "deserve" and secondly, why it is right to inflict on the man what he deserves.

The pivotal principle of all social life and the most enduring and invariable element in the consciousness of moral obligation is to be found in the virtue of justice. One of the most pressing problems in connection with justice is the nature and purpose of punishment or punitive justice as it is called. The action of the wrong doer threatens to set at nought the social good and the majesty of the Law ; and thererore it

becomes imperative that some curtailment of his liberties by way of imprisonment or some other form of punishment should be effected at once and without fail, before this bad practice becomes a precedent and establishes itself as a rule. That is to say, punishment ultimately is the vindication of the law when it is violated. But does punishment really vindicate the worth and authority of Law? No, it certainly does not do that. What it does is simply to prove that disobedience does not pay, and not that it is wrong and immoral. The punishment only points to the wrong doer that he is living in a system, the nature of which is so opposed to his aims that if he tries to realise them, he will earn not success but disaster. Therefore, punishment by itself can never vindicate the authority of Law i e, its right to be obeyed; what it really establishes is its capacity to make disobedience imprudent and painful. Thus to determine if punishment is really deserving, we must first fix and justify the system of purposes and rights to maintain which punishment exists to meet cases of violation.

In Christ's teaching we have the most praiseworthy and uniquely effective method of treating the wrong-doer which dispenses with punishment, but which is a more potent and certainly less violent method than punishment for bringing home to the mind of the wrong doer the evil nature of his action and making him respect the system of rights without which life cannot be lived. Christ has the supreme and unrivalled insight to realise that punishment is retrospective and deals only with the past and that it is the duty of the dispenser of justice to consider the effect of punishment on the wrong-doer. He came not to destroy, but to fulfil. He proposes to formulate a Formative method which will undo the wrong done, educate and reform the wrong-doer, remove the rancour in the man against whom the offence was perpetrated and give an opportunity to him and resume his life in a better and a more chastened spirit.

Jesus Christ in his "Sermon on the Mount" boldly proclaims that the right and appropriate treatment of the criminal is certainly not the method of retribution. "An eye for an eye" comes out of the spirit of vengeance, betrays barbarity, and is an insult to humanity. Nor does he seem to be much fascinated by, and therefore in a mood to underline and emphasise the value and importance of, the doctrine of mere passive non resistance, nor even the more active principle of returning good for evil. The ideal of non-resistance is something negative, morally neutral and colourless in itself; it has no positive content. But morality is affirmation: it is always active doing and never a passive acquiescence. Again, all moralists all over the world have rightly waxed eloquent over the nobility of character that forgets the evil done, and does good in return. There is of course an ineffable sweetness and a transmuting goodness in such a conduct which usually succeeds in uplifting the degenerate by a living example. But Christ wants to go deeper and get at the root principles that make possible all forms of high moral living. He is out to establish a startlingly novel and a refreshingly original method of procedure to be adopted towards the wrong-doer which would at the same time point out to us the secret spring of all spiritual life. For the boldness of its conception and for the profundity of its value, it is perhaps unparalleled in the history of morals. His reasoning is as simple as it is perfect. His confiding faith in the essential goodness of human nature and his irrepressible optimism which gives him courage to set up his standard as an inspiring ideal mark him out as a superb and unequalled teacher of moral principles.

The wrong-doer is avowedly an aggressor. His actions are openly anti social and clearly infringe on the rights of others; and in dealing with him Christ advises us to adopt the specific and active procedure of making the aggressor

understand that we have no objection to his carrying his aggression even further than he has proposed. This is the meaning of his moral imperative "whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also".

Now, let us try to analyse the statement and realise its implications. What is punishment? Nobody to-day is so inconsiderate as to declare that punishment is an end in itself; it is only a means to an end. The underlying idea in all punishment is as was pointed out earlier, the infliction of pain in any form with a view to the restoration of the moral order which has been violated by the crime. The moral order and the social will embody themselves in the form of laws; and these laws should be operative and effective if society should exist. A crime is always a violation of the social will; and the social will vindicates itself and establishes its majesty by inflicting punishment on the wrongdoer. Otherwise, individual and social life would become impossible. This is the demand of justice as ordinarily understood and universally practised.

What does Christ propose to teach in asking us to turn the other cheek? Our rights and privileges, our possessions and properties, though resident in us individually are really social in significance; they derive value and meaning only because they are recognised as such by society. Social recognition, therefore, is the true source of the value and validity of our individual rights and personal possessions. Hence if the criminal steals, he has violated not the will of this or that individual whose property he takes away, but the will of the community. Therefore it is that the state through its system of criminal laws enforces the punishment which is a kind of safety-valve for the righteous indignation of the society. But Christ strikes a thoroughly different and novel note here. What is the attitude of the man who when he is struck on one cheek feels inclined to turn the other?

This is certainly an unusual method. Is it due to momentary helplessness or inherent impotence? Or is it the inevitable effect of a paralysing fatalism? It is evidently none of these.

This unusual frame of mind is the result of a correct perspective of one's own life and a perfectly right insight into the essence of moral living. The man who has been struck on one cheek has hitherto felt really and in earnest that his cheek was safe from assault; but now he has lost that feeling as he finds this privilege of freedom from assault denied to him by this assailant. Under these circumstances, an ordinary man would grow indignant and have recourse to extreme penalties. But not so the man who turns the other cheek. He is so friendly, so brotherly and so genuinely social by training and temperament that he can have no real joy in his possessions unless his enjoyment of them is freely recognised by all and willingly acquiesced in by every individual. His readiness to turn the other cheek thus implies a most sublime form of the feeling of brotherhood which is without doubt more comprehensive and more profound than the spirit of the ordinary citizen which exhibits itself in the demand for justice as commonly understood. This is exactly the fulfilment of the law, the perfecting of morality. The alchemy of this attitude is so powerful and effective that it reveals to the offender the anti-social nature of his wrong-doing in such an emphatic and telling way that it naturally shocks him into a better life.

Quite an endless number of objections could be raised pointing out the utter impracticability of this teaching and the absolute futility of this suggestion even if it could be put into practice. It must, however, be realised that Christ never intended to lay down a law to be blindly and uncritically obeyed in all cases; his aim was to make a masterly analysis

of the essence of moral goodness and reveal in distinct terms the innermost secrets of the virtue of justice, and to inspire by a noble living example the true spirit which ought always to vivify our moral attitude on each occasion of aggression against ourselves. His teaching is, therefore, the culminating point of the gradually growing moral consciousness. It must be carefully borne in mind that the commandment of Jesus is a personal ideal—an ideal intended for the individual—an ideal which is magnificent and grand but which, at the same time is impossible for the whole society to follow collectively and immediately, because the individuals constituting it are at different levels of moral and spiritual development; but on that account the ideal does not lose its value.

Goodness of character is after all the hard achievement of the individual; in the last analysis, the moral life is essentially a personal life; no one can perform the moral task for another; each should work out his own salvation; self-development is only through personal effort; and a true self-development is an indispensable antecedent condition to train oneself to become a willing devotee to the sublime ideal inculcated in the Sermon on the Mount. The secret of this doctrine consists in establishing an indissoluble connection between individual perfection and social uplift. The life of the self is expanded and made right in exact proportion to the degree of realisation of the social good. The problem of justice from the standpoint of Ethics centres round the discovery and enlightenment of the individual who is in a process of finding himself amidst circumstances more or less adverse. There could certainly be no social problem if every man enjoyed opportunities essential to his complete self-expression as an organic member of the society. The ideal most powerfully quickens us to realise what is potential in each of us. It is the prophecy and the revelation of what the actual is in its essence. "A

nap of the world" says Oscar Wilds, "that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which humanity is always landing. And when humanity lands there, it looks out, and seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias".

The Hound of Heaven

By

HIRENDRA NATH DUTT

FRIENDS :—Many of you may be familiar with Francis Thompson's "The Hound of Heaven." It is, in some ways, a remarkable poem and was published in the first decade of this Century. I came to it however, very late, being directed thither by a reference in Evelyn Underhill's "Mysticism".

To start with, the Hound of Thompson's poem bears no sort of affinity to the pair of red-eyed mastiffs which, as we find in the *Rig-Veda*, guard the portals of Paradise and bar the entry of the wicked into Heaven : In fact it does not belong to the genus "canis" at all. None-the-less we find this "Hound of Heaven" relentlessly pursuing its quarry, "without haste but without rest," still following him with deliberate speed, with majestic greed,—“with unhurrying chase and unperturbed pace.”

Meanwhile the Victim—

Flies Him down the nights and down the days :

Flies Him down the arches of the years

Flies Him down the labyrinthine ways

Adown Titanic glooms of chasmed fears.

But the Hound steadily gains on him "though across the mergent of the World he fled." In despair, the victim first seeks all manner of human aid to shield himself—

He pleaded, outlaw-wise

By many a hearted casement, curtained red,

Trellised with intertwining charities ;

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But, if one little casement parted : wide,
The gust of His approach would clash it to.

Failing human help, the victim, as a last resort, draws against Him the bolt of Nature's secrecies. But,
 "Nature, poor step-dame, cannot slake his drouth.

Never did any milk of hers once bless

His thirsting mouth."

Seeing at last that there was no escape and that 'his days had crackled and gone up in smoke'—and finding that

"Now of that long pursuit,

Comes on at hand the bruit."

And that he "is defenceless utterly" the victim surrenders and says :—

"Naked I wait Thy love's uplifted stroke ! "

—the fang of the Hound.spoken of as love's upliftedstroke !
 Yes, for, as you must already have appreciated, Thompson's poem is an allegory of "the remorseless, tireless seeking and following of the soul by the Divine Life to whom it will not surrender ;—the inexorable onward sweep of the tremendous "Lover" hunting the separated spirit, strange, piteous, futile thing that flees Him and will not realise—

"Whom wilt thou find to love ignoble thee

Save Me, save only Me ?"

—not the spiritual allegory of the self's quest of adored Reality but its obverse—the allegory of Reality's quest of the unwilling self, typifying the idea of the love-chase of the human spirit rushing in terror from the over-powering presence of God, but followed, sought, and conquered in the end (Underhill). Though from the first the spirit had an inkling of the truth, though he knew (as Thompson puts it),

Tho' He knew *His* love who followed

Yet was he sore adread

Lest having Him he must have naught beside.

But now "that Voice is round him

Like a bursting sea" and addresses him thus :

“And is Thy earth so marred
Shattered in shard on shard ?

No—not at all—

“All which thy child’s mistake
Fancied as lost. I have stored for thee at Home
Rise, clasp My hand and Come !”

For—“Ah ! fondest blindest weakest
I am He whom thou seekest”—

however blindly, however gropingly, through the ages.

Francis Thompson was anticipated in the 13th Century by a Christian mystic, Mechthild of Magdeburg who heard the voice of God saying to her :—

“I chased thee, for in this was my pleasure. I captured ...thee, for this was my desire. I bound thee, and I rejoice in thy bonds ; I have wounded thee, that thou mayst be united to Me. If I gave thee blows, it was that I might be possessed of thee.”

In this country we have the same idea in some of the love-lyrics of Chandidas and Vidyapati who lived five hundred years ago and were the two Dioscuri of the *Vaisnava* dawn. The wonderful songs of these “minnie singers” of the holy spirit are, as you know, still an inspiration to the spiritually minded in Bengal who follow the *Bhakti* cult. I shall try to translate a verse or two of theirs. It is *Radha*, the timid neophyte, speaking :—“Ah ! Krisna may not, must not touch me. He is so rough and rampant Mon Dieu ! I am terribly afraid.” And when Sri Krisna has possessed her by main force, she cries out in agony to her maidens “Oh Dear ! Dear ! what a night of pain ! What trepidation ! What tribulation ! What ruthless hustlings—as if He would drain my very life out of me, Never more—Oh ! never, never !” The *Bidagdha Madhava* of Rup Goswami puts the same idea rather more delicately :—

*Dharyā pariṇḍagunam Sundara ! Maha mandira
tuman vasasi Taha Taha rundhasi baliyam Jaha Jaha
chaidā palāemhi.*

"Oh Beautiful One ! Thou lodgest in my heart. For fear of Thee, in whatever quarter I fly, Thou bring'st me back by main force !, I'am not unaware that the poets here have—in common with other mystics, both in the East and the West—made use of phrases and images, tinged into roseate hue by eroticism. But it should be noted that such images, though 'they had indeed once been sensuous are here anointed and ordained to holy office, carried up, transmuted and endowed with a radiant purity—an intense and spiritual life.'

Be that as it may, we may be sure that those who fly from the Divine embrace, are really outlaws, rebel souls, abnormal and perverse. The human spirit being an emanation of the Divine Spirit—Man being made in His image or as an American writer has quaintly phrased it—the Ego-man being a reflection of the Ego-God, the Infinite Individuality—there is a natural affinity between the two and therefore the self who resists the pull of spiritual gravitation, who makes a point of avoiding the touch of Eternity—is an exception to the general rule. So the better and the truer version of the Krisna-and-Radha legend says that Radha, as soon as she has the good fortune of casting her eyes on Sri Krisna is smitten with His ineffable charms—

Pahilahi raga nayana-ranga-chela.

and feels *that* love, half-human and half-divine, about which a Christian mystic (Gertrude Moro) has spoken—

"Never there was or can there be imagined such a love as there is between a humble soul and Thee."

and the words that come to Radha's lips are :—

"Oh Love ! I give myself to Thee, Thine ever, Thine to be" and she cries out almost in the phrases of St. John of the Cross :—

“May it please Thee to unite me to Thyself, making my
Soul
Thy bride ; I will rejoice in nothing till I am in Thine
arms.”

This is a familiar mystic experience, as we may know from St. Catharine who has expatiated on her “Companionship with Love Divine” and from Suso, the Servitor of the Eternal Wisdom, who, though a man says in womanly accents :—

“What shall keep me back ? To-day I shall embrace you, even as my burning heart desires to do.”

For, as has been truly pointed out—“Love is the King’s highway which leads man back to the country of the Soul which in this country we name “Brindabana” and the aspiration of the Lover of God is to pour out greater and greater *love* to the object of his devotion. This adoration be it noted, being not a negativity but a positive and flaming outpour of the Soul.

As we say in Bengali, a single palm is insufficient to raise a clap. Krisna on His part feels an intense longing for meeting Radha. This was inevitable, for, as Rumi has told us—

‘When the love of God arises in thy heart without doubt God also feels love for thee.’

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When in *this* heart the lightning spark of love arises be sure this love is *reciprocated* in *that* heart. This is finely put by Mechthild of Magdeberg :—

“The endless love that was without beginning, and is and shall be for ever. And with this our good Lord said full blissfully,—Lo ! how that I loved thee * * *
Oh Soul ! before the World was, I longed for thee and thou for Me. Even as from everlasting thou hast loved thyself—so from everlasting thou hast loved Me. Therefore, when our two desires unite, Love shall be fulfilled.” We long for

the Absolute" says Royce, "only in so far as in us the Absolute also longs."

"God needs man" says Eckhart. "It is Love calling to Love"

As one writer on Mysticism has put it—"The never-ending wonder is that God is indescribably full of love for His creature. If only man would recognise how greatly he is sought by God" ! (Jinarajadas's *Nature of Mysticism* p. 13). But is this really to be wondered at, seeing that God is love—not *only* Power and Wisdom ? He is no doubt Omnipotent and Omniscient—sweetly and mightily ordering all things—*Ishate Ishanivih, Yata-tatthato vyadadhat*—but as Emerson points out, His essence is Love. This "rippling tide of Love, which flows secretly from God into the Soul and draws it mightily back to its source."—"this mutual attraction is called "Divine Osmosis" in the literature of mysticism, whereby a "mysterious 'give and take is set' up between the Finite and the Infinite Life, which presently brings together the two lovers—God and the Soul—into a joyful room when they speak much of love."

This is spoken of as *Kunja-Kreera* by the Bengal Vaisnavas and is led up to by what the Christian speaks of as "orison." Surrender is its secret, a personal surrender, not only of finite to Infinite but of bride to Bridegroom,—of heart to Heart.

So Mira, the queenly lover of Mewar says in her ecstasy :

"Mera to Giridhar Gopal Dusra na Koi, jake sira mayur-mukut mero pati soi.

—"He whose crest is adorned with the peacock-plume. He verily is my Beloved." Thus is love fulfilled and union achieved by the Lover with the Beloved. Thereby he or shall we say she attains a new stratum of Consciousness, for the definition and description of which there are no human words. As Ouspenskie points out in his "New Model of the Universe," mystical sensations (which the lover now experiences) are

sensations of which we sometimes get a foretaste in love "sex," but those sensations, though of the same category as the sensations of love, are infinitely higher and more complex and the lover, who erstwhile discerned in the visage of the Hound of Heaven implacable and inexorable greed and gluttony—now discovers in Him the winsome and adorable lineaments of the Beloved.

Interpretation of some Vedanta Sutras Considered.

By

K. R. SRINIVASIENGAR

The life and soul of a philosophy doubtless consist in its inherent plasticity sufficient to admit of development, growth, modification, reinterpretation according to changing circumstances. But when it is thus modified and re-interpreted, it must be unambiguously recognised as a *modification*, a *qualified form*, an *altered interpretation*, of the original version. There is nothing derogatory in this procedure either to the greatness of the original philosopher or to the genius of him who later on modifies it. On the other hand it distinctly redounds to the glory of both the master and the disciple. Such was the procedure adopted by all the ancient teachers and commentators, especially of the Advaita system. Why should not thought develop beyond Śaṅkara? Have not various schools grown out of his system *professedly differing* from his conclusions on vital points? And yet we find that later commentators have fought shy of acknowledging their differences from Śaṅkara and have tried to father their own views upon him. Of none else is this truer than of Appaiyya Dikṣita, a prolific writer and commentator of Advaita philosophy and of no other part of his teaching than of his doctrine of salvation.

Appaiyya is an enthusiastic upholder of Advaita and its *nirgunavāda*. He has written a critique upon Srikantha's *Sivādvaita* in which he undertakes to prove in a most painstaking manner the identity of that author's doctrine with *nirgunavāda*. He clearly recognises and states in many places that departure on the path of the gods (*archirādīmārga*) does not belong to the "Knowers of Brahman without

attributes" who desire final release. This departure etc., belongs only to those who desire gradual release (*Krama-mukti*) as well as to those who meditate on *Saguna Brahman* desiring Iswarahood. He also admits that the knowledge of *Nirguna Brahman* (*Nirguna Vidya*) embodies the truth and that the knowledge of *Saguna Brahman* is valuable only as a *preparation* for the former, bringing about, as it is believed to do, mental purity, firmness, and the power to concentrate on *Nirguna Brahman*. It is thus intended only for the dull-witted ones who otherwise, not having sufficient strength of mind to contemplate the *nirguna*, may foolishly take to it and thus land themselves in destruction.

Yet admitting all this and much more besides, somehow at the very last moment Appaiyya's ingenuity betakes itself to twisting Saṁkara and fathering upon him the view of release that even by those who practice *nirguna vidya* only *Iswarahood* with attributes is attained in the first instance, while oneness with *Brahman's* being comes only after the final release of all (*sarva-mukti*). This may certainly be an improvement upon Saṁkara, however untenable on the Samkarite premises. But why the elaborate attempt to make it appear as Saṁkara's own view of release? Such an attempt Appaiyya undertakes both in his *Sivadvaita Nirnaya* as well as in his *Siddhanta lesa Sangraha*.

The general arguments of Appaiyya in both these works in support of his contention and their philosophical tenability I have already examined elsewhere.¹ I have also shown therein how the classic Advaitic thinkers give the lie direct to Appaiyya on this point. Here I shall confine myself to an examination of Appaiyya's appeal to Saṁkara (in both the works mentioned above) in support of his peculiar position

1. Vide *Proceedings of the Ind. Phil. Congress, 1936*: Symposium on "Sarva Mukti".

regarding the nature of release. His appeal is to a number of passages in Samkara's commentary on the *Brahma Sutras* and to these we shall now advert *one by one*. *Thereafter*, I shall briefly try to gather Samkara's own view from several other passages in the *Sutras* themselves.

(i) I. iii. 14 etc. (*Daharadhikarana*)

The question in this *adhikarana* is whether the small either in the heart, which is to be sought for and understood, refers to elemental ether or the individual soul or the highest self. Samkara of course maintains the Sutrakara's view that it refers to the highest Lord only (Parameshwara) for this reason (amongst others), that a subsequent passage in the Upanishad ascribes to the "small ether" such qualities as freedom from sin, from old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thirst, possession of true desires, true purposes etc. qualities which are only ascribable to the Self—the highest self. And Samkara concludes in I, iii, 19, by saying that when the unreal nature of the individual soul is dissolved by true knowledge, its true state in which it is one with the highest lord and distinguished by freedom from sin and similar attributes would become manifest. Appaiyya exults over this passage and says that it supports his view that *nirguna vidya* even according to Samkara leads to identity with *Parameswara*.² We must remember, however, that Samkara is able to explain and reconcile the several seemingly contradictory passages of the Upanishads only by having recourse to his three-fold conception of *Brahman* as *nirguna* and *saguna*, as *Hiranyagarbha* as *Virat*. "By skilfully ringing the changes on a higher and a lower doctrine" Samkara "somehow manages to find room for whatever" the Upanishads have to say.³ Now

2. *Bhasyakāro atī spastam muktasya saguneswara bhāvāpattim aha.*

3. Thibaut's trans. of S. B. Vol. I. p. ccxxiii.

there is no doubt that in the passage in question Samkara is talking of *mukti* as equality⁴ with Iswara and not identity with Brahman ; but the question is whether the said passage supports Appaiyya's contention that even the meditators upon Nirguna Brahman attain only identity with Iswara (Iswaraikya) and not oneness with the being of Brahman (Brahmabhava) as the immediate fruit of their release. Now the passage in question itself says nothing about the problem whether it refers to *Sagunopasana* or *nirgunopasana* but from various other passages we are able to determine that Samkara, in this as well as in all passages where lordship and other powers and qualities are mentioned intends to refer only to the fruit of meditation on the qualified Brahman. Two such passages may be referred to (III. iii. 39 and IV. iii 14). In the latter passage especially, discussing the question, to what sphere, then, do the scriptural texts about the soul's going refer to ? Samkara explicitly states : "And where the soul's going is spoken of in a chapter treating of Brahman (and he here refers to various Upanishadic passages⁵) such attributes as "vamani", i. e. Leader of blessings and 'Satyakama' having true wishes, show that there the qualified Brahman has to be meditated upon and to that Brahman the soul can go. Passages which are, if possible, still more explicit on the point are to be found in IV, iv, 16-17 and 11. In the last Samkara says that "Lordly power is valid only for the qualified state" and if it is anywhere mentioned in connection with *nirgunavidya*, it is "only in order to glorify the knowledge of the (unqualified) plenitude, and it therefore presents itself as constituting the fruit of qualified knowledge⁶. In Sutra 16,

4. Not identity with Iswara, be it noted, as Appaiyya assumes.

5. Chapter IV. 15, 6 ; IV. 10, 5 ; VIII. 6, 5 ; VIII. 1, 1 ; IV. 15, 3.

6. Thibaut, Vol. II, p. 400.

commenting upon the absence of all specific cognition, Samkara says that it refers only to deep sleep and final release as identity with Brahman. Those passages, on the other hand, which describe lordly power refer to an altogether different condition, which,.....is an abode where qualified knowledge produces its results⁷.

2. I. iv. 16-17 et seq. (*Jagadvāchitvādhikarana*)

This passage also, taken by Appaiyya as one in his favour, also refers to the fruit of meditation on Brahman as *warding off all evil, obtaining pre-eminence among all beings, sovereignty, supremacy*, and so clearly refers to *Sagunavidya*, especially as the passage explicitly deals with *Brahman as the maker of the world and of persons* which is evidently the *lower Brahman*. In the next *sutra*, however, Samkara, referring to the state of deep sleep, states that the soul in this state becomes one with the highest *Brahman* which, by the characteristics mentioned in connection with it such as the removal of all *upadhis*, can mean none other than *nirguna Brahman*.⁸

3. II. 3. 43. etc. seq. (*Amśādhikarana*)

In this passage again, there are references to Parameswara. But one thing must be clearly noted. Terms like *nirguna* and *saguna*, *Parameswara* etc. do not occur in *Vedanta-sutras* themselves which speak only of *Brahman*, *parah*, *tat*, *paramatman*, *parabrahman* etc. It is Samkara who, as we have seen, adopting the distinctions between *Saguna* & *nirguna*, higher and lower *Brahman*, goes on interpreting the *Sutras* as suits his purpose. Where the text speaks of *Brahman* as transcending all qualities and relation, *Nirguna Brahman* is taught. Where, on the other hand attributes such as All-knowingness, Rulership of the world, direct relation to individual souls such as that of master to servant etc.,

7 Ibid, p. 415.

8. Ibid, Vol. I. p. 273.

are found, it is the *Lower Brahman*—the highest Lord *Parameswara*. Accordingly this *adhikarana* which speaks of the soul as being a part (whether of *Brahman* or the Lord it does not say) is interpreted by Samkara as purporting to say that the soul is a part of the Lord for the obvious reason that in the undifferenced and attributeless *Brahman* we can't conceive of parts, but this by itself does not in any way support Appaiyya's contention regarding the nature of final release. For Samkara has a high place for the Lord also in his system. And as regards the further contention that Samkara here refutes the view that those who attain release would, as parts of *Iswara*, undergo greater suffering and pain since *Iswara* himself is to be supposed as experiencing the misery of all, and thus indirectly establishes the view that release is the attainment of the nature of *Parameswara*, we must point out that Samkara is careful enough in his use of words and does not refer to the released souls as those who have obtained the nature of the Lord or *Iswara*. His own words in stating the *purvapaksa* are : "*tatascha tatprāptinām⁹ mahattaram dukham prapnuyāt*" The "*tat*" here evidently means "*Brahman*" as in "*tat tvam asi*". And Samkara himself, who holds that the soul's undergoing *pain is also only imaginary due to nescience* says, at the end of his commentary on *Sutra* 46 : "Accordingly the Vedanta texts teach that when the soul's individual state, due to nescience, is sublated it becomes Brahman, "Thou art that etc.". Why then should he have entertained at all the *purvapaksha* that if the soul is part of the Lord, it would have to experience greater misery which would necessarily attack to the Lord etc ? This is not difficult to understand, because he has admitted that the soul may *now* in a sense be looked upon as a part of the Lord, as it were ; if so,

9. "Those who obtain that" ; Thibeaute translates this phrase as "they who obtain *Brahman*" : Ibid, Vol. I. p. 63.

it might be thought that the released soul might, as such a part of *Iswara*, experience greater misery—and this view Samkara explicitly refutes in this passage, so that on the whole this passage may be looked upon as a refutation of, instead of a support for, the doctrine of *Iswaraikya*. Or it is open to us to think that the passage applies to *Saguna Mukti* as such in which case there would be no trouble at all. Finally it is possible that Samkara may have meant by *Iswara* nothing else than Parabrahman, which he sometimes does. Appaiyya says that the word should not be interpreted in some way so as to mean pure intelligence. But in the passage under consideration, the actual words of Samkara are “*Kimuta Vishaya shunyadātmānonyaddha sthwantaramapashyato nityachaitanya matraswarupa seyti*”.

4. 111, ii, 1, etc. seq. (*Sandhyādhikarana*).

In sutra 5 of this *adhikarana*, it is stated that by strenuous meditation on the ‘*parah*’—the highest Lord, as Samkara interprets it—the equality of attributes, which till then was existing in the individual soul hidden by the veil of nescience, would become manifest in the soul, and the soul would obtain lordly powers etc. It is difficult to see in what way this passage can lend support to Appaiyya’s contention of *nirguna vidya* leading to *Iswaraikya*, for it manifestly deals with *sagunopasana* as is evident from the words which Appaiyya himself quotes “That again which is hidden is manifested to some persons who, having their ignorance dispelled by strenuous meditation on *Parameswara*, attain perfection by the grace of the Lord.¹⁰ And as if to distinguish this kind of release from the *advaitin*’s true release—obtained by *nirgunavidya*—in sutras 7 to 9 of the same section where the question of *Sushupti* is discussed, Samkara maintains that the soul, in deep sleep becomes

10. *Sivadvaita Nirnaya* : edited by Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (Madras University) p. 118.

united with *Brahman* and awakes also from *Brahman*. In this connection Samkara entertains an interesting *purva-paksha* that the soul which awakes—i.e., returns from *Brahman*—is not the same soul, but either the Lord or some other soul, and, refuting this contention, he concludes by saying that the soul which rises cannot be the Lord or some other soul. Is there no moral in this? Anyhow, it is clear from this that the soul in deep sleep becomes merged in *Brahman* but not in the Lord and my question is if even in deep sleep which is known as *Avantara mukti* the soul becomes merged in *Brahman* only, how shall we say that after true enlightenment has dawned, it attains identity only with the Lord?

5. IV. iv. 5-7 (Brahmādhikarana)

In this section, the sutrakara himself discusses the whole question whether the released soul manifests itself with specific qualities belonging to the Lord's nature or as pure intelligence—*suddha chaitanya*, i. e. pure consciousness. Hence if in Samkara's commentary on these sutras we cannot find support for Appaiyya's view foisted upon him, then we may take it for granted that Samkara does not countenance any such absurdity as *nirgunavidya* leading to *Iswaraikya* immediately. Appaiyya cleverly manages his references to these sutras in a way which can only be characterised as a bold attempt at *suppressio veri* and *suggestio falsi*. The sutrakara, Vyasa-Badarayana, first states two views—that of Acharya Jaimini who holds that the soul manifests itself with specific qualities like freeness from sin and *satyakama*, *satya samkalpa* etc., and that of Acharya Audulomi who believes that it manifests itself as pure intelligence and finally reconciles the two views by saying that since scripture holds both views regarding the ultimate state of the soul, there is no contradiction between them. It may exist in both forms, according to its will and pleasure—this seems to be the sutrakara's opinion. Now

Śaṅkara has nothing to say particularly about the first, Jaimini's view—he simply states it explaining what the 'reference and the rest' in that sūtra (5th) means. But in commenting upon the second,—Audulomi's view, he writes in a manner that leaves not even the shadow of a doubt regarding the fact that he is therein expounding his own view. "Although the text enumerates different qualities" he writes, "such as freeness from sin etc., these qualities rest only on fanciful conceptions due to difference of words ; for what the text intimates is only absence in general of all qualities such as sin and the rest. Intelligence alone constitutes the nature of the Self and hence it is proper to conclude that it manifests itself in a nature consisting of that only.....Qualities, on the other hand, such as having true wishes", because they depend 'on the connexion with limiting adjuncts', cannot constitute the true nature of the self, as intelligence does ¹¹

Who can mistake this passage for anything else but a statement of Śaṅkara's own view though he concludes the passage by saying "This is the view of the teacher Audulomi"? This belief is strengthened especially by the fact that after stating Bādarāyaṇa's view reconciling the two positions Śaṅkara does not say what his own view in the matter is. If there is still any doubt in the matter it is cleared by Śaṅkara's commentary on subsequent sūtras 10-12 where he discusses whether the released soul possesses a body or not, stating again the views of two thinkers, Bādari who says no, and Jaimini who says, yes. After stating Jaimini's view at the very beginning of his commentary on the 11th sūtra Śaṅkara comments independently : "The capability of optionally multiplying one's self is indeed, mentioned in the knowledge which refers to *Brahman* as devoid of qualities, but this lordly power which is valid only for the qualified state is there mentioned only in order to glorify the knowledge of

11. Thibaut, Vol. II. p. 409.

the (unqualified) plenitude ; and it therefore presents itself as constituting the fruit of qualified knowledge, "which means (according to Thibaut) that we are entitled to view that passage (which refers to such powers) as teaching something about him who possesses the lower knowledge."¹²

Thus by closely examining Appaiyya's arguments, we come to the conclusion that his own arguments in favour of *nirgunavidya* leading to *Iswaraikya* are inconclusive while his appeal to Śaṅkara leaves him really supportless.¹³ In fact, the very hypothesis of the released soul merging in *Iswara* is preposterous. A reality of a lower order could merge in a reality of a higher order, a *vyavahārika* (empirical) in a *pāramārthika* (transcendental), a reflection in the original. But what sense is there in saying that an empirical can merge in another empirical, a reflection in another reflection ? If therefore the individual soul is to merge in *Iṣwara* at all, it must perforce be of a lower order than the latter, i. e., be of a *prātibhāsika* status like an illusion, or even of an *alīka* character like a sky-flower.

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12. Ibid, p. 412.

13. Regarding the reliability to be placed upon Appaiyya's interpretations of Srikanta, Prof. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri in his able exposition of Srikanta's *Sivadvaita*, observes: "...Appaiyya seems to be not a wholly safe guide" (p. 35.); "... Appaiyya, though a brilliant thinker, allows himself to be led away by considerations of logical perfection, and adopts interpretations which are very difficult to reconcile with the texts themselves" (p. 39). These remarks seem to hold good of Appaiyya's interpretations in general.

Impossibility of Voluntarist Philosophy of Values.

By
J. B. DAVE.

The philosophy of Values that has found utterance in the writings of Windleband, Münsterberg, Rickert and Royce is strongly inclined towards Voluntarism. It has adopted a teleological view of the world, but the grounds upon which they have based their philosophies is the volitional theory of the self. Royce in his magnum opus "*The World and the Individual*" (Vol. II. p. 32) declares :—"The theoretical 'Ought' of our judgements about facts, like the practical 'ought' of ethics, is after all only definable in terms of what Kant called the autonomy of the will". In a Paper read at the Congress of Philosophy in Heidelberg in 1908 Royce clearly defines his philosophical position when he says that "all truth is indeed relative to the expression of our will and that the will inevitably determines for itself forms of activity which are objectively valid and absolute."

Now it seems to me that in giving a voluntarist setting to their philosophy of values they have accepted a questionable doctrine of the primacy of the practical over theoretical reason.

In the first place it is not clear how the principle of will can explain the whole of our mental life. We not only will and act but we also reflect upon the consequences of our actions. We feel satisfied or dissatisfied with the things around us. Again it is incorrect to say that instinctive reactions, dreams, inchoate moods and imaginations are in any intelligible sense of the term 'will' willed by anybody. As Dr. Höffding says "It was a fatal thing for the treatment of the problem of worth (Value) when Immanuel Kant reversed the relation and tried to derive the concepts of purpose and of worth

from the concept of the norm (i. e. of law—'of will'). This is a psychological impossibility"(Höffding—*The Philosophical problems*). Acting presupposes and depends upon knowing in the sense that no act would follow unless there was awareness howsoever dim and vague. It is a psychological illusion to suppose that in moments of actions, consciousness is held in abeyance. Ferrier says somewhere that awareness is a necessary accompaniment of all psychical states in varying degrees. As Croce says "A will independent of knowing is unthinkable. The Blind will is not will, the true will has eyes". (*Estetica* pp 55-56 ; W. Carr's Eng. Translation).

Will cannot be equated with the whole of mental life, and the implication that the practical reason has primacy over theoretical reason is equally unwarranted by actual facts. It is to create a dualism which simply does not exist in its own right but which is a convenient fiction. As Croce says "Are Knowledge and Will, thought and action two mental forms parallel and independent one of another (for this is what dualism means)? Is not the truth on the contrary that thought is thought of action and action is action of thought? Can we conceive pure intelligence void of will and action? What would it think? Can we conceive blind will and action void of thought? What would it do? There seems to be no other way of understanding the two terms except as distinct and united at the same time and therefore as opposites, reciprocally positive and negative by turns. Action is negation of thought and thought is negation of action, hence the one is not without the other; and their duality is not dualism but dialectic; the true unity is not immobility but activity, not pure being but becoming". (Quoted by Carr in '*Philosophy of Croce*.)

Croce thus conceives the two forms of mental life, the theoretical or the knowing and the practical or the volitional—acting as complementary halves of one concrete reality which is

mind. Let us take a circle and draw a diameter. Which of the two semicircles is prior to the other? The two arcs are continuous one with the other. Similarly perceiving, thinking, acting, etc., are continuous one with the other though logically distinct just as it is illegitimate to speak of the primacy of one semicircle over the other where the only meaning of either lies in the circle which together they form.

Aesthetic and intellectual values are free from the tyranny of volition. It is pure sophistry to say that the true and the beautiful are willed. Rather it would be nearer the truth to say that the true and the beautiful are intuited. It is destructive of intellectual and aesthetic values to root them in volition and I will try to show presently that voluntarist metaphysics is powerless to throw any light on ethical values which are supposed to be based on 'pure' and autonomous will.

The peculiarity of ethical propositions is that they are assertions about that unique property of things which is expressed by the term 'good' and the opposite property expressed by the term 'bad'. If we identify the statement "this is good" with the statement "This is willed", we are confusing two entirely different things and commit what is called by ethical philosophers like Moore a naturalistic fallacy. The spirit of the proposition "this is willed" is not ethical at all. It is legalistic. It has an air of authority. But with regard to authority we may raise a further question: Is it for good? Is it righteous? We all know that an authority which is an overt expression of will is often otherwise than good.

Moreover, knowledge of good and evil is derived intuitively. As Rashdall has put it, "Intuitionism is right in maintaining the ultimate unanalysable character of the ideas implied in our moral judgements—the ideas of right and wrong, good and evil—and consequently the intuitive or immediate character of our ultimate moral judgements" (*Ethics* pp. 76-77). He adds further "that all our intuitions are really judgements of value

i. e. judgements as to the ultimate value of different states of consciousness. In ultimate analysis all moral judgements may be reduced to such judgements of value'. From this it follows that the principle of will is ethically neutral. It may be good or it may be bad. It is a sheer delusion to derive the concepts of "good" and "evil" from will as such. Again will is not primary because will in its operation betrays an intellectual element and a purpose and it implies a forethought as well. As Bradley says "What we know as will implies relation and a process, and an unsolved discrepancy of elements. And even apart from that, such an appeal to will-in-itself is futile. In short an appeal to will either in metaphysics or in psychology, is an uncritical attempt to make play with the unknown".

I therefore, conclude that the values of Truth, Beauty and Goodness cannot be grounded upon or rooted in the principle of will which fails to justify its claims as a sure basis either in psychology or in metaphysics. A philosophy of values raised on the foundation of voluntarism betrays an inner self-contradiction and at the merest touch of logic is doomed like a house of cards.

Thought and Reality

(As viewed by Bradley and Bosanquet).

By

Prof. JYOTIS CHANDRA BANERJEE, M. A.,

Thought according to Hegel is a 'process of mediation' which can constitute a 'whole' since it has negative element in it. The universals are nothing but the 'pervading unity' of the particulars—they are not formed by thought as an abstraction from the particulars. Hegel views that the immediate and the mediate are not at all separable except by an abstraction. For him pure immediacy is meaningless. "There is nothing immediate which can not become mediated and vice versa". The process according to which thought proceeds to concreteness and totality in the system of Bradley and Bosanquet is fundamentally almost the same as in the doctrine of Hegel. But both of them depart from their great master Hegel, on the relation of thought to Reality. Hegel's doctrine of the 'Notion' intimately connects thought with Reality. The Notion seems to be complete and perfectly organised system of experience through the function of thought. The 'Notion of Being' in Hegel's system, being the most abstract and the most real, the highest and the lowest of the categories, thought has been co-extensive with all forms of experience, including immediacy—thought has the capacity of rising from the immediately 'given' or mere 'being' to the 'immediacy above', to the Absolute Being by means of its immanent dialectic. Bradley and Bosanquet attempt but fail to postulate the doctrine of thought as all-inclusive whole.

Bosanquet seems to be nearer to Hegel on this point than Bradley. For Bosanquet 'thought is conterminous with experience'. Thought's immanent dialectic according to him, functions in and through the 'concrete universal' and thereby leads

it nearer and nearer to the all-inclusive coherent Individual—but it ultimately fails to reach the goal since thought can not solve fully its relational character. But Bradley's process is different. His 'immediate experience' is quite distinct from thought or consciousness. Thought, according to Bradley, is essentially relational—its function is always to separate 'existence' from 'content'. It is analytical, discursive. Thought always falls short of Individuality. Our logical judgements can grasp only partial and fragmentary aspects of the ultimate judgement. The attainment of such an ideal realisation and comprehension of thought is what Bradley suggests as thought's suicide. What thought can utmost do is that it attains truth and Reality in varying degrees—and in this sense only thought may be said to be participating in the nature of perfect truth and Reality. But he cannot side with Hegel in asserting the judgement that 'thought attains an immediacy above the dialectic'.

Bradley views that ultimate Reality as systematic and individual Absolute whole and his conception rests on three points :— (1) Reality presents itself in 'immediate experience' which is felt as a totality and thereby non-relational in character. (2) Non-contradiction is the criterion of truth and Reality. He says, "Ultimately reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by the fact that, either in endeavouring to deny it, or even in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity". (3) There is an ascending order of the degree of unity and coherence as mediated by thought, and the all-inclusive Absolute Experience knows no distinction between 'existence' and 'content'.

Bosanquet also like Bradley considers non-contradiction as the absolute criterion of Reality. Everywhere there is contradiction but according to him contradiction is not a deadlock in a system, and this is what he explains by 'Negativity'

He remarks, "Negativity is simply the logical conscious expression of difference". (Log. Vol. 1.) Bosanquet is in agreement with Bradley to a large extent but he differs from him on this point: He comprehends Reality as an all-inclusive individual 'whole' which embodies all distinctness in a transcendent immediacy. The nature of consciousness for him, is 'to include', 'to be a whole', 'a world'. Moreover his concept of perfect individuality is based on the assumption that "the structure of knowledge as a whole presents more and more a non-contradictory or systematic and individual character, as larger and larger sweeps of reality are organised into it."

But such a view of thought and Reality is open to many objections. First, Russell's criticism against Lotze's doctrine of relation may well be directed against this Absolutism of Bradley and Bosanquet. The Absolutist's theory of judgement according to Russell, involves contradiction. That Bradley and Bosanquet hold the position that all predication involves contradiction, can hardly be doubted. If so, then how is it possible for the Reality to be non-relational? How is it possible for the Absolute 'somehow' to swallow up, to transform and transcend all relations? Any effort to deal with Reality involves us in infinite regress of terms and relations. All judgements separate 'existence' from 'content'—and thought as we have marked before, according to Bradley, never succeeds in eliminating contradiction. Bradley wants to avoid the difficulty by suggesting that 'the immediate subject of every judgment is not the whole of Reality but a limited portion'. Accepting this also, the theory does not get rid of contradiction. Supposing that we accept this and say that subject and predicate of the judgment are mere complementaries and not contradictories, we are confronted with the question, but what about, the immanent dialectic to the 'whole'? To keep up moving force of the dialectic we shall have to admit the view that the ultimate subject of every

judgement is ultimate Reality as a 'whole'. And on this ground only we can assert the contradictoriness of all predication; and as a matter of fact Bradley does actually accept this view in his *'Appearance and Reality'*. The whole theory as advocated by Bradley and Bosanquet, involves the confusion of two standpoints of view from which the Reality is estimated—one from the stand-point of the Absolute thinker who perceives the universe intuitively as a whole and another from the finite view-point which breaks up and necessarily breaks up the universe into piecemeal.

Further, Bradley denies all possibilities of external relations, but, according to him, the transcendence of relations is not the denial of relations. By admitting the internal distinctions in the Absolute, he has contradicted his own saying that the 'Absolute to be Absolute must be non-relational in the sense of denying or superseding all relations'. Because any sort of distinctions either internal or external, is not compatible and consistent with the non-relational character of the Absolute. Bradley's Absolute assimilates all relations, but assimilation of all relations does not mean 'supersession of relations'. And hence Bradley's Absolute can not be non-relational.

Another point to be noted in this connection is about the interpretation of the logical principle of Identity as given by Bradley and Bosanquet. Bosanquet seems to give a stress on 'identity' rather than on 'difference' except in *'The Principle of Individuality and Value'* where he discusses contradiction and negativity as the power of the dialectic. Bradley, on the other hand being influenced by his doctrine of immediate experience in which Reality is 'given' as a whole without relations, explains identity and difference as contradictory. He gives more importance to 'difference' than to the 'identity' aspect of thought. But we may safely suggest that bare identity is a tautology. Both the aspects of 'identity' and 'differ-

ence' are quite complementary in the system of thought. Bare negation and bare identity both are equally meaningless. Significant thought requires 'identity-in-difference'. All negations to be of any value in the judgement must have a positive meaning. This means that "in the end the negative judgment, as the affirmative, refers an ideal content to Reality" (cp. *Neti Neti* Judgement of Vedanta).

Secondly, we might point out that Bradley and Bosanquet have not given a proper notice to the objections urged against them by the Neo-Realists. We may not side with Neo-Realism in its reaction against the universal application of the internal theory of relations. We may not have sufficient ground for establishing the doctrine of external relations. But does this necessarily involve us in thinking that we have good reason to give an over-emphasis on the internality of relations and also to maintain the view that all relations are equally relevant as Bradley and Bosanquet suppose? Can we not think of varying degrees of relatedness? All objects to be known must be known in and through relations and relation must be internal since all judgement involves a subject-object relation. But does all relations exist in equal degrees of relatedness? As a matter of fact we do find clues to some such degree in our experiences. (Ref. Leighton, *Phil. Rev.* Vol. 23, 1914).

Next if we consider the objections from the Pragmatists, we find that Bradley and Bosanquet are not free from difficulty. Thought, according to Pragmatism, does not act merely in the role of breaking the coherence of a logical system. The function of thought according to this view is instrumental. And hence the mind being an instrument of action, the criterion of truth, according to this theory, lies on its 'workability', on 'does it work' and not on logical coherence and non-contradiction. Pragmatism contends, therefore, that

Absolutism gives an undue stress on the logical aspect of thought.

The contention of James Ward in his "*Naturalism and Agnosticism*" is almost the same, in principle, as that of Pragmatism. He points out the discontinuities in experience and "defends the claims of contingency in the universe as over against the necessity—e. g. in the 'concrete universal' of Bosanquet". He says, "The actual is wholly historical". "The historical is what we *understand* best, and what concerns most." (*Naturalism and Agnosticism*).

Bradley and Bosanquet meet the objection of Pragmatism by suggesting that thought is instrumental as a means only but 'the end is harmony and coherence'. They also maintain that the error of Pragmatism lies 'in getting itself too much engrossed in the genetic and psychological account of truth ignoring its metaphysical implications'. But "Absolutism overstresses the purely formal or logical aspect of thought at the expense of the valid claims of the teleological aspect"—can it be denied?

The opposition of Ward is mainly launched against Bosanquet's 'concrete universal' which is endowed with the 'power to take proper account of the unique and individual in experience'. Bradley's system because of his doctrine of immediate experience is not so much exposed to this attack as Bosanquet's. And Bosanquet accepts the challenge "Thought," for Ward, "gives only 'science', not existence; we cannot by piling up propositions secure the simplest 'position'." Henry Bergson was also confronted with this difficulty of the incapability of thought to apprehend the real; but he finds a solution in his '*intuition*'. The objection does not lie in forming the adequate notion of the uniformity of nature but in its application as an ultimate explanation of reality. Scientific laws being a mere generalisation of experiences lack in

giving us a full and 'adequate account of the unique character of events'.

Bosanquet meets Ward's objection by describing thought as something which takes all the concrete and unique aspects of our experience, "draws them out of their blankness and exhibits them as aspects of the difference made in a living world of contents". (*The Principle of Individuality and Value*). Thought is in part intuitive—"it always remains at home, as well as goes abroad." Thought somehow 'drags along the spontaneities and the unique character of individuals'—the universals of thought are, as Bosanquet remarks, true syntheses in differences and hence thought may be said to be real account of the Reality. He further maintains his position by clarifying his concept of 'concrete universal,' which we are afraid, rather makes his position more precarious than better. He simply places clearly the inherent weaknesses of his system. He drags us to his conclusion in the form of two alternatives, which, as it were, mutually exhaust the domain of metaphysics, either we shall have to accept Bosanquet's view of Reality or a universe of tiny Absolutes. Here also the same question of relation occurs. We may again suggest in the conclusion that our experience may be interpreted in terms of the internality of relations no doubt but not of equal validity and importance—it is always a question of varying degrees of relatedness and internality.

Can a quality be perceived without substance ?

By

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In the history of modern European philosophy Locke, as it is commonly known, started the distinction between the knowledge of qualities and that of substances by pointing out that while the qualities were known through simple ideas yielded by the senses, substances were known through complex ideas formed by the mind. This distinction was accepted by subsequent thinkers, even when they differed from Locke in many important respects. Standing on this distinction Berkeley tried to show, among other things, that sensation does not reveal to us material substances ; our belief in them is based on confused imagination and it cannot be rationally upheld. Hume also accepts the same distinction in casting doubt on our beliefs in all substances material, as well as spiritual when he points out that the idea of substance involves a belief in some necessary connection which sensation cannot yield. Assuming this distinction again some critics of Descartes complain that what Descartes' argument—*cogito ergo sum*—can legitimately prove is the truth of '*thinking*' and *not* that of a thinking *substance*.

The purpose of this short paper is to show that Locke's distinction is based on a faulty analysis of perception. It is attempted to show that the perception of qualities always involve some perception of substance.

But it will be difficult to prove this point without a preliminary ascertainment of what exactly is meant by 'substance' and in what sense the awareness of some substance is involved in that of a quality. Different functions have been assigned to a substance by different philosophers and even by

the same philosopher in different cases. It is necessary to distinguish them clearly in order to avoid some confusions.

(a) The simplest idea of a substance is 'that which is characterised by *one quality*' (b) A little more complex than this is in the conception of a substance as that which is the ground i. e. the cause of the quality (c) Again a substance is conceived with still greater complexity as that to which, not one, but several qualities belong and which consequently can be thought of as that which ties together the different qualities which are perceived together. (d) By introducing again the time element the static conception of substance comes to be developed into the dynamic one. A substance is, then, conceived as the synthesising factor underlying either a series of one kind of successive qualities or series of successive groups of different qualities.

Let us explain these different conceptions of substance more clearly. When we are aware of one quality only say, colour and also aware of the colour as *belonging to* something, we have an instance of the simplest idea of a substance as possessing one quality. In such a case the substance may be called according to historical terminology, the substratum or support of the quality. But the word substratum is apt to be a little ambiguous, because it can mean either simply 'that in which the quality exists' or 'that which is the ground or cause of the quality'. In some historical views, as those of Locke and the Naiyayikas, both of these senses are contained in the conception of substance. A substance is regarded by them as the container, as well as, the producer of the qualities. But it is necessary to keep these two senses apart for our present purpose. The conception of substance as the cause of a quality is, therefore, shown above separately from the first and given the second place. The third conception of substance is also found in Locke, when, for example, he describes how the idea of substance is formed by the mind. He says--"The

mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together ; which being presumed to belong to one thing and words being suited to common apprehensions and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject by one name ; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together : because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result ; which therefore we call substance." (*Essays concerning Human Understanding* Book II, Chapter XXIII). This conception of substance supplies to the mind the factor required for explaining the constant association which we have of different qualities. A red colour, a sweet smell, soft touch and sweet taste constantly perceived together suggest something that links them together and the idea of the mango-substance as the common repository of all the qualities (or the powers which can produce the ideas of the qualities in the mind) come to be formed.

But the idea of the mango-substance is, here, a factor synthesising only the co-existent qualities. In the idea of a mango, thought may not however, be confined only to co-existent qualities experienced together, but it may include in it the successive states of the mango, through the different stages of its development. Then green colour, hard touch, small size, sour taste, and other co-existing qualities form one group of qualities succeeded by another group of co-existent qualities consisting, say of red colour, soft touch, bigger size, sweet taste and smell etc. succeeded by, say, another group of such co-existent qualities. This is the conception of a substance

conceived as *one individual* lasting through different periods of its history and the changes of its qualities. This conception provides, therefore, a dynamic synthesis as opposed to the static synthesis of co-existent qualities as found in the just previous conception.

We distinguish these four different conceptions of substance as the most important, though we do not deny the possibility of further distinctions. Now what we want to point out is that whenever we perceive any quality, e.g. colour or touch or extension, we are also aware of the substance to which the quality belongs, and, therefore, *come to know substance in the first sense*. Scepticism regarding substance applies to the beliefs in substance in the last three senses and scarcely to the first.

The main ground on which Hume is sceptic about substance is that substance, in his conception, involves some necessary connection, say between itself and its qualities or among its different qualities; but such necessary connection can never be proved by experience and consequently the belief in a substance cannot be justified by reason.

It will be found from the above analysis of substance, that the question of necessary connection may arise only with regard to the last three conceptions of substance and not the first. When we think of a substance as the cause of its qualities, or as that which ties together different qualities or as that which synthesises also the successive states along with the co-existent ones, we may have to think of a necessary connection which cannot be sensed or perceived but has to be supplied by thought. But when we perceive a quality and are aware of its belonging to a thing, we are aware really of a thing characterised by the quality and that as immediately as the quality. There is then no thought of necessary connection between the quality and the thing. There is only the immediate apprehension of the thing so qualified, and this apprehension does not at once involve the

idea that the quality always or necessarily belongs to the substance.

Hume's scepticism fails, therefore, to cast doubt on our belief in a substance simply as a qualified thing. His theory rests on the theory of Locke that qualities only are known through perception. Let us, therefore, examine Locke's position.

Locke's chief argument is that we at first perceive through a simple idea of sense, a quality, say colour and being unable, then, to think how the colour can subsist by itself without a substance, we supply from mind the idea of the substance. But this argument seems to be faulty. If at first we could be immediately aware through sensation of a colour, the necessity of supposing a substance for it would not arise at all. Because the quality if known already by itself, would require no other support. Subsequent thought could only follow the lead of immediate awareness and recognize the independance of the quality which is revealed to sensation as existing without a substance.

If Locke's analysis were true, then the thought of a substance would never arise in the mind, there being no necessity for it. Or, we may say, looking at Locke's position from another angle of vision, that if a substance be that which can be known to subsist by itself, and if it be a fact, as Locke says, that colour etc., are sensed as such (without anything in which they exist), then these qualities should themselves be regarded as substances: Either, therefore, the awareness of a substance (as that to which the quality belongs) is involved in the very first awareness of a quality, or the substance can never be thought of. The position of Locke would, therefore, be embarrassing.

That we have the idea of a substance must be admitted by all. This idea can then be said to be given at the very time when a quality is known. If then a quality is known through

perception, then the substance in which it inheres must also be known perceptually.

If any one objects to this and says that immediate awareness does not reveal an object as a substance having a quality, we would point out that neither does it reveal the object as simply a quality. We may admit that the distinction between the quality and the substance is a subsequent work of analytic thought. Thought discovers by analysis, what was given in immediate awareness ; and when it thus isolates, in the sensed, the quality-factor, it must be aware of the substance-factor also. The awareness of a quality as such would be impossible without the awareness of a substance.

We may conclude, then, that the perception of a quality without its substance is not possible. This perceived substance may not be known as the cause of the quality or the synthesiser of other co-existent or successive qualities, but it is known at least as that which is characterised by that quality. If this conclusion be accepted then we can neither accept the idealism of Berkeley, in so far as it accepts Locke's view that a material substance is never perceived and attempts to show therefrom that the supposition of such a substance is unnecessary, nor accept the scepticism of Hume in so far as he also proceeds from Locke's analysis and shows that unperceived substance is beyond all proof. We have considered, here specially the case of external qualities and material substances. The arguments can be applied *mutatis mutandis* to mental qualities and substances. If reflection, as Locke states, reveals to us simple ideas regarding the operation of the mind, the question arises here also, whether we are aware, at the first instance, only of the operations, like perception and will. If it were possible to perceive them as such, no difficulty would arise, of thinking each of it as a self-subsistent fact, and the thought of a substance underlying any of these would be uncalled for. The very fact, however, that we have the idea

of a substance to which thinking or willing belongs shows that the operation of the mind somehow is felt to be belonging to an operating something. Belief in a thinking or willing substance must be admitted to be as immediate and fundamental as thinking or willing. If this is so, it would also be found that Descartes' contention that the awareness of thinking is awareness of a thinking substance is quite justified; 'substance' being understood, here also in the simplest sense shown above.

Alexander's Theory of Knowledge of other minds :

A Critical Examination

By

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We may best approach Alexander's conception of the character of the experience on the strength of which we believe in the existence of other minds by noting first what according to him it is not and then proceeding to note what he thinks it exactly is. He has found the traditional inference theory untenable ; cognition of other minds must, therefore, he thinks, be possible only by a direct experience of their existence.¹ But he distinguishes this direct experience both from 'contemplation' of the external and from 'enjoyment' of one's own self.

His exclusion of 'enjoyment' as a characteristic of this experience cannot be questioned. For, evidently, one can only 'enjoy' oneself in an immediate awareness which is an *awareness* of oneself and not an awareness *of* oneself and which requires no significant relation—even a relation of immediate presentation so often denoted by the preposition 'of'—with something distinct from oneself in any sense whatever. To apprehend other minds, on the contrary, one must, because of their distinctness from one's own mind, come into a relation essentially of the 'of' kind with them, and can not, therefore, be said to 'enjoy' them.

But his exclusion of 'contemplation' does not seem to rest on a sound basis. His argument is : "We do not contemplate our own mind as if it were an external object, much less the

1. Alexander : *Space, Time and Deity*. Vol. II, 31, 37.

mind of another. Thus I am not aware of B's mind as I am aware of his body, so that I should be able to inspect it and say what it is."² This statement seems really to put two quite distinct reasonings into one: first, that since we do not apprehend even our own minds by contemplation, it should be far less a fact that we should apprehend other minds by this process or form of cognitive experience, and second, that since contemplation is only of external objects, it can not be the means of our knowledge of fellow minds. Now both these reasonings are easily seen to be very defective.

The first runs on the presupposition that what I can not do to myself, I can much less do to another, which can, however, only be true if the act in question requires more intimacy towards the object than I have towards myself and if it be granted that epistemically another's mind is less intimate and more remote to one than one's own. While the latter would always be accepted as true, the former condition is certainly not satisfied in the case under consideration here. Contemplation, the act in question, being awareness of an 'other' object, is not a more but a less intimate act than enjoyment, which is essentially self-awareness. And, consequently, my not adopting, or even not being able to adopt, the less intimate of the two towards my own self is no ground that we should not be able to adopt it towards the remoter object, another person's mind.

The second reasoning would be correct if it were presupposed that by contemplation is to be understood only sense-awareness of external objects. But since it is generally acceded, particularly by realists, to which group Alexander himself belongs, that objects may be directly presented to the mind otherwise than by the intermediation of the sense

2. Ibid. p. 37.

organs, it would be wrong for him to suppose that all external objects must be contemplated through the senses alone and to forget that objects of contemplation may be physical as well as non-physical and that other minds, if they are not physical, are also not my states or processes but external to me and therefore capable of direct apprehension, if at all, by contemplation alone.

However, let us now come to what according to Alexander is the exact character of the direct experience which affords us our apprehension of other minds. "The experience", he says, "is a very simple and familiar one, the experience of sociality and has a double aspect. Our fellow human beings excite in us the social or gregarious instinct, and to feel socially towards another being is to be assured that it is something like ourselves."³

He emphasises that these two aspects into which he analyses the experience of sociality—the instinctive and the cognitive—are not successive. "We do not", he writes, "first apprehend that another being is a mind and then respond to him, whether positively as in affection or negatively as in aversion; but in our tenderness or dislike we are aware of him as like ourselves."⁴ Of course placing the instinctive aspect temporally prior to the cognitive is out of the question; for in that case the latter would be more justifiably considered derivative of and hence inferred from the former.

But when Alexander proceeds to explain how in the instinctive there is always necessarily the cognitive activity, careful reading discloses that the latter relation of succession, while the one more contradictory to the main principle of direct apprehension, has been perhaps unconsciously but effectively adhered to throughout the argument in spite of its logical conclusion in the inference theory.

3. *Ibid* p. 32.

4. *Ibid* p. 32.

What, it must be asked, to perceive this contradiction in Alexander's thought, does he denote by the instinctive aspect in our experience of sociality? And, secondly, what exactly is the meaning of his saying that in the excitement of this instinct in us there is an assurance that the object is a mind like our own? We shall seek answers in his own words where he writes:

"We do not first apprehend that another being is a mind and then respond to him, whether positively as in affection or negatively as in aversion; but in our tenderness or dislike we are aware of him as like ourselves. Just as the emotion of fear or the instinct to run away from certain things discovers them to be dangerous, the cognitive apprehension being given to us only in so far as we practise a certain response, so in seeking the company, or avoiding it, of our fellows we are aware of them as like ourselves. But while without the social instinct we should not be led to this apprehension, we do not experience the satisfaction of the instinct of sociality till we have the experience that the creature towards which we act socially reciprocates our action, either by cooperation or rivalry. The emotion of sociality is a double-sided one; it is a response on our part to the other being, confirmed by a response on his part to us. The double experience is necessary to sociality, it takes two persons to make friends or two persons to make a quarrel. Without the instinctive response we should seek nothing from the other; without the cooperation we should not be aware of him in the fullest sense as our fellow".⁵

From this, Alexander appears to denote by the instinctive aspect of our experience of sociality something essentially composed of two events taken together, a response on our

5. Ibid. pp. 32-33

part to our fellows consisting in affectionate company or in disliking avoidance, and our experience of their response to us by cooperation or rivalry. Again, since one of them, the latter, is said to confirm the other, the former, and to complete the satisfaction of the instinct, the former must be temporally prior to it and precede it and it follows in time.

Further, the third sentence in the last quoted statement seems to place in temporal succession, first, reciprocation on the part of other minds to us, completing the excitement of the social instinct, and, then, our apprehension of them as like ourselves. The first of these, too, by our observation in the last paragraph, must be preceded by the response on our part to them, while this response, evidently, is impossible without a prior cognitive awareness of the object, the fellow beings, though not therein recognized as such, like ourselves.

This order of things is obviously unfavourable to Alexander's own direct apprehension theory and suggests, quite on the contrary, the theory of inferential knowledge as more fitting the facts. For even looking at it in a general way, some behaviouric events are here held to be the necessary antecedent conditions of awareness of other beings as fellow minds.

Looking at it a little more closely, Alexander can not consistently maintain that the apprehension of other minds occurs 'in' or simultaneously with and is therefore not inferred from their reciprocation to our response. For, firstly, there is a further event, my experience of their reciprocation without which the sociality-experience can not be complete and to which yet their reciprocation itself must be prior. Secondly, were simultaneity maintainable, the absence of reciprocation ought not to affect the apprehension in question by virtue of its consequent independence and it should be possible that the latter may occur even without the occurrence of the former. This, however, neither is borne out by empirical fact nor would

be acceptable to Alexander for whom without the reciprocation we should not be aware of the fellow being in the full sense as our fellow.

Apart from this, however, were even this simultaneity accepted for a moment, still, so long as our apprehension of other persons' bodies is held to be temporally prior to our apprehension of their minds, the greater weight would always lie with the inference rather than with the acquaintance theory.

The only remaining argument which might help to explain and justify Alexander's position is his analogy of fear in the last quoted statement. But it too, while avoiding the presumption of an inference between the reciprocation and the apprehension of other minds, still raises the presumption of an inference from behaviouric phenomena, consisting this time in the behaviour of our own selves towards other beings, (which Alexander, it seems, would have as uncontrollable), rather than their behaviour towards us. Moreover, Alexander in drawing this analogy, has sought to use it beyond its legitimate scope. For if the instinct of fear or the running away from certain things discovers them to be dangerous, our seeking or avoiding the company of our fellow beings, within the bounds of proper analogy, should only discover them to be useful or harmful, pleasant or unpleasant, which physical things may be as well as minds; no discovery that they are minds like ourselves is in any way implied or necessarily associated with it. On the top of all this, the facts regarding the relation between the emotion of fear and the discovery of danger, to which he appeals, are quite the reverse of what he describes them to be—apparently still under the spell of the James-Lange theory which has long ago exploded for ever. The very tremors of the explosion have died away, and it is cruel to dig the dead back out of the grave only to batter its skeleton further into pieces a second time and probably to enjoy the mere fun of it.

Thus Alexander, while professing to thereby argue out a theory of direct acquaintance of other minds, brings forth evidence that in fact only tends to disprove it and to prove the traditional theory sought to be rejected, throughout depends upon inadequate and ill-framed arguments and thus succeeds only in bewildering the careful and exacting reader into a hotchpotch of irreconcilable statements, neither leading, to any extent, towards a new theory headed for, nor content with, nay, even disfiguring, the plain doctrine of traditional repute.

The Spirit and Life of Philosophy.

(*ABSTRACT*)

BY

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The Spirit of Philosophy is seeking truth for love of truth ; the life of it is living truth for love of truth. Truthfulness is one and same with love, sincerity, purity, righteousness, loveliness, goodness, harmony and law-abiding. All these are attributes of the life of philosophy. Seeking truth for truth, speaking truth for truth, and doing right for right are the A, B, C, of right philosophy. The literal meaning of philosophy is love of wisdom. Love is sublime emotion, free from passion, acting without seeking fruit of action; wisdom is high mentality, selecting best means as well as best ends. Love of wisdom is the spiritual wedding of love and wisdom. That wedding secures continuous harmony between love and wisdom which keeps action pure, love free from corruption by passion, and reason free from clouding by "I" consciousness, which is illusion of separateness, and parent of pride, prejudice and selfishness. The offspring of the said wedding is right life, which is truthful, good and true. By living right life for love of wisdom, the lover acquires self-knowledge, i. e., the knowledge of his real SELF, which is in tune with God—the Truth. Accurately speaking he does not *acquire* knowledge of real Self, God and Truth; he realizes, he attains Self-realization, God-realization and Truth-realization. Such is the secret of love of wisdom, which is the life of truth and of wisdom.

"Truth is within ourselves. It takes no rise
From outward things, what's'er you may believe,

There is an inmost centre in ourselves
 Where truth abides in fullness, and to know
 Rather consists in finding out a way
 Whence the imprisoned splendour may escape,
 Than in effecting entrance for a light
 Supposed to be without". —*Browning*

Goethe shows how and why up-lifted souls recognise the reign of God—the Truth.

"Who dares to name His Name, or belief in Him
 proclaim?"

Veiled in mystery as He is, the All-Enfolder !

Gleams through the mind His Light.

Feels the Lifted soul His might !

Dare it then deny His Reign?"

Uplifted (earth-bound) souls do not feel His Might, and on that account, some deny His reign, and some accept it on blind faith. The old Aryan philosophers were *up-lifted* souls; they felt His Might, followed His Guidance, lived for Love of Wisdom, Truth, Righteousness, and thereby realised true self which is one with God—the Truth. They exclaimed, "I am Brahma" : (Aham Brahmasmi). "I am that" : (So ham). "Thou art That:" (Tat Twam Asi).

Modern philosophy, science and thought demand demonstration: they say, "No affirmation without demonstration". They fail to see that self-realization cannot be demonstrated by any one man to any other man; each one ought to demonstrate it to himself, by self-realization. All that others can do for him is to show him the way to qualify or prepare himself for self-realization by means of purification and righteousness, which is living for truth by love of wisdom. The life of philosophy and of religion are one and same. It is the votaries of names and forms, of theories and dogmas on each side that fight amongst themselves as well as with the votaries of the other side.

"For forms of faith let graceless zealots fight,
His can't be wrong whose life is in the right".

"He serveth God (Truth) who serveth man;
There is no other way.

"He findeth God (Truth) who findeth Self (real Self)
By service day by day."

The magnificent ideal of the service of man is a stepping stone; the final ideal is good will to all beings. It is clearly expressed in the meditation of Buddha, "So adjust your heart that you long for the weal and welfare of all beings". The final realization of the spirit and life of philosophy and religion is that there is no such thing as separate existence; there is only one existence or reality or truth, and all sense of separation is an illusion. Aryan philosophy recognises that illusion as "the great illusion". The most memorable achievement of modern philosophy is the work of Bergson. He has handled a number of illusions of vital importance. His "*Creative Evolution*" is an epoch-making work, which approaches the Spirit and Life of philosophy and religion nearer than any other work of modern philosophy I know of. He explains how philosophy discloses the life of the Spirit. That disclosure is the spirit and life of philosophy.

An Examination of the Implications of Immortality

(ABSTRACT)

By

DEVABRATA GHOSE.

By immortality we may mean either the imperishability of the substratum, if there be any, of conscious life, or the persistence of personality or conscious life itself after death. It is the latter that is of any importance to the believers in a future life.

Immortality of human soul can be upheld neither on philosophical nor on scientific grounds. The arguments for an imperishable spiritual substance have been effectively disposed of by Hume. The moral arguments for the continuance of personality or psychical life also do not stand to reason ; they satisfy the emotional cravings of sick souls rather than the demands of logic. Nor can the imperishability of personal life be upheld on empirical evidence, the methods employed and the results attained by so-called Psychical Research being scientifically unsatisfactory. The belief in immortality is, thus, an irrational belief fondly cherished by the weak-minded ; it springs not from scientific reasoning but from the emotional texture of certain diseased minds, the fear of the unknown playing the most important part in its formation.

Monism Versus Monotheism

By

M. C. PANDAY.

The distinction between Monism and Monotheism is one of standpoint, the former belonging to Metaphysics and the latter to Theology. Philosophy wishes to ascertain absolute truth behind the phenomenal world while Theology seeks to validate the rich and fruitful experience of one's communion with God as expressed in ideals of truth, beauty and goodness. The tendency of monistic philosophy is towards absolutism in which the phenomenal world loses its independence and the Ultimate Principle is lifted above the categories of space, time and causality, and is regarded as impersonal. Monotheism, on the other hand, believes in a Personal God who is the creator, ruler and moral governor of the phenomenal world and is endowed with qualities like omniscience, omnipotence, eternity and grace in consonance with the needs of a moral government of the world.

The Upanisads know nothing of the absolute opposition of monism and monotheism nor does the Gita as has been advocated by certain mediaeval Vaisnava schools to establish the superiority of the Personal God. In the Taittiriya Upanisad (2-7) and in the Rama-Uttaratipini Upanisad (1-7) the distinction is opposed and explained. It is established in the Upanisads that everything is ultimately established in Atman or Brahman (Ch. U. 6. 2. 1 ; 3. 14. 1) ; but at the same time the self of the individual was identified with the Brahman. In the conception of the *Antaryami* Brahman, in the theory of *prasasana* or regulation of the universe by law, in the doctrine of grace to be found in Katha and Svetasvatara, and in the theory of Brahman as Isa or Lord we have important advance made towards a theistic interpretation of belief on absolutistic basis. The Upanisads do

not indeed make God a transcendental entity after the manner of western deism but they make provision for divine grace—a theory which was elaborated in the Gita by the addition of the theory of periodic incarnation. The Gita has also abolished for all times sectarian claims by conceding that God can be approached in manifold ways and that toleration is the basis of both ethical and spiritual life.

The Ethical and philosophical Significance of The Bhagavad-Gita.

By

N. K. VENKATESAN.

The time, the place and the circumstances in which the teaching contained in the Bhagavad-Gita was communicated by Sri Krishna to Arjuna must be taken into account in realising the ethical and philosophical significance of this piece of literary work, which forms part of the Bheeshma Parva in the Epic Mahavarata. On the battle-field of Kurukshetra, Arjuna, facing the mighty odds against him, laid down his arms and declared to his divine charioteer that for the sake of a kingdom he would not kill so many kinsmen and warriors, including among them his own preceptors and dearest kinsmen and friends. He might gain a kingdom, but with the devastation incidental to a bloody war, Dharma would perish, as men would die and women would be left behind. Social and moral considerations were prominent in his mind when he refused to fight against his foes for the sake of the kingdom and kingly power, which are but transient in the marching history of Time, in the Eternal Universe of God. Sri Krishna was hard put to it. He had to make Arjuna fight and he had to convince him that he would be right and moral in thus fighting against his kinsmen. Arjuna was not a disciple who required

to be told that his Dharma, as a Kshatriya, was to fight. His immediate position was that his conscience created an internal conflict in his mind. Was he now to act or not to act? The doubt was not about his Dharma and about his Karma. Sri Krishna had, therefore, to convince Arjuna that his Karma in thus having set himself to kill his kinsmen for the sake of the kingdom, was in consonance with the dictates of Dharma. Arjuna had this fundamental doubt about his Duty at this critical juncture, because he thought he was the agent and the instrument of Karma. Sri Krishna's whole teaching was directed towards showing to Arjuna by a series of arguments, that he was the instrument of the Lord and not the independent agent that he imagined he was. In the tenth chapter, Sri Krishna speaks of the all-pervasiveness of God and in the Super-vision the Lord gives of Himself to Arjuna, He shows to Arjuna by an ocular demonstration that Arjuna was to be the instrument and not the agent in this affair. Arjuna could have and should have at once surrendered to the Lord and taken up arms. But he did not. More teaching was needed before Arjuna could be induced to surrender himself wholly and agree to take up arms. It is not till the end of the eighteenth chapter that the doubt is really cleared in the mind of Arjuna. It was not the mere dictate of Sri Krishna that made Arjuna agree to fight, but it was his conviction that his fighting against his mighty foes was the true call of Duty, in the interests of Dharma.

The hormone in purposivistic psychology and karma in the Gita.

By

P. S. NAIDU,

The paper attempts to show that the theoretical foundations of Purposivistic Psychology have been anticipated in the Bhagavd Gita. Prof. McDougall's Purposivism is usually believed to have been the outcome of his doctrine of Instincts, but its ultimate source is the Hormic principle. This principle recognises the universal operation of the Horme or the primeval urge. The McDougallian theory of instinct is merely one special aspect of the Horme. The force of the Horme and its universal operation were recognised by the Great Teacher of the Gita. The insistence upon action, the identification of action with renunciation, the teaching that renunciation *in* action, not *of* action is the highest ideal of conduct and the injunction that even the liberated would do work—these could only be understood properly on the hypothesis that the Hormic urge for action is natural to the human mind and that it is right according to the highest ethical standards.

Concurrence in Indian philosophy and modern thought

By

M. V. V. K. RANGACHARI

The disinterested pursuit of truth regardless of consequences was the essence of Pagan Knowledge. It has had no church as by law established which it was bound to maintain. In the modern world the fundamentals of dogma and the vested interests of the historical creeds are under severe tests. Modern thought is wiping out the boundaries between Physics and Metaphysics. Oriental Impersonalism finds acceptance in the theories of certain Mathematical Scientists. The dotted inklings of a half-buried Vedanta may be linked up by -the concreteness of existence, and a full rich Yogic life may yet evolve into individual and collective manhood.

Nature is not wedded to the maintenance of any particular form or modification and is indifferent to the interpretations we put on her. The homocentric view of the orthodox Christian life is fast going out of fashion, and there are several western cultured minds that hold to nature, which remains heathen, theological bias notwithstanding.

In spite of the charge that it has been over-worked, the possibilities of the application of the Gita Philosophy to individual and collectivised life are not exhausted. It may have something to contribute to the success of some of the experiments in collectivised life carried on in our time. If the Bible, according to Luther, was a nose of wax that can be twisted to any shape, Hindu textual authorities (Prasthāna-traya) are more plastic and their spirit, more fluid.

In the manner of the formulation of the social code, Indian thought kept before itself the constant need for reserva-

tions. Its commandments are less categorical and expressed in more comprehensive Sutras. The principle of Ahimsa was put side by side with the propriety of sacrifice. Egoism is the source of polluting reason but the disinterested discharge of duty frees one from all responsibility. Reason is the guide of life, not the cancer of the soul. Bishop Berkeley's phrase 'cool self-love' perceives the external world as the self, as the Gita sings "Atmaupamyena sarvatra samam pasyati" (VI. 32). "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" (Roman. Ch. XIII. 9).

The drive against Christianity in Germany on racial principles is an over-stressed affair tyrannising over certain people, and affecting the freedom of thought and expression. That is not the final word in German life. The Russian movement against Christian philosophy springs from a different motive-force. While Germany denounces the detached other worldly tendencies of religious teaching, the Soviet is concerned with the possessive instincts of capitalist Christendom. In either case the attack on philosophy is on economic fronts. There is an inseparable partnership between God and Mammon. If the Church is losing hold on the people, it is because it failed to cope with the great emergencies of life. If the gospel of peace does not prevail when war threatens, if the 'will-to-power' is not curbed in politics and business, if the poor are not protected against their economic oppressors, it is impotent philosophy unable to handle issues of the gravest moral significance.

But aggressive atheism that wiped out property and social ties errs on the other side. The violent destruction of the personality in the craze for mass-production is the worse evil. Christ's teaching may not be a code of permissible conduct for a large community, and the apprehensions of Dean Inge may prove true. There may be some other mode of thought which albeit addressed to the individual, may yet apply to

collective life. This is a period of crisis in the world-life. The true glory of man is in his capacity for feelings of love, friendship, co-operation and service, to all of which reason is a noble guide. Not by negation, not by turning away from the concrete particulars of life as illusions, but by synthesis, by growing comprehension alone may the inconcurrence the Dvandas of life be cleared. In the concurrence of this, that, and the other will ultimately spring the wholesome currents of Indian Philosophy and modern thought.

The Function of Dialectic.

By

MAKHANLAL MUKHERJI

The Approach through Doubt.

The word Dialectic originally means discourse and represents the typical form of thinking, for not to speak of philosophic debates, even the single thinker in his solitary meditations is debating with himself.

The philosophical attitude that is born of this thinking consideration of things begins not with wonder as Aristotle said, but with doubt. This doubt is a form of self-reflection that will not take things on trust. It is not, however, the blank doubt of the skeptic, but in a way the methodical doubt of Descartes which consists in doubting whatever seems to be doubtful.

Dr. Coffey takes methodical doubt in the sense of fictitious doubt and distinguishes it from what he calls real or universal doubt. He criticises Descartes for misconceiving the philosophical method to be the Real doubt (in his sense) instead of its being methodical doubt. For, according to him the

validity neither of the realistic instinct nor of the mathematical truths can be really or positively doubted.

But Descartes' method of doubt is universal in a metaphysical sense and not in the epistemological sense of Dr. Coffey. Descartes' formula 'Cogito ergo sum' must be similarly metaphysically interpreted as Gentile does.

The nature of doubting activity consists in the movement of reason from a thesis to an antithesis without selecting either, in the disjunction of opposites that remains in a state of suspense.

The Search for a Criterion.

Since it is doubt that casts on all sides the seeds of contradiction, we want to overcome contradictions by taking that to be true which is not contradicted.

Nothing short of non-contradiction can be the test of truth or reality—this position stated and defended from the standpoint of Sankara.

Bradley also finds the absolute criterion of reality in non-contradiction, but in his system, the criterion will not work. The principles of Bradley are sound, but he seems to falter in drawing the inevitable conclusions that almost run square with the position of Sankara. Prof. Alexander's remarks can be quoted in support in this connection.

§ Dialectic as the function of the criterion of non-contradiction.

This ideal of self-consistency and self-sufficiency which is the first fruit of non-contradiction as the criterion of reality can only be reached through the function of the Dialectic as the science of possible concepts. The negative judgment is shown to be an affirmation of disjunction and the possible which remains as an implicit term in a negative judgment becomes explicit in the disjunctive forms of the Dialectic.

Philosophical message of modern Science

By

N. N. DAS GUPTA.

To us nature is mystery. Two alternative solutions have been offered—both ending in failure science being too mechanistic, philosophy being too speculative. Modern has revolutionised the outlook by presenting a balance between the two. Present day science leaning towards Idealism.

According to the new theory of quanta nature, in certain of its aspects, is something which is destroyed by observation. Each observation destroys the bit of universe observed, and so supplies knowledge only of a universe which has already become a past history. "The theory of Relativity" declares the world we see is our subjective selection from the objective reality.

No distinction between secondary and primary qualities is tenable. The resolution of the material world into waves involves some complexes. The conception of cycle universe is not without contradiction. Einstein's new conception of space and time as guiding the modern thought and focusing the nature of the universe.

Conclusion : Controversy between free will and causation. Free will marking the failure of scientific causation — where philosophy takes the lead.

Metaphysical Vindication of Moral Autonomy

By

D. L. DE.

1. Freedom is the *conditio sine qua non* of morality. All the interests of moral consciousness are undeniably bound up with the assertion of freedom. Any scientific explanation to prop up a pseudo-morality is doomed to failure. The living throbbing experience of the moral man—contrition and retribution, approbation and reward, all the grief and humiliation of his life, all its joy and exaltation—imply an ineradicable conviction that his destiny is, in its grand outline, in his own hands, to make or to mar it, as he will. A man cannot escape from the imperative of duty without ceasing to be a man. All the passion of his moral experience gathers itself up in the conviction of his infinite and eternal superiority to nature. Engulfed in the necessity of nature, he could still conceive himself as living the life of nature, or a merely animal life, but no longer as living the characteristic life of man, i. e., a life in free obedience to a consciously conceived ideal.

2. The grand characteristic of the moral life of man, is obligation. The conception of obligation, with its implicate of freedom, is not an artificial product, or a foreign importation into the universe. It is a genuine and authentic exponent of the universe itself. It is the voice of reason—the voice of universal reality. Absolute determinism which would choke its utterance is a libel not only upon human nature, but upon the universe itself. Our moral nature is inexorable in its demands and relentless in its penalties for failure to satisfy them. To resolve the 'ought' into 'is' would be to falsify the healthy moral consciousness of mankind.

3. Freedom, thus, is a patent fact minus which moral judgment becomes a polite fiction. Freedom is another name for teleological determination which is an essential feature of a self-seeking and self-distinguishing consciousness. Determinism: which is based upon sensationalistic metaphysics refutes itself by overshooting the mark and proving too much: by resolving the subject of experience into an abstraction it denies the reality of experience altogether. Indeterminism, too, by denying all rational connection between human actions, contradicts the plainest deliverances of the unsophisticated moral consciousness. Freedom, in the sense of self-determination, can fairly satisfy the demands of morality.

4. A negative, as well as a positive, vindication of freedom is possible—the former by the condemnation of the categories of science as insufficient, the latter by the provision of higher categories for its explanation. Even if we fail to formulate a theory of freedom, or categorise the moral life, we might still vindicate its possibility.

That the problem of freedom is ultimately a metaphysical one, is indicated by the fact that all deterministic theories base themselves, either explicitly or implicitly, upon a definite metaphysic. The materialistic metaphysic makes no room for freedom, or self-determination. Evolutionism too, has closely trodden on the heels of materialism in denying freedom. Moral life is interpreted as a series of adjustments of the individual to his environment. All pantheistic systems energetically maintain that man's conception of moral freedom is an illusion, destined to disappear in an adequate knowledge of the universe, or of the true self.

The connection between the interpretation of human life with the general metaphysical theory is obvious enough. The psychological theory of determinism is logically dependent upon metaphysical empiricism or sensationalism.

If I am merely the series, bundle or mass of sensations and appetites, desires, affections, and passions which constitute my experience ; if, in short, my existence is entirely phenomenal, then the phenomena which are "me" can be accounted for, or refunded into their antecedents, like any other phenomena which are animals or things.

Here then emerges the sole possibility of a metaphysical vindication of freedom—namely, in another than the empirical account of moral self. The nature of the self is a metaphysical question and must be investigated as such. The nature and function of the self is the pivotal problem of morality and knowledge alike. We have to choose between an empirical and transcendental solution of both problems. If, on the one hand, the phenomenal states constitute the self and exhaust its nature, the case for freedom is lost. If, on the other hand, the self is something over and above the successive experiences, if, in short our moral experiences presuppose at each stage the presence and operation of a permanent self, the case for freedom is made good.

That the latter, and not the former, is the true statement of the case, has been finally proved by the transcendental analysis of experience. The empirical view, when offered as a metaphysic, is at once seen to be inadequate. Neither the moral nor the intellectual man can be resolved into his experience. We must regard the moral, equally with the intellectual life, as the product of the activity of the self. Moral experience does not mean merely its resolution into a series of states, but the gathering up of these in the continuous and single life of an identical self. Determinism gives a mere anatomy of the action. Under its dissection, the living whole of the action itself is dissolved into its dead elements ; thus the constitutive synthetic principle of the ethical life is done away with. That principle is the moral personality to which the action must be referred if we should

see it as a whole and from within. Motives, circumstances, temperament and character—the several parts of the determinist whole—all imply such an activity of the self, if they are to enter as living factors into the moral situation. And the self which is shown to be the source of this original and formative activity is thereby proved to be free.

The transcendental proof is the necessary complement of the empirical view. For the question of questions in metaphysics is: How is experience possible? Experience, not being self-explanatory, requires to be explained. The empirical self is not ultimate, but only phenomenal. The psychologist is only concerned with the empirical process. But if, in an intellectual reference, it can be shown that the presupposition of knowledge is a constant activity on the part of the self in the synthesis of the presentational data; that, without a unifying self, the ordered unity of experience would be impossible, it is no less evident that, without a similar synthetic activity on the part of a single central rational self, the unity of moral experience would be impossible. The self weaves the web of its own experience, intellectual and moral. Out of wants, out of the provocations of sensibility, the self by an activity of appropriation constitutes motives of its own activity. To press the empirical view, is to rest in a superficial view when a deeper view is possible and necessary. The phenomenal self may be regarded as the mere sum of motive forces, of tendencies and counter-tendencies whose resultant describes its life. But when we ask what a motive is, we find that it is nothing apart from the self; it is mine, I have made it. I am not merely the permanent deposit of tendencies. I am the theatre of the entire process; it goes on within me and is conducted by me.

Hence the well-marked limits of psychological explanation. The life of man, which is essentially a personal life,

is regarded by psychology as an impersonal stream of thought, a series of phenomenal states of consciousness. But metaphysics must correct the abstractness of psychology generally, and must review the moral life from the standpoint of that selfhood which, as unifying principle, is not to be phenomenolised, because, without its constant operation, there would be no phenomenal process at all. Hamlet without Prince is no less possible than the drama of mental life without a mind. The subjective or personal reference constitutes the very form of consciousness. It is only by hypostatizing experience or consciousness that the case for psychology without a soul seems plausible at all.

We have now to consider the meaning of psychological phenomenon, to see the necessity of this subjective reference. We speak of conscious states. But the state is not conscious of itself, it is a state of my consciousness. Abolish me and it ceases to exist; to separate it from the individual mind is to contradict its very nature and to destroy it. We speak of mental phenomena. But what is a phenomenon that appears to no mind? To phenomenolise the self, to objectify the subject, to reduce the I to a complex of presentations is impossible, for the simple reason that an unphenomenal self is necessary to the existence of phenomena. The resolution of the subject into a series of presentations would be equivalent to saying that there are phenomena which appear to no one, objects that are over against nothing, presentations that are never presented.

5. The objective view of mental life is thus seen to be self-contradictory and suicidal. The phenomenal reality stands or falls with the reality of the transcendental self. If the self did not do everything, if it were not present in every presentation, it could never emerge as the product of their

aggregation. No combination of zeroes will produce a number.

Psychology may confine itself to a statement of the law of the mind; but an ultimate explanation must take account of the mind itself, as the source of that activity. Psychological terms, such as apperception, association, etc., are inexplicable without a reference to a permanent organic centre of unity.

The theory that "all is sensation" is a rank absurdity. Can we explain how the particular sensation can acquire a wholly new kind of independence, and come to measure the worth of other sensations, or constitute the attitude in which they are apprehended?" (Ward, *Mind*, N. S. vol. II, p. 77.)

When we pass from the intellectual to the emotional and volitional life, the reality of the subject, and the impossibility of phenomenalising it, become still more obvious. It is in the emotional and conative life that the ego may be said with unmistakeable emphasis to posit itself. In the intellectual life, the subject is content to spend its entire activity in equipping us for the mastery of the object, so much so that its own existence is almost inevitably lost in the vision of the world. Feeling and activity are always subjective and sensations always objective. Hence the duality of consciousness, or the antithesis of subject and object, is fundamental. Only the extreme desire to make psychology a natural science will account for the thorough, but suicidal, simplification of the mental life which is accomplished by the reduction of feeling and volition to cognitional elements. The fundamental unity of the mental life is to be found not in the object, but in the subject, the elements of whose common life are not to be reduced to one another. And, if, in the cognitional life, the subject seems to be lost in the object, in feeling and in volition the subject becomes the prime reality.

The reality of the moral life is bound up with the reality of human freedom, and the reality of freedom with the integrity of moral personality. If I am a person, an ego on my own account, I am free; if I am not such a person or ego, I am not free.

SECTION OF PSYCHOLOGY.

A standardised group test of intelligence in vernacular

By

SHYAM SWAROOP JALOTA.

A battery of nine test-elements was selected and given to about 1,500 High School and College students at Lahore (1934-'35). This paper reports upon the age and grade norms found in the abovesaid investigation. A table of percentile ratings is given as the same has considerable peculiar advantages in practice. An analysis of the various test element scores was also carried out, and separate grade-norms are also given for the convenience of comparative studies by other scholars. Typical illustrations of the materials, tables, diagrams, etc. are given.

Basis of induction

By

S. K. BOSE.

Various theories of probability have been discussed and found unsatisfactory to explain why we believe that which has happened in a particular way in a vast number of instances will also happen in a similar way in the next instance. Biological and psychological consideration of the problem provide a basis for such belief.

Psychology of artistic creation

By

RABINDRANATH GHOSH.

A great urge for the artistic creation in the mind of the artist. Various theories. The attainment of perfection. The empathy theory supports the feeling of the artist to be one with object of art. The art—the artistic manner, expression and end—different with different artists. S. Freud has found from the analysis of Leonardo da Vinci and his art, the play of Fantasy in the art very important. The security theory of Dr. E. Jones. The cathartic utility of art. The release of unconscious tension and the resolution of the complex. The avoidance of the censor and the super-ego domination. Art aids the repressed force in overcoming the repressing power. The motivation of art is the expansion of the libido and to rise above the limitations of the earthly realities. The perfection of art lies in converting the psychical reality into physical reality.

The function of Emotion as Energizer.

By

J. PRASAD.

Emotion is intimately connected with conative tendency or drive, but there is no innate or necessary bond of connection between a specific emotion and a specific tendency or instinct,—a theory which McDougall holds. Emotion arises when a drive or tendency is, in any way, obstructed, as shown by Deweys, Rivers, MacCurdy and others. An obstacle has the effect of releasing emotional energy. But all activities, however, encounter, to a greater or less extent, some amount of hindrance on account of the fact that situations are practically always changing and dynamic, and therefore they do not permit the habitual, relatively fixed and pre-existing modes of behaviour, to be adequate responses to the situations. The consequent delay or obstruction in prompt response must be held to release a proportionate amount of emotional energy, which seems biologically to serve as a means of energizing or re-enforcing the obstructed tendencies already set into operation by a situation.

If the energy thus liberated is properly and intelligently utilized in the service of a determining tendency, activity proceeds smoothly in the direction of adjustive work, and there is no emotional crisis or violent affective experience in consciousness. But a mild emotional tone, corresponding to the process of proper utilization of the energy, characterizes the progress of the activity, and is discoverable in introspection.

If the obstruction is too great, and hinders all adjustive activity, a large volume of emotional energy is set free as a sort of primitive method of aiding the solution of the difficulty,

and there is an intense emotional feeling experienced in consciousness. Sympathetico-adrenal changes occur, which seem to be apparently calculated to put the individual in a state of vigorous and forceful preparedness to meet the emergency. But, usually, intense emotional excitement fails to lead to a successful solution, since higher control, so necessary for it, is reduced to a minimum as a consequence of overflowing of the organism by an unusual amount of energy. The device of overcoming a difficulty or obstruction by simply intensifying or energizing a drive is the primitive and brute method, and it cannot prove to be adequate unless duly controlled by the higher intelligent processes.

According to this view, therefore, emotion cannot be identified only with that violent affective experience with which common-sense view identifies it and which, much of introspective psychology, endorses. Speaking functionally, emotion is energizer of active tendencies, and comes into operation by releasing energy, when the energy contained in a drive or tendency, turns out to be insufficient to overcome a situation, which for that reason appears as a difficulty or problem. If the energy is not utilized in adjustive activities, it is experienced in consciousness as an affective or emotional state. If it is utilized in intelligently controlled and therefore adjustive activities, there is actually no violent emotional feeling, except for a mild emotional tone accompanying the progress of the activities.

Current tendencies in Educational Theory.

By

R. N. KAUL

(Allahabad University)

The three great schools of philosophical thought which have influenced the recent Philosophy of Education are Naturalism, Idealism and Pragmatism. Pragmatism combines the methods of naturalism with the conclusions of Idealism.

Naturalism in Education begins with Comenius, a contemporary and disciple of Bacon. Herbert Spencer was the next great advocate of this school, which is ably represented in contemporary thought by Sir T.P. Nunn. The latter approaches the educational problem from the biological stand-point and regards the autonomous development of the Individual as the central aim of Education. On the one hand, he reduces the difference between animal and human organisms to one of increasing complexity merely. On the other hand he admits (somewhat inconsistently) a certain creative activity which is peculiar to man. Naturalism in education fails to develop respect for conscience, and emphasises individual assertion as against Social Co-operation.

Pragmatism in Education emphasises the insufficiency of merely theoretical expositions, and the necessity for the pupil working out the practical application of a principle. cf. the Project method, advocated by Dewey. Its undue emphasis on practice is in danger of leading to the neglect of Pure Science, of making art the handmaid to craft. "If culture is to be saved, it must be by developing in pupils a love of knowledge for its sake : the pragmatist is right in maintaining that practical activities must provide the incentives to learning, but the end must be the development of a disinterested activity"

Bertrand Russell expresses the complementary view to that of Pragmatism, when he says that disinterested investigation has no motive beyond the desire to understand the world better.

Idealism in education stands for training the child to enjoy non-competitive factors in experience. It is through education that man actualises his spiritual nature, which is Universal. The human spirit is essentially active and free in its activity. Freedom, which is the condition of the entire life of the spirit, must be the result of education—"A school without freedom is a lifeless institution". The political and economic chaos reigning in the world today would all be resolved, if true and philosophical education were to mould a new humanity. The ideal would shift from *competition* to *Cooperation*, if we put a greater emphasis on spiritual and cultural matters than on economic goods. All fragmentary accounts of education thus find their completeness in the Idealistic Philosophy. Gentile, Rusk and Horne are the leading representatives of this school.

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